Top Badr Commander Named Iraqi Interior Minister: The Ascension of Qasim al-Araji
Top Badr Commander Named Iraqi Interior Minister: The Ascension of Qasim al-Araji
On January 30, Qasim al-Araji, a prominent member of the Iran-backed Badr organization, was appointed to be interior minister of Iraq (al-Arabiya, January 30). As a member of the parliament and a Shia militia field commander, Mr. al-Araji is well known for his anti-U.S. views—though his party was in the government of moderate Shia Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, who has enjoyed significant U.S. and Western support. Nevertheless, al-Araji has not hesitated over the years to embrace and promote a narrative that was hostile and skeptical about the U.S. role in Iraq. At times, he has even accused the United States of supporting Islamic State (IS). Al-Araji’s appointment came at a critical time in the confrontation with IS (al-Sumaria, Dec 28, 2014). As a large part of the Iraqi forces are administered by the ministry of interior, which enjoys the support of the United States in the fight against IS, al-Araji has toned down his anti-U.S. statements since taking office. Even so, al-Araji’s appointment is still an indication on how complicated the U.S. position in Iraq is and, on the other hand, how influential Iran and its allies have become in that country.
From the Popular Army to Politics
According to a semi-official bio, Qasim Jalal Hussein al-Araji was born in the predominantly Shia province of Wasit, south of Baghdad, in 1964. He then moved to Iran during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) and joined the Badr militia, which Iran had formed from exiled Iraqis to fight against the then Saddam Hussein-ruled Iraq. [1] According to this account, he stayed in Iran until the fall of Hussein’s regime after the U.S.-led invasion of 2003 (al-Ghadeer TV, January 30).
An alternative biography, which surfaced after he became a member of parliament in 2011, suggested a different past for al-Araji. This account was published by a man who claimed to have known al-Araji since childhood and throughout his years in exile in Iran. According to this biography, al-Araji was born in 1968 — not in 1964 — supposedly moving to Iran at a younger age. The most controversial part of this alternate history of al-Araji was its claim that he, as a teenager, was a member of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath party militia, the Popular Army. As this report suggests, al-Araji first fought on the Iraqi side of the war, only changing his allegiance and joining Badr after becoming a prisoner of war (POW) (iraqcenter.net May 7, 2011). It is worth noting that Badr had access to a large recruitment pool of Iraqi POWs, in particular the Shias among them. At the time, Iraq accused Iran and Badr of torturing its POWs, while Badr claimed that it was building an army of faithful Shias who had been forced to join the Iraqi army as conscripts. At any rate, thousands of Iraqi Shia POWs joined Badr and gained their freedom in return, though many more, both Shia and Sunnis alike, remained in custody until they were released years after the war ended.
After the U.S.-led invasion of 2003, Qasim al-Araji was one of the first Badr members to return to Iraq. His party took a non-hostile approach to the U.S. military’s presence in Iraq and benefited from the decree signed by the U.S. head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Ambassador Paul Bremer, who became the de facto ruler of Iraq after the invasion, to integrate opposition militias into the new Iraqi security forces. This order came after the infamous order by Bremer to dissolve the old Iraqi army. [2] [3] However, possibly suspecting that al-Araji posed a risk, the U.S. authorities arrested him on April 17, 2003, less than a week after his return. He was put in prison for two months and then released. In the first years after the invasion, al-Araji focused his activities in his home province of Wasit. In 2005, in the first multi-party provincial and parliamentary elections, he was elected to be a member of the provincial council and was selected to be the head of the security committee in the council (al-Ghadeer, January 30).
Of the many reasons for the post-war insurgency in Iraq, one can generally characterize it as two separate insurgencies, one Sunni and one Shia. The Sunni insurgency being larger, as the Sunnis saw their domination over the Iraqi government, something they enjoyed since the inception of the modern state of Iraq in 1920s, diminishing. [4]. For their part, the Shias launched the first wave of their insurgency in southern Iraq. However, al-Araji and his comrades who returned from Iran were not a part of this first wave, as they focused on targeting and replacing the government positions occupied by members of Hussein’s Ba’ath party. Meanwhile, Sunni organizations accused Badr of running an assassination campaign against civilians (al-Jazeera, May 19, 2005).
Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and his followers dominated the first stage of the Shia insurgency. Although still in Iran’s sphere of influence, Sadr has been more powerful than other Shia parties and militias and more open to joint efforts with the Sunnis against the United States. As the years dragged on, Iran pursued a strategy that aimed exhaust the United States in fighting the insurgencies in Iraq. At the same time, Iran exerted its influence on the Shia insurgency, encouraging and creating new groups from those who split from al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia. Tehran apparently still needed the help of the more experienced allies like al-Araji. This was a potential factor in the U.S. military’s second arrest of al-Araji, detaining him while at work at the provincial council building of Wasit. It seems unlikely that the U.S. military would detain an elected official unless it believed there were legitimate concerns. This time, al-Araji’s stay in prison lasted almost two years. He was put in Camp Bocca prison in southern Iraq, the largest U.S. prison facility in Iraq and coincidentally the place where Islamic State leader Abu Baker al-Baghdadi was held, as well as other prominent Shias and Sunnis (al-Ghadeer, January 30; qoraish.com, January 30).
Return to Politics
After his release from prison in 2009, al-Araji quickly threw himself back into politics. By this time, Badr was making a significant move into Iraqi Shia politics. It was leaving its alliance with Ammar al-Hakeem’s Supreme Islamic Council to join with and start working under the leadership of then Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. [5] Al-Maliki had made significant inroads within the ranks of Shia rivals, including the integration of Badr into his coalition (elaph.com , Mar 12, 2012). After al-Maliki secured a second term in office, Badr’s leader and al-Araji’s patron, Hadi al-Amiri, became a member of the cabinet. Al-Araji moved to succeed his boss on the influential defense and security committee in the parliament. This position gave al-Araji a bigger platform to represent his pro-Iran and anti-U.S. views, the espousal of which seemingly contradicts suggestions that he actually was released from prison as a compromise for cooperating with the United States (alforatnews.com Dec 28, 2011).
A Fatwa to Fight Islamic State
In June 2014, IS made a swift, large-scale advance overtaking Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, and most of the Sunni areas in Iraq. As large parts of the security forces collapsed, al-Araji and his group were the first to respond. After years of claiming that it was a merely civilian unarmed organization, Badr emerged as a well-equipped and able force to fight IS on many fronts, receiving substantial support from Iran and Iranian advisors in the field. (Asharq al-Awsat, March 13, 2015; badr.iq, July 11).
The IS advance and the collapse of the Iraqi army put Baghdad and the Shia heartland in southern Iraq under imminent threat. On June 13, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the most senior Shia cleric in Iraq, issued a fatwa (religious decree) calling for a jihad against IS. (elaph.com, June 13, 2014). The fatwa was a call for all Iraqis to join the security forces, though the well-established militias were in the best position to receive and mobilize the new recruits. The government legalized their activities under the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) (al-Hayat, November 28, 2016; Press Release [Iraqi General Secretariat], April 9, 2015) . From that time forward, the PMUs have referenced the fatwa as what brought them into existence. However, in a 2016 interview, al-Araji revealed that that he and his group, Badr, had actually started fighting IS three months before the fall of Mosul and the fatwa (al-Sumaria TV [via YouTube], on July 22, 2016).
Al-Araji, like his leader al-Amiri, took part in many battles against IS. His presence in the parliament, and in the media, was elevated even higher as he became the leader and spokesman of Badr’s block in the parliament after the April 2014 elections. In several interviews in 2014 and afterwards, al-Araji embraced and promoted a narrative that the United States had allegedly been supporting and even financing IS (Akhbar al-Khaleej, December 30, 2014). As an ally of the Iraqi Shia-led government and leader of the international anti-IS coalition, the United States found such conspiracies to be incredibly frustrating, especially because it was echoed by the Iraqi and foreign media and shaped the perceptions of segments of both the Sunni and Shia communities.
Furthermore, al-Araji believed in, and expressed in his interviews, a broader narrative that the United States had an agenda to divide Iraq and redrawn the map of the Middle East, having actually invaded Iraq with the goal of securing Israel. Al-Araji’s anti-U.S. views were on display is his interview with the Russian government-owned TV network Russia Today in which he used Iranian-like rhetoric, describing America as being al-Shaitan al-Akbar (the Great Satan) [6] and thanking Russia for supporting the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria (Russia Today [via YouTube], Nov 22, 2014).
Conclusion
Since 2014, Badr has gained significant power and popularity within the Iraqi Shia community. The appointment of al-Araji, one of its most outspoken members, to a position as key to Iraqi security as interior minister would not be possible otherwise. When the current Iraqi government was formed in 2014, the Sunnis in the parliament blocked Badr leader al-Amiri from being nominated as interior minister. In order to secure confirmation for the post, Badr had to nominate one of his aides who had a reputation of being a moderate, Mohammed al-Ghabban (al-Ghadeer TV, Oct 18, 2014). This time around, however, al-Araji, with all his radical history, secured the nomination.
Since taking office, al-Araji has taken a more moderate approach. Even more significantly, local police, in Baghdad in particular, have been enjoying more authority when it comes to checking the movement of PMU convoys in urban areas. Though his first few months in office suggest a moderate shift in his politics, al-Araji has so far given no indication that his first loyalty has shifted from that to Badr and the PMU. [7] Al-Araji even made a surprise visit to Saudi Arabia, a country that he had in the past accused of sponsoring extremism and discounted the possibility of reconciliation. He was welcomed in Riyadh, and his visit was followed by an improvement in relations between the two countries after a long dispute (al-Arabi al-Jadeed, July 18).
With an estimated 20,000 fighters, Badr maintains one of the most powerful groups in the PMUs. Despite PMU criticism of the Iraqi military, and accusations Iraqi military of violations against it, a law passed by parliament made the PMUs a fully-fledged part of the Iraqi military — almost all Sunni parties were against this (al-Arabiya TV, Nov 26, 2016). Badr is the largest group in the PMU, with its high visibility and large presence. It has posts in Diala, Salahuldeen, Mosul, Kirkuk and Baghdad province (alghad press, date n/a). Badr works closely with Iraqi forces, and Badr leader al-Amiri is respected by senior Iraqi military commanders who receive direct training and support from the United States. Shia politicians — even those like al-Araji who spent years in Iran and in U.S. military prisons, and have battlefield experience — are in their strongest position in Iraq since 2003, and important fact to remember when considering the best path forward with Iraq, or even Iran.
NOTES
[1] While based in Iran before 2003, Badr was considered the armed wing of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), which was formed by Iran as an umbrella group for Islamist Shia parties who opposed the Saddam Hussein regime. Over the years, Badr has changed the description in its official name several times: Bad Brigade, Badr Corps and Badr Organization. In this article I will be using the term Badr only.
[2] see Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 91, June 2, 2004
[3] see L. Paul Bremer, My Year in Iraq, The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope, Threshold Editions, p58, New York 2006
[4] Over the decades, several Iraqi Shias were in high positions at various times and under political regimes. Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath party included millions of Shias including, some in its high echelons. However, every ruler of Iraq between (1921-2003) came from a Sunni family. That was reversed after the invasion —all prime ministers have been Shia, as Iran-backed political parties won most seats in every parliamentary election after the war.
[5] For most of its time in Iran, the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) was led by the Shia cleric Muhammad Baqir al-Hakeem. Following his assassination after his return to Iraq, he was succeeded by his brother Abdul Aziz al-Hakeem. The party changed its name to the Iraqi Supreme Islamic Council (ISCI) in 2007. When Abdul Aziz died in an Iranian hospital 2009, he was succeeded by his son Ammar. Ammar has recently left ISCI to form a new party. Badr was SCIRI’s military wing and although it had its own chain of command, it still followed al-Hakeem’s family’s leadership.
[6] The phrase was crafted by the Iranian leader Ruhollah Khomeini after the 1979 revolution and became part of the Iranian propaganda discourse. Iraqi Shia politicians have generally avoided such rhetoric since they returned to Iraq and became parts of U.S.-sponsored and U.S.-friendly governments.
[7] Author’s interview with two Iraqi journalists who come from two different communities and who have been usually critical to militia activities.
