Fabricated Russian Videos Backfire

Fabricated Russian Videos Backfire

Executive Summary:

• Russian forces are using artificial intelligence-generated and manipulated videos to fabricate territorial gains in Ukraine, including around Kupiansk this month. These videos supplement traditional flag-raising operations and seek to create the appearance of battlefield success for Russian and foreign audiences.
• False battlefield reporting can distort Russian commanders’ understanding of the war against Ukraine and contribute to tactical errors. Repeatedly claiming territorial gains that have not occurred, reinforced by fabricated visual evidence, can obscure actual frontline conditions from higher command.
• Controlled information operations can support battlefield objectives when synchronized with military operations. Delayed disclosures, accurate footage, and targeted refutations can deny Russia operational intelligence while strengthening domestic and international confidence in Ukraine’s military position while undermining trust in Russian claims.

Control of the city of Kupiansk has become a primary focus of Russian attacks in Kharkiv oblast since late 2025. Amid limited or contested battlefield progress, Russian military authorities and pro-war bloggers have repeatedly promoted exaggerated or false claims of territorial gains. On October 2, a Russian military blogger posted a video on Telegram purporting to show the capture of part of the city of Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi, a suburb of Kupiansk, by Russian forces. The terrain, however, especially the railway station building, does not match the current condition of buildings in the city, which have been severely damaged during ongoing battles. Ukrainian experts say that other visual anomalies also indicate the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in the clip (Telegram/@ssternenko, October 3). Similar manipulated, archival, and AI-generated videos have been identified and debunked by international experts and even Russian military bloggers in recent months (X/@Playfra0, August 13; X/@actfast, August 16; X/@LetsArmUKR, August 20; Telegram/@milinfolive, September 5). 

Fierce kinetic battles and equally intense information wars are raging around Kupiansk. In December 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the complete capture of the city for the third time since November 2025 and invited journalists to verify this advance. The Ukrainian command has repeatedly stated that these claims are untrue (Radio Svoboda, November 20, 2025; New Voice of Ukraine, January 27).  Ten days later, on December 12, 2025, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy recorded a video address near the Kupiansk entrance sign, refuting Russian claims of the city’s capture (President of Ukraine, December 12, 2025).

Russia’s “flag raising” tactics for demonstrating real or false control over territory are changing. Alongside often one-way missions involving real soldiers recording videos in disputed or Ukrainian-controlled territory, they have begun using videos that have been altered or entirely generated using AI. Information operations are a crucial component of Russian tactics in Ukraine. Videos, photos, open-source intelligence confirmation and refutation, online narratives, and official statements are as much a part of Kremlin strategy as missile strikes and mechanized assaults. With the development of AI, new tools and methods of information warfare are emerging.

This approach creates additional uncertainty for Ukrainian commanders regarding the actual situation on the front lines, paints a positive picture for the Russian public, and attempts to convince Ukrainians that resistance to Putin’s aggression is futile. Russia similarly intends to use falsified flag-raising videos to convince the West that Kyiv cannot win and ongoing aid to Ukraine is pointless (Center for Countering Disinformation, May 11).

In June, Putin claimed that roughly 5,000 Ukrainian troops were nearly encircled on the “left bank of the Stary Oskol River,” apparently confusing the Oskil River in Ukraine with the Russian city of Stary Oskol in Belgorod oblast. He also falsely claimed that Russian troops were advancing within about 8 miles of Sumy in September (UNIAN; New Voice of Ukraine, June 29; 5.ua, September 2). The reality on the battlefield, however, is forcing Putin to push back deadlines for the complete capture of Donbas for the 16th time, with Russia losing territory on the net in September (The Moscow Times, September 10). 

The Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) “Vivaldi” counteroffensive operation, which ran from late May to October 14 in the Lyman sector under the command of the 3rd Army Corps, used a new information strategy. This operation was initially conducted with rigorous control over any leaks regarding the directions of Ukrainian forces’ advances, and Ukraine did not publicize results until September (Texty.org.ua, September 22). This approach is in stark contrast to how the “announcements” of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in 2023 were handled (InformNapalm, September 18). After completion of Vivaldi’s initial phases, the 3rd Army Corps, already known for its strong media team and high-quality work in this area, launched an information campaign (Telegram/@InformNapalm, September 29, 30). This effort began with a video address by then-3rd Army Corps commander, Brigadier General Andriy Biletsky, from the city of Svyatogorsk in Donetsk oblast, in which he refuted Putin’s claims that the Russian army controlled the city (RIA Novosti, September 1). Biletsky stated that Ukrainian forces firmly control the city, which currently serves as a rear area for the corps (Telegram/@ab3army, September 7). As of September, the distance from the city to the front line was no closer than 13 kilometers (8 miles) (ISW, September 2).

The Ukrainian military released videos explaining Vivaldi’s progress only after the successful completion of certain stages of the operation. Until the official announcement, an information vacuum was created for Russian forces, in part because of the targeted destruction of Russian reconnaissance drones (Tyzhden, October 7). This tactic reduced the Russian Armed Forces’ operational intelligence regarding the Ukrainian military’s actions, complicating Russian efforts to respond to the offensive.

In the Russian military, there is a widespread practice of lying in reports to higher command, distorting situational awareness among commanders regarding the positions of their own forces (Telegram/@motopatriot78, October 8). Combined with fake video evidence purporting to show control over Ukrainian-held territories, these practices have become such a serious problem that even Russian military bloggers have begun to criticize them (Telegram/@rybar, September 7; Telegram/@milinfolive, September 29; Telegram/@dva_majors, October 4).

Ukraine released a video showing 250 captured Russian soldiers in early October, in contrast to a falsified Russian video from Piskunivka village in Donetsk oblast that purported to show surrendering Ukrainians (Armia.Inform, May 5). Ukrainian military videos intend to refute false Russian claims and undermine trust in the Russian Federation’s leadership (X/@LetsArmUKR, September 29). 

Creating and managing narratives supporting military operations by restricting information leaks and controlling the release of objective data contributes to international and domestic political support for Ukraine. Russia’s use of AI-generated video in military operations may quickly undermine trust in its information.