Central Asia Diversifies and Indigenizes Defense Procurement to Limit Reliance on Moscow

Central Asia Diversifies and Indigenizes Defense Procurement to Limit Reliance on Moscow

Executive Summary:

• On January 13, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev announced plans to revise Uzbekistan’s 2018 Defense Doctrine, signaling a major modernization shift centered on artificial intelligence (AI), drones, and cyberwarfare, alongside efforts to expand domestic defense industrial capacity.
• The reform reflects a broader Central Asian trend of reducing reliance on Russia’s legacy security architecture, as states reassess dependence on Moscow amid its constrained defense industry, sanctions pressure, and reputational concerns following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
• Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are investing heavily in indigenous defense industries, particularly drone production, armored vehicles, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-standard ammunition, reflecting a broader regional strategy to strengthen military autonomy while avoiding excessive dependence on any single foreign supplier.

On January 13, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev announced a plan to revise the country’s Defense Doctrine (President of Uzbekistan, January 13). Uzbekistan last updated its defense policy in 2018. The revisions will focus on the use of artificial intelligence (AI), drones, and cyberwarfare. Mirziyoyev vowed to further develop the country’s defense industry and “strengthen the military-scientific base of engineering and technology and to organize local military technology parks” (President of Uzbekistan, January 13).

Central Asia continues to lean on Moscow for its security more than three decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia has supplied roughly two-thirds of the region’s arms imports and has been involved in over a third of all joint military exercises involving Central Asian militaries since 1991 (Kennan Institute, June 4, 2021). This enduring influence reflects structural legacies: the inheritance of Soviet-era hardware, continued institutional linkages through frameworks such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the ongoing presence of Russian military facilities in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. 

Central Asian governments increasingly view their defense dependence on Russia as a liability. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has exposed the risks of overreliance on a supplier now constrained by sanctions, battlefield losses, and competing demands on its defense industry (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, September 15, 2022). To some in Central Asia, Russia itself is also a security risk, considering its revanchist rhetoric. Central Asian governments are not abandoning Russia outright, but they are increasingly seeking allies and building domestic defense capacity to gradually dilute their reliance on it.

Russian officials and state media channels have frequently described Kazakhstan’s territory as a gift from Moscow and say that its northern regions are historically Russian. Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s Vkontakte (VK) account called Kazakhstan an “artificial state” in August 2022, though his office claimed that a hacker was responsible for the post (The Moscow Times, August 22, 2022).

Central Asia was long embedded in the Soviet military-industrial complex, designed to support central planners rather than operate with any strategic autonomy. Following their independence, the new republics were left with equipment tailored to Soviet standards, leaving Moscow with a captive market. 

According to Oxus Society data, Russia sold $3.8 billion worth of arms to Central Asia in the first three decades of its independence. The lion’s share, $2.3 billion, went to Kazakhstan (The Oxus Society, accessed May 14). Russia also continues to dominate maintenance lifecycles for regional equipment, with many locked into multi-decade reliance on Russian support networks. 

Central Asian militaries have turned to alternative suppliers as they modernize outdated hardware to adapt to modern warfare (The Oxus Society, accessed May 14). Attempts to diversify defense partners in recent years have resulted in growing unease about overcorrecting toward reliance on the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which is now the region’s second-largest supplier. Beijing increased its share of the Central Asian arms market from 1.5 percent to 13 percent between 2012 and 2022 (Pakistan Today, January 15, 2022). The PRC’s growing defense sales have left some Central Asian officials and analysts wary about substituting one form of dependence for another. 

Central Asia has been reorienting toward North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners to escape defense dependence on the PRC and Russia. Türkiye’s contribution has been the most transformative, centered on affordable drone platforms like the Bayraktar TB2, which have been bought by Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan (TsAMTO, September 28, 2021; Radio Azattyq, October 22, 2021; Kommersant, December 26, 2024; Radio Azattyq, January 16). The impact of Bayraktar TB2 drones was evident in the 2022 Kyrgyz–Tajik border conflict, where Kyrgyz forces used them to conduct laser-guided attacks on Tajik positions (Anna News, September 18, 2022). Italy has sold helicopters, drones, and aircraft to Central Asian countries. Italy has accounted for some 30 percent of Turkmenistan’s arms purchases since it gained independence from the Soviet Union, making it Ashgabat’s largest defense partner (Oxus Society, September 28, 2020). These sales have included Leonardo M-346FA light attack aircraft, AW139/AW101 helicopters, Falco XN unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and Beretta ARX-160 assault rifles, a staple of Turkmenistan’s military parades (Bellingcat, January 25, 2019). 

Central Asian states are investing in domestic defense production alongside diversification of arms purchases. These manufacturing efforts are not designed to replace foreign suppliers entirely, but to mitigate supply disruptions, build limited industrial capacity, and strengthen bargaining power in procurement relationships. 

Kazakhstan, the region’s wealthiest state, has taken the lead in weapons manufacturing. In April 2025, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Defense launched a $1 billion Defense Industry Development Fund. This fund aims to acquire the licenses and manufacture domestically critical military hardware, such as artillery ammunition, weapons systems, and armored vehicles (Kazinform, April 16, 2025). A key driver in this effort is Kazakhstan’s defense company, Paramount Engineering, which produces next-generation armored vehicles, including the Alan-2, tailored for special forces and emergency units, as well as the Barys 6×6 and Barys 8×8 infantry fighting vehicles (Paramount Engineering, accessed May 14). Kazakhstan has also moved to address one of the most acute vulnerabilities exposed by Russia’s war against Ukraine: ammunition supply. In 2023, Kazakhstan launched the ASPAN project to build four factories to produce NATO-standard ammunition, artillery shells, and mines, valued at $1 billion (Bugin, December 10, 2025). The goal is to achieve military autonomy and potential export opportunities, while reducing reliance on Russia.

The region’s most populous country, Uzbekistan, is also developing its domestic capacity, albeit at a less advanced stage than Kazakhstan. Mirziyoyev’s 2026 plan for comprehensive military reform prioritizes increasing domestic production of military equipment to reduce reliance on foreign suppliers (President of Uzbekistan, January 13). Even before this announcement, a defense industry was already emerging in Uzbekistan. AKSUM Group, founded in 2019, manufactures ten-seat Aksum Max-V armored vehicles at its manufacturing facility in Chirchik, as well as the Chaser 980 and the Chaser 1200 armored patrol boats (Deloviye Emirati, January 24, 2024; Army Recognition Group, March 11, 2025).

Unmanned systems have become a focal point in Uzbekistan. In 2022, Uzbekistan’s State Defense Industry Committee announced plans to develop indigenous drone capabilities, marking a shift toward technologies that are both strategically relevant and comparatively accessible (Uza.uz January 19, 2022). This would mark a regional first. Uzbekistan’s Lochin HA-341(M2) drone has a 50-kilometer range and is designed for surveillance (Daryo, February 24). Another model, the Lochin HA-251 hexacopter, is designed for tactical strike operations and can carry a 10-kilo payload. 

Kazakhstan has followed suit, with its Airborne Assault Forces (AAF) establishing a domestic drone production facility that produced 100 units within its first three months of operation in early 2026 (Times of Central Asia, January 23). These initiatives underscore a broader regional lesson drawn from recent conflicts: that drones offer a relatively low-cost, high-impact capability that can be developed domestically with fewer barriers than traditional artillery and aerial systems.

Central Asia is no longer content to unconditionally rely on Russia for defense. Diversification and limited indigenization are reshaping the region’s defense landscape, even as legacy systems and structural constraints preserve Moscow’s central role in the short- to medium-term.