‘Energy Truce’ Could be Preamble to Ukraine Peace Deal

‘Energy Truce’ Could be Preamble to Ukraine Peace Deal

Executive Summary:

• The January 30 “energy truce”—under which Russia and Ukraine agreed to halt strikes on energy infrastructure until at least February 1—mirrors Russia’s established strike cycle on the already devastated Ukrainian grid, serving as a low-cost concession for the Kremlin.
• Talks under a new U.S.–Ukraine–Russia format show some momentum. Russia’s demand for a full Ukrainian retreat from Donetsk may be within reach since Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy views security guarantees for Ukraine as a higher priority.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin may frame a potential peace deal featuring control of Donetsk as a victory. The high cost of the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine makes compromise difficult to justify, but continuing the war is increasingly unsustainable.

The Arctic vortex covering Moscow and Kyiv has given new momentum to talks on the final parameters of a peace deal. It was not difficult for Russian President Vladimir Putin to consent to U.S. President Donald Trump’s request for a pause on Russian attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure because the Russian bombing campaign had already inflicted catastrophic damage on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure (Radio Svoboda, January 30). In the middle of this “energy truce,” Ukraine suffered a major blackout caused by the breakdown of its severely degraded electricity grid (Novaya Gazeta, January 31). The so-called “energy truce” fits the pattern of Russian strikes, in which a massive combined missile and drone attack is followed by five to six days of lower intensity drone assaults (RIA Novosti, January 30). Putin’s readiness to continue the pause into the first week of February, when temperatures are predicted to hit new lows, will reveal his true intentions.

This small episode in Russia’s protracted war of attrition against Ukraine appears to be a possible step forward in the peace-making process, as it was negotiated under a new diplomatic format. This format brings together the top teams of negotiators from the United States and Ukraine with a new, and apparently lower-level, Russian delegation led by Admiral Igor Kostyikov, the Director of the Main Intelligence Directorate and deputy to Army General Valery Gerasimov, the chief of the General Staff (Vedomosti, January 29; Novaya Gazeta Europe, February 1). Mainstream Russian media were cautiously optimistic about the proceedings in Abu Dhabi and skeptical about the prospect of an “energy truce” until Putin granted it his approval (Izvestiya; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, January 26). The talks are set to continue later this week, albeit without the U.S. team, which returned to Miami for a meeting with Putin’s special envoy, Kirill Dmitriev, who is keen to discuss possible joint economic projects with Steve Witkoff, Trump’s special envoy for peace missions (RBC, January 31).

Putin’s demand for control over all of Ukraine’s Donetsk oblast remains the main obstacle in negotiations. Russian commentators are describing Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s refusal to order a retreat from the Ukrainian-controlled parts of Donetsk as deliberate sabotage of peace talks (Lenta.ru, January 30). Compromise on this seemingly irresolvable territorial issue may be within reach since Zelenskyy views security guarantees for Ukraine provided by a European stabilization force with strong U.S. support as a top priority (New Voice of Ukraine, January 25). The Russian Foreign Ministry, which Putin has effectively excluded from the talks, has issued a stream of statements on the unacceptability of any deployment of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in Ukraine and accusing Europe of subverting the U.S.-led peace process (RIA Novosti, January 29; Izvestiya, February 1). Security guarantees, however, will primarily be resolved in discussions between Ukraine and its Western partners.

Putin is likely to present a peace deal that includes Russian control of Donetsk as a clear victory, even if it excludes many of his maximalist demands, such as the legitimization of Russian annexation of Crimea and limiting the number of Ukrainian troops (Riddle, January 30). False triumph over a peace deal with limited gains for Russia is entirely in tune with Russian public opinion polls, which show a consistently strong preference for ending the war but limited approval of making concessions to Ukraine for peace (Levada  Center, January 27). The crucial test for the Russian public’s acceptance of a compromise agreement is the revival of economic growth, since, at present, no amount of propaganda can dispel the perception of a heavy burden of war costs (The Moscow Times, January 30). The Russian economy has been profoundly deformed by the Kremlin’s long war against Ukraine, and its ability to recover in the absence of external investments and inevitable reduction of state funding is highly uncertain (Re: Russia, January 27). The European Union continues tightening its sanctions regime against Russia. It is certain to prioritize post-war reconstruction in Ukraine, even if proposals for its accelerated EU accession may encounter greater resistance than Hungary’s contrarian stance (Kommersant, January 30).

Putin may find it easier to project power while negotiating a peace deal than to slow the erosion of Russia’s international prestige. Indian companies demanding deeper discounts on Russian oil delivered mostly by the “shadow fleet” of tankers is just one small manifestation (Neft Kapital, January 26). More significantly, Russian troops were recently withdrawn from several bases in Syria following President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s visit to Moscow (Novaya Gazeta Europe, January 28). Russia’s irrelevance in managing the crisis in Iran—despite Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Ali Larijani’s plea to Putin—is an even greater sign of Russia’s diminished international sway (Kholod Media, January 31). Russian mainstream pundits warn that Trump does not perceive Russia as a peer. They claim that U.S. respect for Russia may decline further after peace in Ukraine (RIAC, January 29). Some pro-war commentators even draw parallels between the current military deadlock in Ukraine and the crisis in February 1917, when Russia’s exhaustion from World War I compelled the abdication of Emperor Nicholas II (TopWar.ru, February 1).

Putin is caught between the crippling cost of staying the war course and the incalculable risks of signing a deal on ceasing the hostilities but continuing confrontation with Europe, to which Ukraine is set to be firmly anchored. His usual tactic is to postpone a hard decision for as long as possible, but the United States and European Union are driving a hard bargain. Putin finds himself dependent upon Zelenskyy’s decision at an ideal moment and sufficient reward for agreeing on a retreat that is less consequential than the Russian retreat from Kherson in late 2022. Putin may try to ignore that gaining control over the completely devastated Donbas amounts to Russia’s strategic defeat in a war intended to subjugate Ukraine. Putin’s crime of aggression will, nevertheless, hang over the remaining years of his reign.