The PRC’s Expanding Arms Control Agenda
Executive Summary:
- The State Council has published a new arms control white paper that expands its arms-control agenda to include outer space, cyberspace, artificial intelligence, and technology governance, signaling Beijing’s intentions to shape emerging security norms.
- The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) now presents itself as a rule-shaper in global arms control, projecting leadership, offering “Chinese solutions,” and more forcefully contesting U.S. behavior while selectively embracing transparency and risk-reduction on its own terms.
- The PRC’s long-standing arms control principles, defensive nuclear posture, no-first-use, minimal deterrence, and UN-centered multilateralism, have persisted over the past 30 years, indicating durable strategic principles despite major shifts in its capabilities and environment.
On November 27, the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) released its first standalone arms control white paper in two decades (State Council Information Office [SCIO], November 27). Amid acute global nuclear anxiety, escalating great-power competition, and the erosion of the post-Cold War arms control regime, Beijing is seeking to portray itself as a leader in the field.
Compared to the PRC’s two previous white papers on the topic, released in 1995 and 2005, respectively, the latest iteration recasts the PRC from a reactive defender of the status quo to a proactive proponent of “global security governance” (全球安全治理) (SCIO, November 1995, September 1, 2005). This mirrors Beijing’s ambitions for leadership in other fields of global governance. Tracing how the new white paper redefines Beijing’s ambitions, instruments, and intended audiences indicates that the PRC is likely to be more active in future arms control negotiations while safeguarding its own modernization goals and avoiding constraints on its own behavior.
Continuities in the PRC’s Arms Control Posture
Across all three white papers, the PRC presents arms control as an extension of its long-standing strategy of achieving peace through development and safeguarding a stable external environment for national modernization. The white papers maintain a consistent rejection of hegemonism and power politics. Just as in other areas of foreign policy, Beijing situates legitimate arms control within the UN-centered multilateral system. Despite major changes in the PRC’s capabilities and in the international system, its ultimate normative horizon, a world without weapons of mass destruction, remains unchanged.
A second area of continuity lies in how the documents frame the PRC’s own military posture. Beijing emphasizes that it pursues a defensive national defense policy, maintains only the capabilities required for self-defense, and “will never engage in any form of arms race” (从不参加任何形式的军备竞赛). This consistency is most pronounced in the nuclear domain. The three documents repeatedly reaffirm the PRC’s no-first-use policy, its commitment never to deploy nuclear weapons abroad, never to extend a nuclear umbrella, and its intention to keep its nuclear forces at the minimum level necessary for national security.
PRC Grows More Assertive and Expands Focus Areas
The three white papers differ significantly from each other. A first major difference relates to descriptions of the international environment. Characterized by cautious optimism, the 1995 white paper acknowledged challenges but mostly highlighted opportunities created by the end of the Cold War. The 2005 document saw arms-control-related issues at a “crucial crossroads” (关键的十字路口) and pointed to emerging threats (SCIO, September 1, 2005). By contrast, the 2025 white paper portrays a world in deep systemic crisis, marked by escalating great-power rivalry, erosion of arms control treaties, and accelerating arms races across multiple domains. The document’s introduction attributes this deterioration to the actions of “a certain country” (个别国家), a formulation that refers to the United States. [1] Such direct attribution of blame specified through repeated references to unilateral withdrawals, bloc politics, and forward deployments is absent from earlier versions.
The most striking evolution across the three white papers is the expansion of issue areas. The 1995 document centered on traditional domains, that is, global disarmament principles, nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) regimes, and conventional force reductions. It discussed domestic restraint, including troop cuts and low defense spending, at length. The 2005 white paper retained these themes but added distinct sections on missiles and arms races in outer space, while broadening the conventional dimension to include landmines, explosive remnants of war, and small arms and light weapons. The 2025 white paper marks a qualitative leap. It introduces a full chapter on “leading international security governance in emerging fields” (引领新兴领域国际安全治理), covering outer space, cyberspace, artificial intelligence (AI), and technology controls. In this new framing, arms control becomes a multidomain governance project. The PRC explicitly articulates ambitions to shape norms and rules in these areas, mirroring its broader push to take on a leadership role in global governance (China Brief, September 5, October 31).
This new chapter primarily lays out the PRC’s positions on international security governance in emerging domains. It also provides extensive accounts of its activities in these fields. Regarding outer space, the white paper reiterates the PRC’s support for the UN playing a key role in strengthening outer space security governance, though it does not offer details on how this role could be fulfilled. The section on cybersecurity reiterates the PRC’s principle of cyber sovereignty and emphasizes that its suggestions, such as creating a “community of common destiny in cyberspace” (网络空间命运共同体), have been integrated into UN resolutions. Finally, regarding military applications of AI, the PRC reiterates its position that human primacy must be upheld and that AI systems “must remain under human control at all times” (始终处在人类控制之下). The white paper also calls for an international governance framework for the military application of AI and highlights the PRC’s contributions to the development of a related UN framework. In addition, it highlights the need to reinforce measures of risk prevention and non-proliferation through strengthening AI-related military ethics and security education.
This expansion of issue areas reflects a shift in Beijing’s self-positioning in the global arms control architecture over the last three decades. In 1995, it cast itself primarily as a “reliable force for peace,” emphasizing unilateral restraint and domestic measures as evidence of its responsibility. The 2005 white paper portrayed it as a constructive supporter of international regimes, highlighting active participation in the negotiation and implementation of key treaties. By 2025, this posture has evolved into a more assertive identity: the PRC now describes itself as a “key promoter of international arms control” and, more broadly, a builder and defender of global security governance.
Expert Commentary Goes Beyond White Paper’s Rhetoric
The timing of the latest white paper’s release is symbolic, as the white paper itself notes. The year 2025 marks the 80th anniversaries of the end of the Second World War and the founding of the United Nations, and so is framed as an appropriate moment to reaffirm the PRC’s longstanding support for multilateral disarmament. The document also argues that the world “once again stands at a historic crossroads” (又一次站在历史的十字路口), with rising geopolitical rivalry, the erosion of key arms-control regimes, and growing risks stemming from advanced technologies. [2] Considering these trends, Beijing claims an urgent need to reinvigorate multilateral arms control and articulate its positions on emerging domains such as outer space, cyberspace, and AI. Official statements around the release do not indicate why the paper has been published now, rather than 10 years ago, which would have matched the established rhythm.
State media presents the new white paper as both a timely response to a deteriorating global security environment and a demonstration of the PRC’s responsible role as a major power. They see the global arms-control system facing severe erosion, with rising nuclear risks and the collapse of key treaties. They then argue that the PRC seeks to stabilize this system by reaffirming its nuclear restraint, articulating a new philosophy for arms control (军控理), and expanding the agenda to outer space, cyber, and AI governance (CCTV, November 28). State media also amplifies the white paper’s criticism of U.S. missile defense, alliance politics, and Japan’s failure to eliminate abandoned chemical weapons (Global Times, November 27; Sina, November 30).
Expert commentaries are well represented by Guo Xiaobing (郭晓兵), an arms-control specialist at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, which is affiliated with the Ministry of State Security. He echoes official talking points but offers a more explicit interpretation of the PRC government’s intentions. Guo argues that the reason the PRC issued the white paper now is that the international arms-control and nonproliferation regime faces “serious challenges” (严重挑战), including rising nuclear dangers linked to Russia’s war in Ukraine and the conflict in the Middle East, the collapse of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaties, and U.S. efforts to expand global missile-defense networks. He frames the white paper as the PRC’s effort to “contribute Chinese wisdom” (贡献中国智慧) and inject “positive energy” (注入正能量) into the global arms-control process, presenting Beijing as a stabilizing force at a moment of strategic uncertainty (China National Radio, November 28).
Chinese commentators also go beyond the white paper in three notable ways. First, they present the PRC as offering unprecedented transparency, pointing to its voluntary missile-launch notifications and closure of historic nuclear weapons facilities. They frame these as trust-building measures rather than long-standing policy positions (Global Times, November 28; Sina, November 30). Second, they articulate a sharper critique of the United States and Japan than the white paper itself does. U.S. missile defense, alliance activity, AUKUS, and the golden dome are described as “destroying the strategic balance” (破坏战略稳定) (Sina, November 30). Third, experts directly connect emerging technology governance to lessons drawn from recent wars, including drones, unmanned vessels, cyberattacks, and commercial satellites like Starlink, offering a more operational and conflict-driven justification for the PRC’s expanded arms-control agenda (CCTV, November 28). This reflects a common feature of PRC foreign policy discourse where experts are given wider latitude to fill the government’s often vague concepts with substance (Mokry, 2025). [3] These commentaries build a more pointed narrative than the official text, sharpening the PRC’s positioning as an aspiring architect of global security governance.
Conclusion
The 2025 white paper suggests that the PRC government sees arms control in more expansive and assertive terms than earlier iterations implied. It preserves long-standing principles but no longer presents Beijing as a cautious and largely reactive participant in existing regimes. Instead, the PRC now frames arms control as an arena in which it must both safeguard its modernization and actively shape emerging global rules. This results in realpolitik in practice and a normative role in discourse. The PRC maintains its criticism of U.S. alliances, missile defense, and strategic dominance, yet promotes a Chinese philosophy (理念) for arms control and insists on greater fairness, balance, and inclusiveness. The expanded coverage to encapsulate outer space, cyberspace, AI, and export controls positions arms control as a multidomain governance project allows the PRC to defend its interests and influence international standards. At the same time, Beijing emphasizes risk-reduction and selective transparency as tools to project responsibility without accepting symmetric constraints, though it remains to be seen whether these initiatives will translate into behavioral change.
PRC white papers always have a messaging function, and often to an international audience. Little is currently known, however, about how Beijing’s evolving arms control posture is perceived among states in the Global South. The 2025 white paper’s emphasis on fairness, technological equity, and the rights of developing countries suggests a deliberate appeal to audiences who feel marginalized in existing export-control and governance regimes. But the proliferation of PRC-manufactured weapons in ongoing African conflicts, for example, may undermine the official rhetoric coming from Beijing (China Brief, June 7, October 28). At the same time, the document avoids engaging with Western demands for greater transparency about the PRC’s rapidly expanding nuclear arsenal, sidestepping one of the central concerns in contemporary arms-control debates.
The white paper signals that the PRC will be a more assertive actor in arms control, but not a participant in traditional bilateral arms-reduction negotiations. Beijing will resist any framework that caps its growing nuclear forces, while positioning itself as a defender of multilateralism and a contributor of “Chinese solutions” (中国方案)—a phrase that appears four times in the document—to global governance. Going forward, Beijing is likely to expand its involvement in UN-based forums and dialogues among the “P5” permanent members of the UN Security Council, promote norms in emerging domains, and deepen engagement with the Global South on export controls and technological equity. It will continue to combine limited operational transparency and risk-reduction measures with strict secrecy on capabilities, avoiding symmetric constraints. The PRC will likely act as an issue-driven rule-shaper—assertive in new governance arenas, guarded in traditional nuclear arms control, and increasingly vocal in contesting U.S. strategic behavior.
Notes
[1] The original Chinese formulation, “个别国家” can be ambiguous, and does not necessarily refer to an individual country. The official English translation of the white paper, however, contains no ambiguity. Across six instances of this phrase that appear in the document, each time it is either translated as “a certain country” or “this certain country.” Given the surrounding context in each case, the only country it can be referring to is the United States (SCIO, November 27).
[2] This phrase “historic crossroads” has been used frequently in recent white papers and messaging this year (China Brief, May 23).
[3] Mokry, Sabine. Chinese Scholars and Think Tanks’ Constructions of China’s National Interest: Hidden Hand on Demand. Routledge, 2025.
