Plans for the “Siberianization” of Russia Remain Unrealized
Plans for the “Siberianization” of Russia Remain Unrealized
Executive Summary:
- Kremlin officials have been actively promoting “Siberianization” to pivot Russia away from the West, proposing new capitals and industrial clusters to shift the country’s geopolitical and economic focus eastward.
- These ambitious development plans clash with grim realities, as Russia’s war against Ukraine drains the necessary financial resources and accelerates Siberia’s already rapid demographic decline.
- Microelectronics and resource projects in Siberia and the Far East face structural constraints, reliance on the People’s Republic of China, and geopolitical risks, casting doubt on whether “Siberianization” can deliver sustainable growth or genuine strategic independence.
Over the past year, Kremlin officials and pro-Kremlin ideologists have been actively promoting the idea of the “Siberianization” of Russia (Siber.Realii, January 22). This is the opposite of the concept of the “Europeanization” of Russia, proposed during the Perestroika era, when then-General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Mikhail Gorbachev spoke of the project of a “common European home.” “Siberianization” reflects the anti-European course of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime, which, instead of engaging with the West, has chosen a pivot to the East (see EDM, February 6, April 17, September 9, 2024).
The main proponents of the “Siberianization” of Russia are Secretary of the Russian Security Council Sergei Shoigu and pro-Kremlin ideologist Sergei Karaganov, who became famous for his proposal to use nuclear weapons against European countries (The Moscow Times, January 15). Regarding Siberia, Karaganov states:
If Peter the Great were alive today, he would undoubtedly have founded a new capital in Siberia and greatly expanded the window to Asia. Along with Moscow and St. Petersburg, Russia absolutely needs a third, Siberian capital in Siberia. The military-strategic situation that will develop in the coming decades also demands it (RG.ru, January 27).
He has also recently argued, “[Russia] needs to not only victoriously end the war, but also its European journey, which has dragged on for an unnecessary century and a half. There is no future in Western Eurasia” (RG.ru, January 27).
The loud panegyrics to Siberia display the imperialist-centralist approach common to Moscow. In their arguments, Siberia is important not as a unique region, but as a new venue for the Kremlin’s geostrategic ambitions. Notably, there is no discussion of any form of proper federalization—one that would grant Siberians the right to their own development projects in their regions and republics (see EDM, April 28, 2025). Officials in the presidential administration also support this idea. Deputy Chief of Staff Maxim Oreshkin states that “Siberianization” is not an ideological construct, but an economic and geopolitical necessity dictated by objective factors. For example, the shift of the global economic center to Asia, the need to ensure sovereignty over the eastern territories, and the search for new drivers of growth for the country as a whole (Persona-strany.ru, January 22).
Officials have yet to provide concrete details on how such a large-scale project would be carried out. In 2021, Shoigu proposed building five cities in Siberia with populations of up to a million people, and even relocating the capital there (RBC, August 5, 2021). Against the backdrop of Siberia’s grim reality, however, this idea seems far-fetched.
One of the main problems facing Siberia today is its rapid depopulation. Currently, Siberia’s population is approximately 16.5 million, whereas the last Soviet census in 1989 recorded a population exceeding 24 million. The current annual population outflow from Siberia is around 300,000 people (The Moscow Times, November 6, 2025). Siberia’s demographic decline has accelerated significantly due to Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, which was launched in 2022, when Shoigu was still Russia’s Minister of Defense (see EDM, July 9, 2024). It was under his leadership that mass mobilization and the recruitment of residents to fight in the war occurred in Siberian regions (see EDM, December 21, 2023, April 16, 2024).
Russian officials ignore such “trifles.” They propose fantastical projects, such as the “Angara-Yenisei Cluster”—a science and technology center spanning Krasnoyarsk krai, Irkutsk oblast, and the republics of Khakassia and Tuva. The stated goal of this cluster is to transform Siberia’s resource potential into a source of sustainable, innovative development for Russia. The project proposes integrating the extraction and processing of rare earth metals, the development of advanced materials, microelectronics, energy solutions, and artificial intelligence systems. This project is personally supported by Putin, who has invited investors to the Angara-Yenisei Cluster (Irk.ru, December 19, 2025). Since 2022, however, Russia’s economy has become increasingly militarized, limiting funds for other sectors (see EDM, July 12, 2022, October 3, 2024; see Strategic Snapshots, March 13, May 8, 2025). A project of this size would require expenditures exceeding 700 billion rubles (about $9 billion), a figure the Russian government cannot afford in the short term (Ngs24.ru, November 8, 2025).
Krasnoyarsk, a Siberian city with a population of over a million, presents another example of regional under-development. Russian officials have long promised to build a metro in the city, but with most regional funds being spent on the war, the project has yet to be completed. Economists have calculated that the cost of this construction is 90 billion rubles (around $1.17 billion), which is equal to the amount Russia spends on the war effort in four days. Similarly, the unbuilt bridge across the Lena River in Yakutia, which officials have long-promised to build, would cost the equivalent of just four days of wartime spending (Siber.Realii, February 26, 2024).
Another fantastical project is being proposed for the Far East. Authorities plan to build three microelectronics factories in the Primorsky and Khabarovsk krais (Primamedia.ru, January 26). The region currently lacks such facilities, but officials have promised “special support measures.” When discussing this project, Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District Yuri Trutnev stated, “Today, our country is continuing a special military operation and needs to learn how to produce the necessary components” (Telegram/@Govorit_NeMoskva, January 26).
It’s impossible to wage a modern war without microelectronics. Given that all ties with Western countries that once supplied Russia with these products have been severed, Russia aims develop its own (see EDM, March 4, 2024). Deep experience and existing infrastructure are required for carrying out these plans, however.
By the end of 2025, the Russian microelectronics market had collapsed by 25 percent, and the share of domestic components barely exceeded one quarter (Cnews.ru, January 14). Consequently, Russian imports of high-tech components from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are growing (see EDM, September 10, November 13, 2024; President of Russia, May 8, 2025; see China Brief, July 18, 2025; Izvestiya, December 19, 2025). The long-term benefits of close cooperation with Chinese companies remain to be seen, however. They are unlikely to be particularly interested in allowing Russian companies to become competitors in the microelectronics industry. They will therefore likely seek to gain a significant stake in the management of the Siberian factories before any significant investments (see EDM, December 5, 2023). Notably, the PRC published maps with the original Chinese names of Russia’s cities in the Far East in 2023 (Vl.Aif.ru, February 26, 2023). As Russia’s war against Ukraine continues and Moscow scrambles to find ways to support its economy while being increasingly isolated from the West, the “Siberianization” of Russia that Moscow’s ideologists dream of may not come to fruition in the way they imagine.
