Zhang Youxia’s Differences with Xi Jinping Led to His Purge

Zhang Youxia’s Differences with Xi Jinping Led to His Purge

Executive Summary:

• On January 24, authorities announced investigations into Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia and Chief of Staff of the CMC Joint Staff Department Liu Zhenli.
• Official statements point to disagreements with Xi Jinping over PLA development and training, and even instances of open resistance to his directives, as the cause of the generals’ downfall.
• Zhang Youxia’s timeline for PLA joint operations training did not align with Xi Jinping’s 2027 deadline for the PLA to be capable of invading Taiwan. His force-building agenda also focused on fewer priorities and placed less emphasis than Xi on military struggle as a standalone objective, instead integrating it into training activities.
• January 2026 marked the start of the final annual training cycle before 2027. The divide between Zhang Youxia and Xi Jinping no longer centered on debate or planning and instead shifted to execution and direct noncompliance. This problem was clearly visible across the PLA, and it posed a serious threat to Xi’s authority.

At 3:00 p.m. Beijing time on Saturday, January 24, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) announced that Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia (张又侠) and Chief of Staff of the CMC Joint Staff Department Liu Zhenli (刘振立) face investigation for “serious disciplinary and legal violations” (严重违纪违法) (MND, January 24). At first glance, this move fits General Secretary Xi Jinping’s pattern of using distrust-driven anti-corruption purges to secure power, with clear parallels across communist regimes. Some anonymous sources cited in Western media have claimed that Zhang Youxia had leaked nuclear secrets to the United States and was implicated in bribery-for-promotion schemes linked to former defense minister Li Shangfu (李尚福) and others (Wall Street Journal, January 25).

Senior officials in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) almost always carry some exposure to legal or corruption issues. Whether Xi Jinping chooses to act is decisive, as the 2023 Equipment Development Department probe that stopped at Li Shangfu but spared Zhang Youxia illustrates (China Brief, September 20, 2023). Based on official statements and recent developments in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), one can identify the probable core reasons and internal logic behind this purge. Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli most likely fell from power due to disagreements with Xi Jinping over PLA development, particularly the joint operations training timeline, and may have pursued policies or issued orders that ran counter to Xi’s directives. (The simultaneous announcement of investigations into Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli indicates the decision stemmed from the same underlying cause.)

Seven Differences With He Weidong Readout Indicate Zhang Youxia’s Defiance of Xi

A comparison of the PLA Daily editorials published the day after the announced purges of former CMC vice chairman He Weidong (何卫东) and of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli reveals four political and three military differences (see Table 1 below) (PLA Daily, October 18, 2025, January 25).

The four political indicators suggest that Zhang and Liu likely defied Xi Jinping’s directives on military affairs in an open manner. First, official statements described He Weidong and others as having “abandoned their original mission, lost party principles, suffered a collapse of belief, and betrayed loyalty” (背弃初心使命、丧失党性原则，信仰坍塌、忠诚失节). Authorities did not apply this language to Zhang and Liu. This could indicate that personal corruption or private gain did not drive the purge of Zhang and Liu.

Second, while both cases cited damage to the PLA’s “political ecology” (政治生态), Zhang was additionally described as causing “severe damage to the military’s political awareness” (政治建军). This wording suggests that Zhang did not prioritize political loyalty as the guiding principle of military building. Given the absence of major personal corruption allegations, the core issue likely involved placing military effectiveness above political control.

Third, descriptions of violations of the chairman responsibility system (军委主席负责制) differed in severity in the two cases. Authorities accused He Weidong and others of “seriously undermining” (破坏) the system, while they accused Zhang and Liu of “seriously trampling” (践踏) it. The former implies obstruction that diluted Xi’s orders, while the latter implies direct defiance or disregard.

Fourth, official language stated that He Weidong “severely damaged the image” (形象) of senior cadres, whereas Zhang Youxia “seriously undermined the image and authority” (形象威信) of the CMC leadership. This distinction suggests that Zhang and Liu’s disagreements with Xi reached a visible and widely recognized level within the PLA.

Table 1: Differences Between the Purges of He Weidong and Zhang Youxia

(Source: Compiled by the author)

The three military indicators, meanwhile, suggest that Zhang and Liu fell from power because their results in force building and war preparation failed to meet expectations and may have jeopardized Xi Jinping’s requirement that the PLA be capable of invading Taiwan by 2027. First, the official statement explicitly accused Zhang and Liu of causing “severe damage to combat capability development” (战斗力建设), a charge absent from the case of He Weidong. This distinction indicates that the CCP leadership viewed Zhang and Liu’s actions as having a direct negative impact on PLA military capability.

Second, the language describing their relationship with the Party center differed in weight. Authorities said He Weidong and others “betrayed trust” (信任), while they said Zhang and Liu “betrayed a trust and heavy responsibility” (信任重托). At the 20th Party Congress in late 2022, Xi broke age norms by shifting Zhang from political oversight to operational command as CMC vice chairman. Xi likely sought to rely on Zhang’s combat experience and senior status to push forward the new military training system that Xi personally announced in 2020 to correct long-standing PLA training deficiencies (Xinhua, November 25, 2020). This role clearly carried a heavier level of trust than was granted to He Weidong and others.

Third, both cases cited negative effects on the Party and the military, but they differed in scope. He Weidong and others “caused severe damage to … national defense construction” (给 … 国防 … 造成极大损害) while Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli “caused serious harm to … the state” (对 … 国家 … 造成极为恶劣影响). References to the “state” point to broader national development. In military terms, this concept centers on resisting external threats or, in the PRC’s specific context, achieving unification with Taiwan. [1]

Zhang’s Focused Approach Denied Xi’s 2027 Timeline

Based on publicly available information, Zhang and Liu likely failed to meet Xi Jinping’s requirements for force building related to a Taiwan invasion, and may even have engaged in open disagreement or defiance within the PLA. Other official statements indicate that the root cause of slow progress and resistance likely lay in a fundamental divergence in Zhang’s and Xi’s views over the timeline for military development.

PLA joint operations training progressed slowly through early 2026 (China Brief, January 24). The PLA established a new basic training model in June 2023 and a new combined training model in October 2024, but as of early 2026 had not finalized a joint training model (Xinhua, June 20, 2023, October 22, 2024). Xi Jinping’s requirement that the PLA be ready to invade Taiwan likely rests on it achieving a baseline level of joint operational capability, but the absence of a new joint training model makes it difficult for the PLA to reach an appropriate level of joint capability by 2027.

These implementation problems likely stemmed from a divergence between Zhang and Xi over military development concepts. Xi’s preference has been to pursue speed and scale, while Zhang favored a more focused and deliberate approach. A key indicator appeared in the defense section of the 15th Five-Year Plan recommendations released in October 2025. Two clear differences emerged between the priorities announced by the Party center and Xi’s requirements at the 2025 Two Sessions on the one hand, and Zhang Youxia’s own articulation of “key tasks” (重点任务) for national defense modernization in November 2025 on the other (Xinhua, March 7, 2025; October 28, 2025; People’s Daily, November 12, 2025).

The first point of divergence concerned “accelerating advanced combat power” (加快先进战斗力). The Party center’s version listed a wide range of construction tasks and called for stronger targeting, initiative, and shaping in military struggle (斗争). Zhang Youxia’s version instead identified networked information systems and unmanned, intelligent warfare as urgent priorities, and called for the full rollout of new models of basic, combined, and joint training. In Zhang’s framework, “shaping the struggle” (斗争塑势) appeared as part of joint exercises, joint training, and diversified military employment rather than as a standalone objective. The second point of divergence related to advancing the modernization of military governance. The party center’s version and Xi Jinping’s 2025 Two Sessions remarks emphasized a “frugal force-building approach” (勤俭建军方针) and a path of high efficiency, low cost, and sustainability. Zhang Youxia did not include these themes in his list of priority tasks, and instead placed them in sections outlining broader guiding principles. In short, Xi sought expansive and assertive military construction and placed heavy emphasis on military struggle. Zhang favored a narrower focus, downplayed struggle as an independent priority, and embedded it within training and exercises.

Xi’s greater haste can be seen in his aim to achieve joint operational capability for a Taiwan invasion by 2027, whereas Zhang clearly placed this goal closer to 2035. In a November 2025 article, Zhang stated that key tasks to complete by 2027 included consolidating and expanding advantages, breaking through bottlenecks, and strengthening weak points, while goals to achieve before 2035 would include building on the 2027 outcomes to significantly enhance joint operations based on networked information systems and all-domain operational capabilities (People’s Daily, November 12, 2025). This framing indicates that Zhang prioritized resolving long-standing training deficiencies in the near term and did not support moving aggressively into full joint operations training to meet Xi’s 2027 deadline.

Notably, signs of tension between Xi Jinping and Zhang Youxia had already surfaced during the 2025 Two Sessions, a critical period for drafting the 15th Five-Year Plan (Xinhua, October 28, 2025). First, in Xi’s annual address to the PLA delegation, he unusually invited speakers who did not come from the CMC or senior command institutions. This departure from past practice suggested Xi’s distrust of senior officers’ views, likely including Zhang and other top commanders (China Brief, March 15, 2025). (Note that He Weidong disappeared shortly after the Two Sessions concluded.) Second, when Xi departed the closing session of the Two Sessions, Zhang Youxia stood with his back to Xi. In Chinese elite politics, especially since Xi consolidated power following the 19th Party Congress, such behavior is highly unusual and politically risky (HKTKWW, March 11, 2025). Third, during routine individual speeches by CMC members at the Two Sessions, neither Zhang nor Liu mentioned the “CMC chairman responsibility system,” despite having done so in previous years (China Brief, April 11, 2025). Publicly affirming this principle serves as a basic signal of loyalty to Xi. Their silence suggests significant disagreement with Xi and may even reflect opposition to the system itself.

Taken together, political and military evidence points to disagreements between Zhang and Xi over the pace and method of joint training. Both officers possess real operational experience and likely held firm views on combat and training requirements. They may have judged some of Xi’s objectives, including the force-building timeline, as unrealistic, and resisted or declined to implement them on professional military grounds.

Xi Moved to Act by Shortening Timelines

January 2026 marked the start of the final annual training plan before 2027 and the initial implementation phase of the 15th Five-Year Plan. Earlier frictions reflected disagreements in planning and rhetoric, but as they shifted into concrete disputes over implementation, they appear to have become explicit, public, and potentially irreversible acts of defiance against Xi Jinping’s directives.

Xi likely focused most on the annual training plan because it directly revealed whether Zhang and Liu intended to meet the 2027 requirement. Each January sees the launch of a new training cycle. The disclosure of training content, schedules, and execution would have exposed the gap between Xi’s demands and Zhang’s approach. These differences, and signs of open noncompliance by Zhang and Liu, likely circulated within the PLA. Joint training progress was already lagging behind Xi’s targets, and the new plan showed no correction to this trend. As the divergence became visible, Xi was prompted to move quickly: the launch of the 15th Five-Year Plan in 2026 would have further clarified implementation gaps.

The timing underscores Xi’s urgency and resolve. Zhang and Liu last appeared publicly on December 22, 2025, and authorities announced their purge on January 24. Officials released the announcement on a Saturday afternoon, and PLA Daily even published its follow-on editorial in advance via Xinhua late the previous night (Xinhua, January 24).

Conclusion

Observers can frame this case through the broad lens of power struggles common to CCP politics. Recent PLA developments, however, reveal concrete and specific indicators that clarify the underlying dynamics.

The impact of removing Zhang and Liu on the PLA’s ability to invade Taiwan likely did not rank as Xi Jinping’s primary concern. Their approach to war preparation did not align with Xi’s objectives, and whether they remained in office or not would not have enabled the PLA to meet the 2027 target. Their continued presence instead posed a challenge to Xi’s authority. Given that Zhang could not deliver the rapid development of joint operational capability that Xi demanded, Xi had little reason to justify Zhang’s exceptional age waiver or extended tenure.

Although the probability of achieving the 2027 Taiwan invasion capability remains extremely low, Xi Jinping will likely appoint successors who are willing to execute his military blueprint in place of Zhang and Liu. Under intense pressure, these successors may accelerate the pace of joint operations training and push forward joint drills or even exercises in a more rushed manner. As a result, while the Chinese military remains unlikely to invade Taiwan in the near term, PLA training and exercise activity may become more aggressive and more frequent than in recent years.

Notes

[1] Taiwan has long been viewed by the PLA as lost territory that must be unified, making training around Taiwan highly relevant for realistic combat preparation. Given that 2027 marks the PLA’s centenary, Xi Jinping has repeatedly linked military readiness to safeguarding sovereignty and achieving national rejuvenation, which explicitly includes complete national unification (see CMSI Notes, March 13, 2025). A critical reference point came in 2023, when CIA Director William Burns stated that Xi Jinping had instructed the PLA to be ready by 2027 to conduct a successful invasion (CBS News, February 3, 2023).