Russia’s Unmanned Systems Forces Become Wildcard in Moscow’s Military Modernization

Russia’s Unmanned Systems Forces Become Wildcard in Moscow’s Military Modernization

Executive Summary:

• Russia has established the Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) as an independent military branch, institutionalizing drone warfare after lessons from Ukraine, reflecting a doctrinal shift toward drones as a central component of modern combined-arms operations.
• The USF features a centralized command structure overseeing development, procurement, training, and deployment, with integrated units across all command levels and a dedicated acquisition system managed jointly with the Ministry of Defense’s research directorate.
• Moscow plans to recruit nearly 79,000 personnel by 2026, drawing heavily from students, veterans, and technically skilled civilians, while expanding university training pipelines and specialized academies to sustain long-term drone force development.
• A four-phase roadmap for the USF envisions a massive expansion to roughly 210,000 personnel and nearly 1,000 units, embedding drone capabilities across ground, air, and naval forces, despite funding gaps and organizational challenges.
• Russia’s buildup parallels Ukraine’s earlier institutionalization of its drone force and signals an enduring transformation, with drones accounting for most battlefield fire missions and reshaping operational doctrine, particularly along the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) northern and northeastern strategic fronts.

Russia’s Ministry of Defense has moved to formalize the country’s rapidly expanding drone capabilities under a newly established branch of the armed forces—the Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) (Voiska Bezpilotnykh Sistem; Войска беспилотных систем (ВБпС)) (Komsomol’skaya Pravda, November 12, 2025; RBC, November 28, 2025). The creation of this independent branch reflects a broader doctrinal shift driven by the demonstrated battlefield utility of first-person-view (FPV) drones, multirotor copter-type unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and fixed-wing platforms during the ongoing war against Ukraine. The move also mirrors parallel organizational steps taken by Kyiv, signaling that both belligerents now view dedicated drone formations as a permanent feature of modern combined-arms warfare.

On March 1, 2025, the Russian Ministry of Defense formally established the Headquarters (HQ) of the Chief of the Unmanned Systems Forces (Upravleniye nachalnika voysk BpS; Управление начальника воиск ВпС). This decision was made to direct the inter-service development, equipping, training, and employment of USF across the armed forces. Simultaneously, a Military-Scientific Committee for Unmanned Systems was suggested to provide scientific and technical guidance on unmanned air, ground, and maritime platforms throughout their lifecycle—from development through retirement (TASS, November 13, 2025).

The establishment of the USF headquarters drew on the assets of the Military Academy of the General Staff in Moscow (TASS, November 13, 2025). Control structures were simultaneously instituted at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, including staff sections at main command HQs of service branches, UAV staff departments within army and corps HQs, and flotilla staffs, and UAV service sections within division, brigade, and regimental HQs

The formalization of the USF also necessitated a restructuring of procurement and logistics responsibilities. Under arrangements confirmed in 2025, the Advanced Inter-Service Research and Special Projects Directorate of the Ministry of Defense (UPMI) was designated as the primary acquisition authority for non-airfield-based UAV platforms (Vzglyady na sovershenstvovanie organizatsionno-shtatnoy struktury formirovaniy voysk bespilotnykh sistem [Views on the Improvement of Organizational-Staff Structures of Unmanned Systems Forces Units of Combined-Arms Formations of the RF Armed Forces and Foreign Countries in Light of the Special Military Operation Experience], Voyennaya Mysl’, No. 3, 2026). Operational accounting, planning for UAV procurement and repair, and aggregating requirements requests to UPMI were assigned to the USF Headquarters. At the same time, UPMI retained authority over development contracting, procurement execution, modernization planning, and maintenance.

According to planning documents, the Russian Ministry of Defense intends to recruit 78,800 personnel into the USF by the end of 2026. Of this total, approximately 58,000 are to be drawn from university students, veterans of aviation units, and female recruits; the remaining 20,800 are to come from the conversion of conscripts and active-duty personnel to contract status. Drone operator training curricula are currently active at 32 Russian universities (Important Stories, March 5).

Recruitment criteria favor candidates with experience in aviation or special forces, as well as civilian drone pilots, competitive gamers, model aircraft enthusiasts, and esports players—reflecting the hand-eye coordination and situational awareness demands of drone operation. Contracts run for a minimum of one year, including two months of mandatory specialized training in the Ministry of Defense’s educational network. Recruitment campaigns are underway across all regions of Russia (Telegram/@voenkorKotenok, March 12).

Planning documents also call for the creation of specialized training centers and a dedicated USF Military Academy—a purpose-built higher-education institution for the new branch. According to the roadmap, full implementation of planned measures is projected to increase, and by 2025–2026, the number of reconnaissance UAV operator crews on key axes is projected to increase by 12 percent, strike UAV crews by 10 percent, ground and maritime platforms by 100 percent, and counter-drone assets by 2.7 times (Kyiv Independent, November 12, 2025).

Russia’s organizational effort did not occur in a vacuum. Ukraine was the first of the two belligerents to formalize drone warfare at the service-branch level. By Presidential Decree No. 382/2024, dated June 25, 2024, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy established the Syly Bezpilotnykh System (Сили безпілотних систем, СБС; Unmanned Systems Forces, SBpS) as an independent branch within the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), accompanied by a dedicated SBpS Command. The Central Directorate for Unmanned Systems Forces was simultaneously established within the AFU General Staff (President of Ukraine, June 25, 2024).

The Ukrainian model features a clear functional division of labor. The Central Directorate is responsible for conceptual development, operational planning, coordination of UAV employment, proposals to expand UAV production capacity, personnel training, manpower management, and unit equipping. The SBpS Command focuses on planning, coordination, and oversight of operational activities; training of directly subordinate formations; collection and institutionalization of lessons learned; participation in strategic planning; and readiness monitoring (Vzglyady na sovershenstvovanie organizatsionno-shtatnoy struktury formirovaniy voysk bespilotnykh sistem [Views on the Improvement of Organizational-Staff Structures of Unmanned Systems Forces Units of Combined-Arms Formations of the RF Armed Forces and Foreign Countries in Light of the Special Military Operation Experience], Voyennaya Mysl’, No. 3, 2026).

As of March 2026, the SBpS order of battle includes five brigades, nine regiments, and twelve separate battalions, including maritime drone units. Combat support elements encompass electronic intelligence, information operations, and engineer units; sustainment assets include logistics, communications, and training center components. In addition, every AFU brigade fields a dedicated Unmanned Aviation Complex (UAC) battalion, each mechanized battalion contains a UAC platoon, and each brigade’s reconnaissance company fields nine drone operator crews.

Ukraine’s drone forces have achieved notable operational impact. According to AFU Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi, Ukrainian UAVs struck more than 105,200 enemy targets in February 2026 alone—with one quarter of those engagements attributable to dedicated SBpS formations. Ukraine maintains a quantitative advantage in the use of multirotor FPV drones, despite Russia’s estimated production capacity of 19,000 FPV drones per day. Ukrainian forces also reported an 18 percent reduction in Russian FPV employment in February, attributed in part to successful strikes on adversary UAV stockpiles.

Kyiv’s intelligence assessments, cited by General Syrskyi, indicate that Russia is actively accelerating USF force generation—particularly on southern axes where Russian forces are losing operational momentum. Russian USF strength was projected to reach 101,000 personnel by April 1 (Telegram/@osirskiy, March 12).

Russia’s Four-Phase Force Generation Roadmap

Russian planning documents drawing on an issue of Voyennaya Mysl’ (Military Thought) outline a four-phase development timeline extending through 2028 (Vzglyady na sovershenstvovanie organizatsionno-shtatnoy struktury formirovaniy voysk bespilotnykh sistem [Views on the Improvement of Organizational-Staff Structures of Unmanned Systems Forces Units of Combined-Arms Formations of the RF Armed Forces and Foreign Countries in Light of the Special Military Operation Experience], Voyennaya Mysl’, No. 3, 2026).

Phase One (2025)

By March 1, 2025, USF management organs were established at the strategic level. Five strike UAV detachments equipped with “Garpiya”/“Geran’”-type platforms were stood up within the Aerospace Forces (VKS) at airfields in Millerovo (Rostov oblast), Primorsko-Akhtarsk (Krasnodar krai), Shatalovo (Smolensk oblast), Kursk (Kursk oblast), and Oktyabrskoye (Russian-occupied Crimea).

By May 1, 2025, the 77th Drone Regiment (cadre strength) of the Eastern Military District (EMD) had been formed—reporting 99.9 percent personnel fill—alongside a Drone Battalion of the 5th Combined Arms Army, at 100 percent strength. Milestones planned through end of year include: UAV battalions within six airborne and air assault divisions and one airborne brigade (by August 1); strike UAV detachments in four Air Army aviation squadrons and the 924th State UAV Center (by September 1); cadre-strength drone regiments in three military districts and an additional 20 battalion-level formations across combined-arms armies, armor, and marine infantry, as well as maritime drone regiments for the Black Sea and Baltic Fleets and a drone division for the Caspian Flotilla (by December 1).

Phase one also calls for the creation of 283 military management organs totaling 1,209 personnel across all command echelons.

Phase Two (2026)

Full-strength drone regiments (headquarters plus three drone battalions and one counter-drone battalion each) are to be completed in the Leningrad, Moscow, Southern, and Eastern Military Districts. A maritime strike drone regiment is planned for the Northern Fleet. Planning documents acknowledge that this phase requires 77.7 billion rubles (approximately $900 million) in supplemental funding that is not currently allocated in the 2025–2026 budget. This shortfall constitutes a significant implementation risk.

Phase Three (2026)

Drone battalions are to be formed within eight combined-arms armies (3rd, 18th, 20th, 25th, 35th, 36th, 49th, and 58th), with a maritime strike drone regiment for the Pacific Fleet. Six separate UAV regiments and one UAV squadron are to be added to the Aerospace Forces. Russia is forming units ahead of schedule. In several armies, established battalions are being reorganized into unmanned systems regiments. The unmanned systems brigades are expected to be fully formed by summer, rather than by the end of the year as previously planned.

Phase Four (2026–2027)

The final phase envisions a separate drone brigade as a Supreme High Command reserve, command organs for non-service-branch forces (principally the FSB and Rosgvardiya), and the reorganization of army-level drone battalions into cadre-strength regiments (at least 16 formations). Most ambitiously, Moscow plans to embed no fewer than 204 drone battalions within motorized rifle and tank brigades, military bases, and regiments by 2028.

End-State Force Structure

Upon completion of all four phases, USF is projected to reach a total strength of nearly 210,000 personnel, including approximately 16,000 in management organs. The combat order of battle will comprise 977 units and subunits, including: 35 brigades and regiments, 150 battalions, 11 divisions, three squadrons, 13 detachments, 206 companies, eight batteries, 517 platoons, and 33 sections.

Unit organizational tables define the following building block structures. A separate military-district drone regiment will consist of 1,739 servicemembers (187 officers) organized into 114 operator crews—of which 74 are strike-designated (two “Geran-2” and 72 ZALA-type crews). A combined-arms army drone battalion will number 490 personnel (45 officers). A motorized rifle or tank division will field a UAV company of 120 servicemembers. Within the Airborne Forces, the primary subunit structure will include a separate drone battalion at the division level, a drone company at the regimental level, and a drone platoon at the battalion level.

The weapons inventory associated with these formations was on display at the May 9, 2025, Victory Day parade, where the 7th Separate UAV Regiment presented Garpiya-A1, Geran-2, Orlan-10, Orlan-30, and Lancet drones (“Izdeliye-51” and “Izdeliye-52” variants). The appearance confirmed that the USF inventory spans reconnaissance, loitering munition, and long-range strike roles.

The formalization of Russia’s Unmanned Systems Forces represents one of the most consequential institutional adaptations to emerge from its war against Ukraine. The scale of Moscow’s ambitions—210,000 personnel, nearly 1,000 operational units, and over 200 battalion-level formations embedded across the ground forces—signals that drone warfare is no longer viewed in the Kremlin as a supplementary capability but as a foundational pillar of future combined-arms operations. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov’s September 2025 assessment that UAVs now account for up to 80 percent of fire missions in the theater provides the doctrinal rationale.

Several implementation challenges warrant close monitoring. The acknowledged $900 million funding shortfall for phases one and two raises questions about pace and fidelity. Recruitment targets that rely heavily on students, women, and personnel transitions may produce trained operators of varying quality and retention rates. The organizational table for a district-level drone regiment—187 officers among 1,739 total—implies an unusually high officer-to-enlisted ratio that could strain the existing officer corps.

The recruitment trajectory carries a further signal worth registering. Syrskyi’s intelligence assessment that Russian USF strength was projected to reach 101,000 personnel by April 1 is consistent with the domestic institutional picture. Drone operator curricula are already in place at 32 Russian universities, and the conversion of conscripts to contract status is proceeding in parallel. The convergence of university-based pipeline expansion and active-theater recruitment suggests Moscow is not waiting for a post-war reorganization but is building permanent institutional mass while combat operations continue.

According to numerous OSINT-based observations by this author, unmanned systems battalions have already been formed and are being employed at scale within Russian forces. Despite the available data remaining incomplete, a partial list of identified units indicates a distributed structure aligned with combined-arms formations across multiple military districts:

• 1st Separate Unmanned Systems Battalion — 5th Combined Arms Army (Eastern Military District)
• 2nd Separate Unmanned Systems Battalion — 41st Combined Arms Army (Central Military District)
• 3rd Separate Unmanned Systems Battalion — 6th Combined Arms Army (Leningrad Military District)
• 4th Separate Unmanned Systems Battalion — 20th Combined Arms Army (Moscow Military District)
• 6th Separate Unmanned Systems Battalion — 25th Combined Arms Army (Western Military District)
• 8th Separate Unmanned Systems Battalion — 2nd Combined Arms Army (Central Military District)
• 9th Separate Unmanned Systems Battalion — 8th Combined Arms Army (Central Military District)
• 11th Separate Unmanned Systems Battalion — 51st Combined Arms Army (Central Military District)
• 13th Separate Unmanned Systems Battalion — 35th Combined Arms Army (Eastern Military District)
• 15th Separate Unmanned Systems Battalion — 90th Tank Division (Central Military District)
• 21st Separate Unmanned Systems Battalion — 76th Air Assault Division (Leningrad Military District)
• 24th Separate Unmanned Systems Battalion — 58th Combined Arms Army / 7th Air Assault Division (Southern Military District)
• 25th Separate Unmanned Systems Battalion — 58th Combined Arms Army / 104th Air Assault Division (Southern Military District)

The 2027 end-state, if achieved, would represent a structural transformation of the Russian military with implications extending well beyond Ukraine—and directly bearing on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) northern and northeastern flanks. Russia is simultaneously forming new motorized rifle divisions in the Leningrad Military District, upgrading railway infrastructure in Pskov Oblast, and reactivating Soviet-era logistics sites oriented toward the Latvian border (see EDM, May 28, June 3, 2025).

The USF build-up is not a standalone development. Drone battalions are planned for each of the motorized rifle and tank brigades now being positioned in Russia’s northwest. The combination of a “pulsing offensive” doctrine—rapid mobile penetrations without waiting for flank stabilization, as employed in Zaporizhzhia—with embedded drone battalions at brigade level would give Russian commanders a layered ISR-and-strike capability precisely in the terrain and operational corridors as most vulnerable to Russian exploitation.