Caspian Less Safe for Shipping as Russia and Iran Increase Military Use of Sea

Caspian Less Safe for Shipping as Russia and Iran Increase Military Use of Sea

Executive Summary:

• The increased military use of the Caspian by Russia and Iran, ranging from the illicit delivery of arms to attacks on Ukraine, is sparking concerns that the sea is no longer safe for shipping in Azerbaijan and other littoral states.
• Ukraine has responded to this trend with drone attacks in the Caspian. Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan have increased the size and activity of their navies, and Azerbaijan and Türkiye have expanded their cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
• Three alliances are emerging on the Caspian littoral, and the risks of clashes between them are growing, heightening tensions and threatening the interests of trading partners, such as the People’s Republic of China, which depends on Caspian sea lanes.

The recent sinking of an Iranian ship in Turkmenistan’s sector of the Caspian Sea on January 14 may or may not have been the result of hostile action (Telegram/@istories_media, January 14). According to Nurani, an Azerbaijani columnist writing under a mononym, it has called attention to how “the weapons corridor” Russia and Iran have established in the sea means that the Caspian and its littoral are no longer safe. As far back as 2023, reports arose that Iran was sending weapons across the Caspian to Russia for attacks on Ukraine or from Russia through Iran to their allies and partners (Meduza, August 19, 2025; Minval Politika, January 17). Nurani continues, “From [the Caspian], Russia has launched Kalibr missiles at targets in Ukraine, and these are most often civilian targets. Even earlier, before the start of the Ukrainian war, targets in Syria were attacked [by Russia] from the Caspian Sea” (Minval Politika, January 17). Russia’s use of its Caspian Flotilla against Ukraine is also important, as it has done so by moving ships from the Caspian to the Sea of Azov via the Volga-Don Canal (see EDM, August 16, 2022).

The Azerbaijani analyst explains that Ukraine openly targets Russian vessels in the Caspian. Nurani notes, 

The base of the Red Banner Caspian Flotilla in Kaspiysk, Dagestan, was attacked by Ukrainian drones. Oil platforms in the Russian sector of the Caspian have repeatedly come under attack. Finally, there have been attacks on a Russian control ship in the Caspian” (Minval Politika, January 17). 

The columnist further suggests that “it is even possible that tomorrow the United States and its allies will enter the game … [since] the issue of strikes on Iranian targets is on Washington’s agenda” (Minval Politika, January 17). Russia feels confident that it can develop ties between itself and Iran—given that both are littoral states_, something the 2018 Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea permits—even as it declares that expansion of ties between other littoral states and foreign powers such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are impermissible under the terms of the convention.

The other littoral states are concerned by burgeoning military trade between Russia and Iran via the Caspian (see EDM, March 16, 2023). Perhaps as a result, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan have taken serious steps to to develop their navies (see EDM, June 24, 2021, August 1, 2023, January 21, 2025; Window on Eurasia, October 25, 2025; Kazpiiskii Vestnik, January 19). These states seek to cooperate with one another and with outside powers such as Türkiye and NATO to counter Russian and Iranian military use of the Caspian (see EDM, September 5, 2023, April 24, 2025; Window on Eurasia, May 15, 2025; Kaspiiskii Vestnik, September 17, 2025; Caliber.Az, January 24). The non-Russian navies in the Caspian are now sufficiently large enough to challenge Russia’s long-time dominance of the sea (Window on Eurasia, January 29, 2022). This means the likelihood of clashes is far greater and more plausible than ever before, despite continuing declarations of the need for all littoral states, including Russia, to peacefully cooperate (see EDM, November 18, 2025).

Nurani is far from the only analyst in the region to suggest that problems lie ahead between Russia and Iran, on the one hand, and the Caspian littoral states, on the other. Andrey Matveyev, a Kazakhstani commentator, has suggested that three distinct multi-country blocs are emerging around the Caspian littoral and that this has transformed the Caspian from “a Russian lake” into “a contested strategic zone” and even “a sea of discord” (The Times of Central Asia, July 24, 2025). The first of these “blocs,” he says, consists of Russia, Iran, and the non-littoral state of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). They’ve been conducting annual “security belt” exercises since 2019 and working together to dredge Caspian ports and the Volga-Don Canal (see EDM, February 24, 2023; Eurasia Today, July 25, 2025). The second includes Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and other Turkic world countries. The third consists of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. While still fluid and sometimes cooperating, especially the latter two, these blocs are increasingly formalized, a development that means their members will cooperate more closely and that any consideration of how one might respond to challenges or threats should not rest on the capacity of any single state. That is especially true now when the drying up of the Caspian has reduced the ability of the large ships of Russia’s Caspian Flotilla to operate while leaving that of the smaller ships of the other Caspian states unaffected (Window on Eurasia, July 11, September 13, 2025). Additionally, Azerbaijan and other littoral countries may feel Russia is weak and that they have the support of the United States, as a recent flurry of meetings between U.S. and Azerbaijani officials suggests (Caliber.Az, January 24).   

Officials in various countries with an interest in Caspian transit and Caspian petroleum deposits, ranging from the PRC to the United States, may conclude that shipping via the Caspian is becoming unsafe. Alternatively, they may conclude that the risks of conflict there are so great that shipping via other routes is more attractive. This could have enormous consequences far beyond the shores of that body of water. Among the largest of these could be Moscow’s decision to move against the littoral states to ensure its dominance or press for the expansion of rail and highway routes to the west and east of the Caspian to complete Russian President Vladimir Putin’s long-desired north–south corridor (see EDM, January 16, 2025; Window on Eurasia, July 11, 2025). A second consequence is the PRC’s decision to cut back on its development of east–west trade via Central Asia and shift it to the Northern Sea Route or the Suez Canal (Window on Eurasia, July 19, 2023). Additionally, a reduction in the interest of others, including the European Union and the United States, in developing the Caspian link with Central Asia could dramatically slow the region’s development. Developments that may or may not happen on or above the Caspian will affect countries far removed from its shores. Even the possibility that current trends may lead to the clashes that Nurani fears and that could reduce the attractiveness of the Caspian as a route will have consequences far beyond that inland sea.