Xi Seeks Further Political Control Over PLA at Two Sessions
Xi Seeks Further Political Control Over PLA at Two Sessions
Executive Summary:
- The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) meetings during this year’s Two Sessions show that General Secretary Xi Jinping is attempting to further strengthen political control over the military.
- Requirements for military delegates to evince a correct political stance while participating in meetings, as well as key proposals from Xi Jinping and military representatives, shift from previously diverse military topics to a single focus on political awareness in the military.
- Xi Jinping places strong emphasis on listening to suggestions from grassroots officers and enlisted personnel on strengthening political control, which aligns with the 2025 emphasis on grassroots supervision of cadres within the military’s political work system.
On February 28, shortly before the opening of the Two Sessions (两会), PLA Daily, the most authoritative internal newspaper and political study platform of the Chinese military, launched a special column titled “Study and Education on Establishing and Practicing the Correct View of Political Performance (树立和践行正确政绩观学习教育).” This column supported a February 23 notice issued by the Central Committee’s General Office on the same theme, and aimed to hammer home the required ideological orientation for all Party members within the military (Xinhua, February 23; PLA Daily, February 28).
These pronouncements set the theme for the military meetings at this year’s Two Sessions, which placed particularly strong emphasis on General Secretary Xi Jinping’s political control over the armed forces. As several variations on this theme elaborated over the course of the meetings, Xi aims to ensure that all officers and soldiers follow and implement his directives, so as to resolve long-standing problems within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). A comparison with military-related events at previous Two Sessions since the 20th Party Congress in October 2022 indicate that this year’s operational priorities for the PLA and the People’s Armed Police (PAP) were unusual in their narrow focus.
Stronger Demands for Political Obedience
Each year, the news release on the PLA delegation’s establishment meeting for the Two Sessions follows the same structure. It announces the “election” results for the head and deputy heads of the delegation, highlights the overall significance of that year’s Two Sessions, and then details the requirements placed on military delegates, the guidelines for proposals submitted by the delegates, and the expectations for discipline and conduct among the representatives. In this year’s release, most sections conformed to this typical structure. But the sections on requirements for military delegates and guidelines for proposals contained notable differences. Table 1 compares the news releases issued since the 20th Party Congress (PLA Daily, March 4, 2023, March 4, 2024, March 4, 2025, March 4).
Table 1: Comparison of News Releases on the Establishment of the PLA Delegation
| Year | Requirements for Military Delegates | Guidelines for Proposals |
| 2026 | Thoroughly study and implement Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era Participate in the meetings with a strong sense of political responsibility and full political enthusiasm Elevate political stance (政治站位) and firmly uphold the correct political direction in deliberation and decision-making | Offer proposals and recommendations on advancing political awareness of the military (政治建军), deepening political rectification (政治整训), strengthening combat training and war preparedness, and improving military governance |
| 2025 | Follow Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era as the guiding framework, implement Xi Jinping’s thought on strengthening the military, and faithfully represent the interests and will of the people Grasp the requirements of building a strong country and a strong military from a political and strategic perspective | Submit proposals and recommendations on major issues including political awareness of the military (政治建军), combat training and war preparedness, deepening reform, and military governance |
| 2024 | Thoroughly study and implement Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, remember the trust placed by the Party and the people, and faithfully fulfill the duties of a National People’s Congress delegate Elevate political stance (政治站位), adapt to the process of Chinese-style modernization, and grasp the requirements of building a strong country and a strong military | Conduct in-depth research on major issues such as strengthening combat training and war preparedness, promoting high-quality development, and consolidating and improving the integrated national strategic system and capabilities |
| 2023 | Thoroughly study and implement Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, and fully implement the spirit of the 20th Party Congress and the First and Second Plenary Sessions of the 20th Central Committee Grasp the profound significance of this meeting, strengthen political responsibility, and shoulder the responsibilities of the era | Focus on achieving the centenary goal of building the military, perform duties conscientiously in accordance with the law, and actively submit proposals and recommendations |
(Source: Compiled by the author)
This year’s meeting made requirements for political obedience among military delegates more explicit. For the first time, the Party set expectations regarding the political obedience of delegates and their participation during the meetings. These include participating in the meetings with a strong sense of political responsibility and full political enthusiasm, raising one’s political stance, and firmly maintaining the correct political direction in deliberation and decision-making. In previous years, requirements mainly emphasized implementing certain political ideas and understanding the political demands of the era.
Another new development was the inclusion of “political rectification” (政治整训) in the proposal guidelines for the first time since the 20th Party Congress. Among three other areas highlighted this year, combat training and war preparedness appeared for the third consecutive year, and political awareness of the military (政治建军) and military governance appeared for the second consecutive year.
Xi’s insistent political demands stem from dissatisfaction with the operation of the military and with the military’s implementation of his requirements for improving performance. This dissatisfaction has accumulated over many years—the military delegation at the Two Sessions in 2025 included demands to improve the PLA’s overall performance, including building the military with frugality, allocating national defense resources scientifically, and conducting professional evaluation throughout the entire process of plan implementation while building a complete and effective supervision system. These requirements initially appeared during the military delegation meeting in 2019 (China Brief, March 19, 2025). Xi’s continued focus on these areas suggests that he sees a lack of progress.
Grassroots Suggestions Also Highlight Strengthening Political Control
Xi always delivers a speech at the plenary meeting of the PLA and PAP delegations during the Two Sessions, at which six or more military representatives also typically deliver remarks. Compared with previous years, which featured senior PLA officers or generals from functional departments of the Central Military Commission (CMC), this year’s speakers were all mid- and lower-ranking officers and enlisted personnel (China Brief, March 19, 2025). [1] For example, Deputy Commander of the Air Force Zheng Yuanlin (郑元林) spoke in 2025, Vice President of the Academy of Military Science Yao Dangnai (姚党鼐) spoke in 2024, and Deputy Director of the CMC Equipment Development Department Rao Wenmin (饶文敏) spoke in 2023. This year, however, the most senior officer to deliver remarks was Hao Jingwen (郝井文), a major general in the PLA Air Force (CCTV, March 7). [2] This selection suggests that Xi seeks advice from lower-grade personnel, perhaps as much due to a lack of trust in his senior generals as to ensure that political directives reach grassroots units directly. Xi wants to prevent superficial compliance, prevent senior officers from mixing personal or factional interests into military affairs, and prevent the growth of power or organizational networks that could challenge his authority.
Xi’s remarks this year emphasized both positive and negative measures to further strengthen control over the military. He called for tightening supervision and strengthening management systems through restrictive and negative measures, as well as promoting historical education through inspirational and positive messaging (PLA Daily, March 8). The most prominent portion of his speech prioritized handling political problems within the military. In a sign that the recent purges have rattled the leadership, Xi stressed that “it is the military who holds the gun, and the armed forces must never include individuals who harbor divided loyalty toward the Party” (军队是拿枪杆子的，军中绝不能有对党怀有二心之人) (PLA Daily, March 8). This represented a departure from previous occasions, where his remarks have largely focused on the overall priorities of military development for the given year, such as emerging technology or military-civil fusion (PLA Daily, March 9, 2023; March 8, 2024; March 8, 2025). Table 2 compares the news releases from these meetings across different years.
Table 2. Comparison of News Releases on Xi Jinping’s Participation in the PLA Delegation Meetings
| Year | Main Theme of Xi Jinping’s Remarks | Key Points in Specific Details |
| 2026 | Since the 18th Party Congress, the Party Central Committee has led the people’s military with unprecedented determination and intensity to deepen political rectification and advance political awareness of the military, and these efforts have achieved major results. The military holds the guns, and the armed forces must not include anyone who harbors divided loyalty toward the Party, and must not provide any place for corrupt individuals to hide. | Strengthen oversight of major projects, strengthen supervision of military–local integration, and advance reforms in military budget management Comprehensively strengthen the Party’s leadership and Party building in the military Strengthen the development of revolutionary and professional talent within the armed forces Strongly preserve and promote the fine traditions of our Party and our military |
| 2025 | The implementation of the military’s 14th Five-Year Plan for development has achieved a series of major results over more than four years, while it also faces many contradictions and problems. Handle the relationships between progress and quality, cost and effectiveness, overall priorities and key tasks, development and supervision, and plan implementation and capability formation. Follow a path of high-quality, high-efficiency, low-cost, and sustainable development. | Strengthen coordination across departments, across fields, and between the military and local authorities, build the military with frugality, and allocate national defense resources scientifically in terms of direction and scale Strengthen joint military–local efforts and make full use of the advantages and resources of local authorities Conduct professional evaluation throughout the entire process of plan implementation and build a complete and effective supervision system |
| 2024 | Since the 18th Party Congress, we have coordinated the development of strategic emerging industries and new types of combat forces, and these efforts have produced a series of major achievements. After the 20th Party Congress, the Party Central Committee proposed accelerating the development of new productive forces from the overall objective of promoting high-quality development. Seize the current momentum, grasp the characteristics and development patterns of emerging sectors, and promote the efficient integration and mutual reinforcement of new productive forces and new combat capabilities. | Enhance the capacity to manage and develop the maritime domain, improve the capability to safeguard national cybersecurity, and strengthen major projects in intelligent technology Promote independent innovation and original innovation, and strengthen integrated innovation and comprehensive application Improve institutional mechanisms for demand coordination, planning alignment, and resource sharing Deepen reforms in the national defense science and technology industry system |
| 2023 | Consolidate and strengthen the integrated national strategic system and capabilities. Focus on integration and maximize national strategic capabilities Uphold the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee. Strengthen the integrated alignment of strategic planning across sectors, the integrated coordination of strategic resources, and the integrated employment of strategic forces Systematically enhance China’s overall capacity to respond to strategic risks, safeguard strategic interests, and achieve strategic objectives | Improve the integrated national strategic system and capabilities |
(Source: Compiled by the author)
Delegate Proposals Center on Political Control
Beyond the main military-related meeting, the military delegation to the Two Sessions also holds separate plenary meetings where representatives present their own opinions and proposals. Remarks from the second such meeting this year continued to focus on political control over the military. Speakers presented proposals on strengthening ideological and political education, accelerating improvements in combat capability, strengthening supervision across different sectors and fields, and strengthening grassroots-level development (PLA Daily, March 10).
This focus differs from equivalent meetings in previous years, which emphasized broader aspects of military development. In 2025, for instance, discussions addressed joint operations command capability, battlefield medical capacity, national defense mobilization, network and information system development, and military theory research; while 2024 included discussions addressing joint operations capability, defense technology innovation, application of emerging technologies, new equipment capability development, reserve force organization, frugal military construction, and grassroots combat training and readiness (PLA Daily, March 10, 2024, March 10, 2025).
Conclusion
Meetings related to the PLA during this year’s Two Sessions show that Xi Jinping is unrelenting in his efforts to further strengthen political control over the military. This is partly a response to recent purges of senior generals—Xi seeks to strengthen political awareness in order to ensure control over generals, officers, and soldiers who remain in service. In the longer term, Xi hopes that comprehensive political control across the entire military will address problems that appear to have dissatisfied him for many years. The unusual focus on political awareness of the military and political rectification during this year’s Two Sessions represents an even broader effort to consolidate Xi’s control over the PLA.
It is still too early to assess how effective these efforts will be, but one thing seems clear: despite several years of purges among senior officers, the continued need for military-wide political education and bottom-up supervision suggests that Xi still has a high level of distrust toward the PLA. This helps explain why many senior positions have remained unfilled for months and are still being held in an acting capacity—a situation that may persist for some time, at least until ongoing personnel reviews are completed and the latest round of political education and control measures begins to show some results.
