Ukraine Responds to Russia’s Starlink Use

Ukraine Responds to Russia’s Starlink Use

Executive Summary:

• The Russian army uses Starlink for military purposes despite sanctions restrictions. There is evidence that Russia may have used Starlink to perpetrate drone attacks in Ukraine in January and February.
• Kyiv is coordinating with SpaceX to restrict Moscow’s use of Starlink. SpaceX imposed speed limits that disrupt fast-moving Russian drones, and, as a more thorough long-term solution, created a registration “white list” so that only verified terminals can operate in Ukraine.
• Ukraine is currently dependent on a single private provider for essential military functions while Russia has the ability to bypass sanctions to obtain military equipment through using other countries as re-export hubs.

On January 27, Russia attacked a passenger train in Ukraine’s Kharkiv oblast with 291 passengers on board. Russia used three Shahed-type suicide drones, causing a fire in one of the carriages and killing six people (24th Channel, January 28). On January 24, Russian Telegram channels shared a video showing an attack on Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in Ukraine’s Kirovohrad oblast (Telegram/@the_wrong_side, January 24). On February 1, at least two Russian Shahed-type drones attacked a service bus carrying miners after their shift in the Pavlohrad district of Dnipropetrovsk oblast, killing 12 and injuring 15 (Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, February 1). All three attacks used modernized strike drones, which reporting indicates Russian armed forces can remotely control with signal transmission via Starlink satellite internet terminals. There is evidence that these attacks may have used Starlink, demonstrating the danger posed by Russian drones’ utilization of imported technology (see EDM, June 4, 2025; Odessa Journal, January 29; Euromaidan Press, February 2). The Russian army is trying to seize the technological advantage that previously belonged to Ukraine.

Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov, a military expert in electronic warfare (EW), reported on the first use of Starlink terminals for Russian BM-35 drones—a modified Geran or Shahed-type drone—just a few weeks before these attacks (Telegram/@serhii_flash, January 15). According to Beskrestnov, the Starlink terminals were previously used only on smaller Molniya-type UAVs, but a sharp increase in Starlink for larger, more modern drones could be expected. More advanced drones are less vulnerable to EW, and remote video control allows the operator to accurately hit stationary and mobile targets. Remote internet control allows the Russian drone operator to be located in a safe area, out of reach of Ukrainian weapons (Telegram/@serhii_flash, January 15). Military expert David Sharp noted that with such improvements, Shahed drones can conduct reconnaissance, identify targets, and attack them with great accuracy. This is a serious problem that needs to be solved. In Sharp’s opinion, more camouflage, air defense systems, and passive protection for critical infrastructure are needed to make UAV strikes less effective (24th Channel, January 28).

Moscow is scaling up its use of Starlink for military purposes. It is using Starlink to counter Ukrainian EW systems’ effect on strike and reconnaissance drones and for communications and data transmission for its command posts (Militarnyi, February 10, 2024). Russia is copying Ukraine’s drone tactics to compensate for its inability to domestically create such systems. The Kremlin has a satellite communication system for data transmission called Gonets, but it has several disadvantages compared to Starlink. Gonets has a much smaller number of satellites in orbit, low data transfer speeds—about 19.2 kilobits per second, which is only enough for transmitting short text messages or emails without attachments—and a large antenna size, which makes it inconvenient to use, especially on moving platforms such as drones (Dev.ua, March 7, 2025). According to investigations by Nordsint and InformNapalm, Moscow obtains Starlink terminals through parallel import schemes using third countries, including those in the Middle East, Central Asia, and Asia. The terminals are activated through accounts registered outside the Russian Federation, and the equipment is legalized through fictitious or distorted customs declarations once imported into Russia. These are not isolated cases, but entire batches of terminals (Nordsint, January 6; InformNapalm, January 27).

The scale of Russia’s use of Starlink requires the Ukrainian authorities to take more serious measures. On January 25, Minister of Defense Mykhailo Fedorov announced that Beskrestnov was appointed as his advisor. Beskrestnov will be responsible for issues related to the development of EW and will seek systemic solutions to Russian strike and reconnaissance UAVs (DW, January 25). On January 29, Fedorov reported that he and his team contacted SpaceX to find a solution to Russian UAVs equipped with Starlink terminals (X/@FedorovMykhailo, January 29). As a temporary fix, SpaceX introduced a speed limit of 75 kilometers per hour for Starlink terminals because Russian drones travel at higher speeds than Ukrainian drones. With this restriction, Russian operators lose the ability to control drones if they exceed that speed (ArmyInform, February 1). SpaceX owner Elon Musk confirmed new restrictions on Starlink terminals, which Russian military bloggers also substantiated (Telegram/@ssternenko, January 31; X/@elonmusk, February 1).

The creation of a “white list” of all civilian and military terminals in Ukraine is a more thorough and permanent solution. On February 2, Fedorov confirmed that soon only verified and registered terminals will be able to operate in Ukraine, while all others will be disconnected. According to him, this will help maintain stable communications for Ukrainians, while denying Russia access to Starlink services (Telegram/@zedigital, February 2). Users in Ukraine have already started receiving messages with instructions on how to register their terminals.

This situation demonstrated the Ukrainian armed forces’ reliance on a single private provider of essential services without any real alternative (seeEDM, April 10, 2025). It also showed Russia’s ability to quickly copy successful Ukrainian military tactics by circumventing sanctions. Ukraine needs assistance and active involvement from international partners to solve both problems. This assistance may include strengthening export and transit controls on the supply of satellite and telecommunications equipment to countries that the Russian Federation uses as re-export hubs. It is also necessary to analyze and identify Starlink terminals that have already been delivered to these intermediaries. SpaceX may have to take additional steps to block these terminals if they fall into the hands of the Russian military.