Curtailed Parade Dispels Mirage of Victory in Putin’s War

Curtailed Parade Dispels Mirage of Victory in Putin’s War

Executive Summary:

• Russia’s May 9 Victory Day Parade is crucial for justifying Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine. This year, however, it was scaled back due to Ukrainian drone strikes, revealing the war’s growing strain on Russia.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy leveraged ceasefire negotiations and long-range strike capabilities ahead of the holiday, leaving Moscow dependent on Kyiv and Washington’s allowance to safely conduct the parade.
• The war’s mounting casualties, declining volunteer recruitment, and rising public support for peace talks are intensifying pressure on Putin, leading to aides reportedly drafting a plan for political management in the case of a pause in combat operations and long-distance strikes.

Russia’s Victory Day parade is crucial for justifying Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine. The references to the great sacrifices in defeating the aggression of Nazi Germany in 1941–1945 are pivotal for mobilizing public support for the Kremlin’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine. The pompous demonstration of military might is necessary for asserting the claim that victory is predestined, a claim which Putin repeated in his traditional address to the parade on May 9 (President of Russia, May 9). The much-reduced format of the ceremony, which lasted just 45 minutes and featured only the marching of a few columns with no military hardware, and the ban on any open-air public celebrations, however, made the victorious discourse ring hollow (Radio Svoboda, May 8). In most major cities in Russia, similar reductions were implemented, and in at least 27 regional capitals, including Kursk, Sevastopol, Rostov-on-Don, and Nizhny Novgorod, celebrations were canceled altogether (Verstka, May 7).

The Russian Defense Ministry mentioned only the “current operational situation” as an explanation for the unprecedented limitations. The meaning of this vague reference is clear—the threat of Ukrainian long-distance strikes (RIA Novosti, April 28). In the first week of May, drone attacks caused huge fires at the oil refineries in Perm and Yaroslavl, and a hit on the air control center in Rostov-on-Don paralyzed air traffic across Southern Russia (Current Time, May 8). Air defenses around Moscow were built up at the expense of other key centers, but a drone still managed to breach them and damage a high-rise building on the prestigious Mosfilmovskaya street (Forbes.ru, May 4). Colonel-General Viktor Afzalov was fired as the commander-in-chief of the Aerospace Forces and Colonel-General Aleksandr Chaiko replaced him. The appointment of a veteran tank commander instead of a professional air defense commander, however, is hardly going to neutralize the threat of Ukrainian attacks (TopWar.ru, May 4).

New long-distance strike capabilities granted Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy the initiative in the political contest focused on the Moscow parade, which became a strategic vulnerability for Putin. The intrigue started with Putin’s call to U.S. President Donald Trump on April 29 and the confirmation of readiness for a short ceasefire, which Ukrainian commentators derided as a plea for security guarantees (Komsomol’skaya Pravda, April 29; NV.ua, April 30). Zelenskyy suggested a week-long ceasefire, which Russian attacks duly broke (Nezavisimaya gazeta, May 5). Rustem Umerov, the key Ukrainian negotiator, was dispatched to Miami, Florida, to coordinate follow-up moves and Zelenskyy issued a presidential decree granting Russia permission to hold the Red Square parade (RBC, May 6; The Insider, May 8). Moscow responded with a threat to deliver a massive strike on Kyiv, but Trump announced a non-negotiable pause in hostilities for May 9–11 (Novaya Gazeta Europe, May 8). Putin was left staging his parade under the allowance of Kyiv and Washington, and Moscow was beautified not by the usual visual propaganda, but by many machine guns on rooftops (Meduza, May 9).  

Zelenskyy scored some quick diplomatic points and exposed Putin’s inability to conjure an apparition of victory, alongside stirring the pool of discontent in war-weary Russia (Re: Russia, May 8). Opinion polls show a consistently strong preference for ending the war, and among 18–39-year-olds in Russia, support for peace talks is overwhelming (Levada Center, May 7). The independently compiled list of Russian fatalities now includes 352,000 names, and the campaign for attracting volunteers, particularly into the newly-created Unmanned Systems Forces, yields diminishing results, despite record high premiums for enlisting (see EDM, April 4; Meduza, May 9).

Reacting to these brewing public sentiments, Putin deemed it opportune to state that the Ukrainian conflict was nearing a conclusion (Izvestiya, May 10). Leaks from the presidential administration confirm that a group of aides is busy drafting a plan for political management of a pause in combat operations and long-distance strikes, which needs to be presented to the key elite groups and the broader society in Russia as the best possible outcome of the strategic deadlock (Dossier Center, May 7). Putin may discard this presentation as incompatible with his posture as a determined leader. He cannot position himself as the chief proponent of war, however, as even jingoist commentators are discussing plots for his removal, certainly referring to Western sources (TopWar.ru, May 7).

One typical trait of Putin’s leadership is the fear of showing weakness. Complimenting Trump for making the ceasefire offer, he tried to assert a firm stance against the hostile pressure, primarily from Europe (RIAC, May 8). The curtailed parade did not provide the usual demonstration of military might. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, however, attended as guests of honor, likely as part of an effort to prove that Russia still has influence in Central Asia (see EDM, April 13; Kommersant, May 9). Another attempt to demonstrate Russia’s international credibility, likely aimed at strengthening Putin’s hand during his forthcoming visit to the People’s Republic of China, was the inclusion of a North Korean battalion, which proudly marched through Red Square (RBC, May 9). The arrival of some 15,000 North Korean troops was crucial for pushing back the Ukrainian incursion into Russia’s Kursk oblast in autumn 2024, which is supposed to be marked by a special monument. That victory, however, is of little relevance to the present-day stalemate resulting in a steady degradation of the Russian army under relentless Ukrainian middle-range strikes (TASS, March 24; The Insider, May 8).

No amount of patriotic propaganda can hide the depletion of Russia’s power resources exposed by the pitiful parade, and Putin is acutely aware of the humiliation Zelenskyy’s gibe has aggravated. He may not understand how false his assertions of a steady march to victory sound, or how pathetic his obsession with his own safety appears. He can hardly ignore the signs of exhaustion from the war course, however, so the next parade can only be even worse. Options for breaking the deadlock through escalation involve significant risks that he is not prepared to take at this late-autumnal phase of life, which remains so precious to him. Making a peace deal is by no means risk-free, but every delay drives him deeper into the position of weakness where riskier concessions become necessary.