Attacks on Indians Compromise Moscow’s Ability to Attract New Migrants
Attacks on Indians Compromise Moscow’s Ability to Attract New Migrants
Executive Summary:
- Moscow wants to replace departing migrant workers from Central Asia and the Caucasus with new ones from India. Attacks on Indians studying in Russia, however, make that an unlikely prospect, as Indian workers will hardly want to face such xenophobia.
- If Moscow cannot attract new migrants, however, many jobs that such workers now perform will go unfilled, adding to popular anger when streets are not cleaned or packages are not delivered and undermining the prospects for economic recovery even further.
- This spread of Russian xenophobic attacks on Central Asians to Indians almost certainly presages more xenophobic attacks by Russians on the non-Russian quarter of the population, threatening Russia’s stability and even territorial integrity.
The number of migrant workers from Central Asia and the Caucasus in Russia has decreased over the last several years. This has been caused by Russia’s economic problems and even more so because of the rise of xenophobic attitudes. The Kremlin has sought to replace those departing with new migrant workers from India and other South Asian and Middle Eastern countries (Nakanune.ru, March 6, 2025, February 16; RITM Eurasia, February 14). Attacks on Indian students in Russia’s Bashkortostan on February 7, however, undermine the possibility of success for that policy. Indian workers are unlikely to want to move to a country where they would be subject to xenophobic attacks, and the Indian government is unlikely to be indifferent to what is happening (Versia, March 4, 2024; RFI, February 7). If Russia continues to lose migrant workers from Central Asia and the Caucasus and cannot attract new ones from other places, such as India, many of the jobs migrant workers now perform will go unfilled. Popular anger will intensify when the streets are not cleaned or packages are not delivered. This would undermine the prospects for economic recovery even further (see EDM, October 22, 2024; Window on Eurasia, December 28, 2025; RITM Eurasia, February 14). At the same time, these attacks also call attention to something that almost certainly represents an even greater threat. When xenophobia intensifies, those infected by it often quickly shift the targets of their anger from one group to another. There is thus the prospect that the xenophobic attacks on Indians will soon lead to more attacks on the non-Russian quarter of Russia’s population, threatening the stability and even the territorial integrity of that country (see EDM, February 3; Window on Eurasia, April 3, 2024; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May 3, 2024). The attacks on Indian students may prove to be the harbinger of far larger problems than a superficial glance at them might suggest.
Since 2024, as the number of migrant workers in Russia has fallen by more than half a million, the number of Indian nationals in the Russian Federation has almost doubled from 36,200 to 56,500. Their fate, however, has not been a happy one. The students have regularly complained about racist comments, discrimination, and even physical attacks. This pattern came to a head on February 7 when an armed man broke into a dormitory at a medical school in Ufa, wounded four students from India, and drew a swastika on one of their bodies (RFI, February 7; Govorit NeMoskva, February 8; Radio Svoboda, February 12). Fearful for their lives, the students appealed to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, calling on him to intervene on their behalf (Tsiforvaya Meditsiya, February 9).
The Moscow media have largely ignored these developments or at least played them down. Officials in Ufa held meetings with the students to reassure them that the February 7 events were an isolated incident and that they are safe. Human rights experts, however, disagree and say that what happened reflects both the growth of xenophobia among Russians and the increasing willingness of some of them to use violence against members of groups they do not like. Among these is Stefaniya Kulayeva, an expert at the Memorial Anti-Discrimination Center. She argues that the events in Ufa are part of a broader pattern in which Russians, primarily among the younger generation, are acting in this way based on “chauvinism” and “racial hatred” against those who look different than themselves (Radio Svoboda, February 12).
Such xenophobic attacks have driven Central Asian and Caucasian migrant workers to leave. The attacks are making it ever more difficult to attract anyone to replace them, especially for jobs that Russians have long viewed as beneath their dignity. Perhaps even more fatefully, Kulayeva says, they have deepened the divides between ethnic Russians and non-Russians. On the one hand, the departure of yesterday’s migrant workers is leaving essential work undone. This simultaneously places yet another obstacle to economic recovery in the Russian Federation and infuriates Russians who expect jobs to be done even if they are unwilling to fill them themselves. On the other hand, those with xenophobic views are ever more willing to use violence, but those who are victims of such violence are ever more willing to speak out and seek the protection of others.
Kulayeva says the increasing willingness of victims to seek protection and redress should be welcomed if the trend toward greater and more lethal violence is decried. She recalls that in 2006, when Indian students who were studying at the Petersburg Medical Institute were attacked, and one was killed, they did not react in this way or seek the protection of their government (Sova Center; September 25, 2006). In that case and subsequent ones, the Russian authorities treated the attacks as the work of isolated individuals rather than as the “systemic” problem they have increasingly become.
Attacks on migrants are affecting the Russian economy. It has also been playing a role in transforming Russian patriotism into ethnic Russian nationalism, an extremely dangerous development in a multi-ethnic and poly-confessional country such as Russia, especially at a time when non-Russians and non-Orthodox are increasing their share of the population (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, July 18, 2024; see EDM, October 7, 2025). Non-Russians who have long been victims of hostility and discrimination by ethnic Russians are increasingly concerned that attacks on migrants may soon lead to attacks on indigenous peoples as well. In 2024, some 50 activists from Russia’s regions and non-Russian republics, many living in forced emigration, explained why. In an open letter, they explained how easy it is for hatred of one group to lead to hatred of others, especially if it appears that the government will not punish the perpetrators or even is saying and doing things that will encourage the attackers (Indigenous Russia, March 30, 2024; translated and discussed at Window on Eurasia, April 3, 2024).
Such arguments are now being heard ever more often as attacks on migrants have increased. Now that non-Russians are members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the platform has established a dialogue with Russian democratic forces, which are likely to circulate even more broadly. The issue of xenophobic attacks in Russia is to be internationalized in ways it has seldom been in recent years (Idel.Realii, February 16). A few other countries, most prominently Ukraine, have also spoken out against Russian xenophobia and attacks on non-Russians (Window on Eurasia, October 11, 2025). If that should prove to be the case, then the racist attacks on Indian students in Russia earlier this month may lead to an even tougher European position on Moscow’s approach and hopefully prompt the Kremlin to change course before the situation spirals out of control.