China Coast Guard Increasingly Assertive
Executive Summary:
- The China Coast Guard (CCG) has adopted more assertive and complex operational patterns near Kinmen, shifting from single-file incursions to multi-axis converging formations coordinated with PLA joint air–sea patrols. These actions signal a transition from routine harassment to integrated coercive pressure on Taiwan’s offshore islands.
- The CCG’s dual identity as a law-enforcement body and a paramilitary force have expanded its strategic utility for Beijing. The CCG now plays a central role in operations framed as “maritime jurisdiction enforcement,” reinforcing Beijing’s political–legal claims over Taiwan under its “one-China principle.”
- Beijing’s lexical shift from foregrounding discussion of a “blockade” to a “quarantine” scenario suggests a move toward selective maritime controls within the scope of domestic PRC law.
- Beijing’s approach raises the risk that the PRC may exploit regional crises—such as tensions with Japan—to intensify pressure on Taiwan under the guise of “law-enforcement” operations.
The China Coast Guard (CCG) led three intensive incursions into waters around the island of Kinmen in November. This marked a sharp escalation in operational assertiveness after a period of relative calm in October. Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) reported on November 20 that the 12th Patrol District from its Kinmen–Matsu–Penghu Branch detected a CCG vessel operating with its automatic identification system (AIS) disabled. This usually indicates hostile intent (CGA, November 20). The CGA responded by dispatching patrol ships to intercept the vessels. An hour later, four CCG vessels entered Kinmen waters from two directions, approaching from the southwest of Lieyu Township and the southeast of Liaoluo Bay in column formations. [1] The CGA deployed four patrol vessels to prevent the CCG ships from advancing deeper until the ships eventually withdrew.
These incursions reflect a broader shift in CCG tactics around Taiwan. Earlier operations typically employed “single-file” penetrations, but November’s actions featured east–west converging formations, testing Taiwan’s responsiveness to more complex maneuvers. By leveraging numerical superiority and larger-tonnage hulls, the CCG aims to impose continuous pressure on Taiwan’s offshore islands and to create conditions for isolating and encircling these outposts.
From November 19 onward, CCG activity near Taiwan’s offshore islands also coincided with PLA joint air–sea combat readiness patrols (Ministry of National Defense [MND], November 20). This synchronization likely indicates an emerging multi-axis harassment pattern. The combination of CCG pressure at close range and PLA maneuvers in the broader battlespace mirrors the PLA’s longstanding strategy to “encircle a point and strike reinforcements” (围点打援). This means that the CCG can fix Taiwan’s offshore garrisons while PLA units position themselves to deter or interdict potential reinforcements. As such, CCG actions cannot be treated as isolated maritime law enforcement incidents. They are part of a larger, integrated coercive posture.
CCG More Assertive Since 2018 Reforms
A turning point in CCG behavior occurred in 2018, when the People’s Republic of China (PRC) formally transferred the CCG to the People’s Armed Police (PAP) (People’s Daily, June 28, 2018). This was presented as an administrative adjustment but it initiated a comprehensive restructuring that affected personnel training, command culture, and force modernization. Many CCG vessels originally commissioned for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) were transferred to the CCG and refitted for maritime law enforcement. As the PLAN continues to induct new vessels, further transfers are expected, which will strengthen the CCG’s capacity.
Although subordinated to the PAP and ultimately the Central Military Commission, the CCG retains the outward identity of a law-enforcement body. This duality affords Beijing considerable operational flexibility. After the Joint Sword 2024-B military exercise, Beijing increasingly relied on the CCG for operations targeting Taiwan (China Brief, November 1, 2024). Framing such actions as law enforcement activities, Beijing seeks to normalize its claims to Taiwan by pushing a narrative that it is simply dealing with domestic matters under the “one-China principle” (一个中国原则) (MFA, February 2000). These political-legal considerations significantly shape the CCG’s expanding operational role.
Shift in Language Emphasizes Legality of Potential Actions
Beijing’s evolving discourse regarding potential actions against Taiwan is equally consequential to its strategy (China Brief, November 1, 2024). In 2022–2023, official rhetoric emphasized the possibility of a “blockade” (封锁) of Taiwan, implying that the PLAN would have a central role in comprehensively severing Taiwan’s maritime access. By contrast, from 2024 onward, Beijing has increasingly adopted the term “quarantine” (隔离), which entails selective, temporary restrictions on “suspicious” vessels (CSIS, June 5, 2024).
Beijing likely recognizes the difficulty of completely cutting off maritime traffic through the Taiwan Strait. It may instead seek to use the CCG to impose targeted, selective maritime controls, supported by PLAN, PLA Air Force, and PLA Rocket Force assets designed to accelerate a rapid-war scenario. This approach aligns closely with the PRC’s legal warfare (法律战) strategy. The PRC’s primary objective in conducting legal warfare against Taiwan is to impose enforcement authority and jurisdiction over Taiwan. Through this approach, Beijing seeks to make Taiwanese vessels and citizens subject to control by its own law enforcement bodies. Similar actions can be seen in the PRC’s recent threats to issue arrest warrants for Taiwanese individuals via Interpol (Taipei Times, November 10). Regulating shipping with a law enforcement agency under the PAP further reinforces the narrative that Taiwan is a domestic issue of the PRC.
The November pattern raises concerns that the PRC could exploit external crises—such as escalating tensions with Japan in the East China Sea—as cover for heightened pressure on Taiwan. A scenario resembling “feint in the east, strike in the west” (声东击西) cannot be discounted. [2] After all, the underlying catalyst for heightened Sino–Japanese tensions remains closely linked to Taiwan’s security and its geo-strategic position in the first island chain.
Conclusion
The CCG’s recent behavior suggests that its approach to Taiwan continues to evolve. It employs more complex formations, closer integration with PLA air–sea patrols, and increasingly coordinated political–legal signaling. These developments underscore that the CCG has moved well beyond traditional law-enforcement functions. It now sits at the center of Beijing’s calibrated coercive strategy, capable of shaping the battlespace, reinforcing legal narratives, and synchronizing with PLA operations. For Taiwan, understanding the CCG’s changing operational patterns is no longer a maritime security issue alone. It is now inseparable from broader cross-strait military planning.
Notes
[1] The CCG vessels that entered Kinmen waters on November 20 were ships 14515, 14603, 14605, and 14527.
[2] “Feint in the east, strike in the West” is one of the Thirty-Six Stratagems (三十六計), published in the 6th century (ctext, accessed December 2).
