Kremlin’s Russian Nationalism Alienating Non-Russians at Home and Abroad

Kremlin’s Russian Nationalism Alienating Non-Russians at Home and Abroad

Executive Summary:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin’s increasing appeals to Russian ethno-nationalism—which he has employed to sustain support as Moscow enters the fifth year of its war against Ukraine—are alienating non-Russians domestically and across the former Soviet space.
• Putin’s repression has decreased the visibility of non-Russian alienation within Russia, but has not reduced it. Internationally, his war against Ukraine and bullying of other former Soviet republics have intensified anti-Moscow sentiments and led other countries in the region to distance themselves from Russia.
• There are some signs that Putin is learning that appealing only to the largest nationality within an empire has limited utility, but his moves away from this strategy have so far been ineffective.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has adopted ever more intense imperial Russian ethno-nationalism as his war against Ukraine grinds on. This trend is alienating non-Russians both within their own country and across the former Soviet space (Window on Eurasia, June 12, 2022, December 3, 2023; see EDM, June 24, 2025). The Kremlin’s repressive actions at home have obscured but not reduced this trend. Putin’s continuing aggression against Ukraine and bullying of other former Soviet republics that he believes are part of Moscow’s sphere of influence have intensified anti-Moscow feelings and led almost all the countries in the region to distance themselves from Russia (Window on Eurasia, March 17, 2022; see EDM, June 5, 2025; Idel.Realii, December 22, 2025). The situation has become so serious that there are some signs Putin—having begun to learn that relying on a core nationality alone is typically counterproductive—is backing away from some, but far from all, of his nationalist and imperialist positions (see EDM, June 5, 2025; Window on Eurasia, January 30, 2023, July 8, 26, 2025). His moves in that direction appear to be ringing hollow with his intended audiences and may leave him and his regime in an even worse position. This may especially be the case if non-Russians within Russia and the non-Russian countries conclude that he has been weakened and thus is in retreat (Natsional’nyi Aktsent, December 25, 2025, January 29).

Putin invaded Ukraine because of an imperialist vision of a restored Great Russia. Until recently, he tried to reduce the element of ideology as far as Russians are concerned, lest he trigger the rise of a nationalist movement inside his country that he could not control (see EDM, March 22, 2022). Instead, he has sought to recruit soldiers by paying them rather than inspiring them with his vision (see EDM, June 27, July 29, August 7, October 24, 2024, May 14, November 5, 2025). As the war has ground on, however, his regime has introduced ever more ideological elements. The Kremlin is facing more difficulties in filling the ever-depleting ranks of its military and a rise in xenophobia among Russians toward migrant workers (see EDM, May 9, 15, 2024, November 18, 2025). Putin also fears that Ukraine’s resistance is inspiring non-Russians within the Russian Federation and thus threatening his rule (Window on Eurasia, September 26, November 9, 2022, July 19, 2023). Non-Russians within the Russian Federation have certainly been affected by the war because Putin has recruited them disproportionately and deployed them in more dangerous positions (see EDM, April 4, 9, 16, 30, 2024, June 20, September 23, 2025). Kyiv’s efforts to help non-Russians and what is happening in Ukraine have also changed the way many of them think (Window on Eurasia, August 12, 2022; see EDM, January 25, February 1, April 25, August 8, 2024, October 16, 2025). Putin’s response has been repression, with most of the leaders of non-Russian nationalist groups now in jail or having emigrated, a situation that has obscured the power of such feelings but hardly reduced them.

If Moscow is holding its own in the non-Russian republics within the Russian Federation—at least as far as public demonstrations are concerned—it has been suffering repeated defeats in the independent countries that emerged in 1991. The list of their moves to distance themselves from Moscow since Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine is large and growing. For example, almost all independent countries that emerged following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, other than Russia, have fully accepted the West’s sanctions regime. Most have denounced the Kremlin’s plan to change borders, two have left Kremlin-organized post-Soviet regional organizations, and hostility toward Russia and even the use of Russian has increased (see EDM, May 12, 2022, August 5, July 22, October 31, 2024). These changes reflect the views of post-Soviet peoples and their governments. Moscow has been worried because its loss of influence in these countries will reduce Russia’s role in the world. The Kremlin has responded with ever more imperialistic bombast that frightens many far from Russian borders, but has a different effect on those next door.

Two new articles, one from Kazakhstan and another from the Russian Federation, call attention to this trend. The first article mentions developments in non-Russian countries, and the second article discusses developments inside of Russia. In the first, Serik Maleyev, the editor of Kazakhstan’s Altyn-Orda portal, is explicit. He says that to compensate at home for its failure to achieve victory in Ukraine, Moscow propagandists, such as Aleksandr Dugin, have adopted increasing imperialist rhetoric about countries in the region. Maleyev argues that this effort is backfiring and is convincing these countries that the only way they can have a secure future is for Russia to suffer a crushing defeat and disintegrate further (Altyn-Orda, January 24; Region.Expert, January 30).

Dugin, the chief megaphone for this rhetoric, Maleyev continues, is not just some odious eccentric. Rather, his words about the former Soviet republics not having the right to exist except as Russian client states are “the concentrated expression of imperial revanchism, which long ago became part of the Russian propaganda mainstream.” The Kazakhstan analyst adds that “the louder these imperial fantasies are sounded, the more obvious their compensatory character is.” Additionally, residents of neighboring countries will see this language “not as an argument in favor of coming together but rather as a direct warning” and as a reason “to see Russia’s total defeat not as something radical but sensible,” particularly at a time when Russia is in what is so obviously a “weakened” condition (Altyn-Orda, January 24).

In the second article, the well-connected and influential Nezygar Russian Telegram channel argues that Moscow’s increasingly Russian nationalist messaging is alienating non-Russians. It adds that “separatist sentiments in Russian regions have become a source of serious concern for the Kremlin and the security forces.” “Internal sociological surveys” conducted for the Putin regime show these sentiments have not disappeared in their hidden form but instead have intensified (Telegram/@russicaRU January 20). Minval, an Azerbaijani outlet that has been tracing the decline of Russian influence among non-Russians both within the Russian Federation and across the former Soviet space, highlighted Nezygar’s arguments (Minval, December 22, 2025, January 21, 30).

According to Nezygar, “closed studies record increases in alarming sentiments in the non-Russian republics.” Residents there increasingly interpret war deaths “not as abstract losses but as threats to the very existence of their peoples.” These perceptions are “fueled by alternative narratives” which “continue to circulate despite censorship.” This does not mean, it says, that Russia is about to see “a repetition of ‘the parade of sovereignties’ of the 1990s.” Moscow still has too tight control in regional capitals for that. Rather, Russia will see a period in which “regional elites will increasingly use the theme of autonomy as a bargaining tool.” It continues, saying that “as socio-economic problems [of the country] intensify,” demands for increased regional powers will grow—both from local elites and from the population. In the non-Russian republics, this demand is extremely likely to take the form of separatist sentiments.” The channel concludes that a major reason for this is Moscow’s “ideological shift toward Russian national patriotism” (Telegram/@russicaRU January 20).

The notion of a civic Russian identity “has been effectively replaced” over the last few years, the Telegram channel continues, by a more ethnic-Russian-centered nationalism that non-Russians are expected to accept. Nezygar argues:

For national minorities, this rhetoric appears exclusionary and reinforces a sense of alienation. No attempt is being made to strike a balance between ethnic diversity and the dominant national narrative, which, in the medium term, only increases the risk of destabilization.

That means the growth of separatism is “the most likely scenario” (Telegram/@russicaRU January 20).

Whether Putin will pull back from imperialist Russian nationalism and thus save Moscow’s position and perhaps his own remains to be seen. The threats to him and Moscow both inside and beyond Russia’s borders, however, are growing, and the time for him to do so may be running out.