Moscow Tries to Tie Its Partners to Putin’s Worldview

Moscow Tries to Tie Its Partners to Putin’s Worldview

Executive Summary:

• A September article by the Valdai Discussion Club argues that non-alignment no longer exists and that the West treats neutrality and confrontation alike, leaving governments in the Global South no choice but to pick a side.
• The claim originates with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who attends Valdai’s annual meetings, and Russian officials have pressed the same argument on a number of countries including Armenia, Serbia, India, and the United Arab Emirates.
• Moscow has little to offer the countries it courts. Russia plays a secondary role even within BRICS, depends on the People’s Republic of China and Iran, and cannot match the benefits of trade with the West.

On September 10, Russian political scientist and Valdai Discussion Club Program Director Timofei Bordachev penned an article titled “Non-alignment no longer exists” (Valdai Club, September 10). He argues that even insignificant manifestations of independence by governments of the “Global South” are “strikes against the interests of the United States and Europe,” which the West tolerates only because “at this time it simply is not strong enough to regain control of the world economy and politics.” He concludes that “there is no reason to think that the West’s policy toward those who have entered into confrontation with it and those who talk about their neutrality is structurally different” (Valdai Club, September 10).

The argument carries institutional weight because Valdai is not an independent research institution. Russian President Vladimir Putin attends its annual meetings, where his keynote addresses are published on the Kremlin’s official website (President of Russia, October 2, 2025). Independent Russian and Western journalists describe the club as a showcase for Kremlin foreign policy and note its ties to the Presidential Administration (Istories Media, September 15). The pattern follows Putin setting out a narrative, Valdai analysts giving it an analytical framing, and Russian officials repeating it in diplomatic form (see EDM, June 5, 2023).

Bordachev’s argument rests on a conflation of concepts. The Valdai analysts acknowledge that economic competition is inescapable in relations between large countries. From this, they draw two conclusions. First, that the West treats competitors as enemies. Second, that it will suppress any manifestations of independence by these “enemies” regardless of their conduct, simply because they are sovereign.

The view originates with Putin. The concept of the “unconditional enemy” seeking to destroy Russia because of its very existence was one of the main justifications for his aggression, which he can then present as “defense.” At the end of August, Putin declared that killer whales in the Arctic are eating bears and that this explains “why we are conducting the special military operation” (Meduza, August 29). He had earlier made similar but less metaphorical claims, asserting that the West has a single goal—to dismantle Russia and “lord it over its constituent parts and bring them under the Western control” (Kommersant, February 26, 2023).

The concept serves two purposes. Domestically, it justifies expansionist wars. In foreign policy, it serves to convince allies to “choose a side” in the confrontation between Russia and the West. Since, by Russian logic, the West is prepared to destroy its competitors regardless of their actions, those countries have no alternative but to choose Russia.

Russian officials advance the same argument in practice. In May, Russian Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov criticized Armenia for continuing to “sit on two chairs,” presenting its balancing act as an obstacle to relations with Moscow (Interfax, May 7). More often, officials follow the Valdai line and blame the West. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has argued that the European Union turns Serbia against Russia and forces Belgrade into an artificial choice between East and West (Daily Storm, February 19, 2018). The claim is that the West, not Moscow, leaves these states no alternative.

Valdai authors apply this logic directly to India and the United Arab Emirates. Brazilian political scientist and Valdai Club author Fabiano Melnichuk affirms that it is precisely “American assertiveness and associated neo-colonial practices that make it necessary for traditionally pragmatic countries to choose a side.” According to him, “the optimal way for both India and the UAE to restore strategic maneuverability and balance their relations with the West is to strengthen their commitment to BRICS,” particularly “in sectors where a partnership with the West appears most attractive” (Valdai Club, September 9). [1]

This is not the first time the Kremlin has attempted to force India and other countries to take Russia’s side and determine “which direction they take and with whom” (Argumenty i fakty, October 22, 2022). Kremlin strategists do not hide that they are trying to manipulate their foreign counterparts by playing on their colonial past (Valdai Club, April 14, 2022). Moscow cannot offer its partners any real alternatives.

The same analysts admit that BRICS today confronts myriad crises, particularly in relations between the UAE and Iran (Valdai Club, September 9). The People’s Republic of China (PRC), not Russia, leads BRICS, and Moscow is growing more dependent on Beijing (see EDM, November 13, 2024; The Big Asia, September 14). The PRC has proven a less-than-reliable partner for Moscow. Following Putin’s meeting with PRC President Xi Jinping at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, the contract for the construction of the Power of Siberia 2  gas pipeline was not signed, while a major fire at the Amur gas chemical complex underscored the risks for PRC companies investing in Russian projects (see EDM, September 8).

Moscow’s reliance on even such odious partners as Iran is also growing. As early as 2023, independent analysts noted that multi-billion-dollar investments by Gazprom in Iran were not paying off (Carnegie Politika, May 22, 2023). This has not prevented the Valdai Club from publishing odes to Iran dedicated to “understanding the legacy” of the late Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in relations with Russia.

The text abounds in complimentary rhetoric and declarations regarding “joint efforts to combat unipolar hegemony, counter unilateral coercive measures, and establish an independent financial infrastructure” (Valdai Club, September 2). Cooperation is primarily evident in the military sphere, and even there the direction is reversed. According to Western journalists, Iran is not so much supplying weaponry to Russia as asking Moscow to sell it advanced Geran strike drones for use in the war against Israel and the United States (Financial Times, September 14).

The Kremlin has virtually no investment projects capable of outweighing the benefits of trade with the West in the eyes of its partners. Sanctions create additional problems in cooperation with Russia. Against this background, Moscow’s persistent calls for partners to “choose a side” might backfire. The leaders of India and other states are unlikely to believe the West seeks to destroy them at any cost. If the choice becomes unavoidable, most of Russia’s current partners might opt for a completely different side.

Note:

[1] BRICS is a loose political-economic grouping originally comprised of Brazil, Russia, India, the People’s Republic of China, and South Africa, but now comprising 11 member states (BRICS Info, accessed September 9).