Assessment of Gunpowder and Explosives Manufacturing in Russia
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 22 Issue:
By:
Executive Summary:
- Gunpowder production in Russia nearly doubled from 2022 to 2024 due to increased imports and domestic manufacturing of cotton cellulose nitrate. This rise suggests a potential doubling in artillery shell output during the same period.
- Russia remains dependent on imported raw materials, particularly cotton pulp and cellulose nitrate, despite ongoing efforts to develop alternatives from linen and hemp. Domestic sourcing challenges hinder self-sufficiency in critical components of gunpowder.
- Key chemical inputs for explosives, such as toluene and concentrated nitric acid, have seen noticeable production increases in Russia, reflecting both post-2010s recovery and heightened military demand since 2022, but growth capacity appears limited.
- A 17 percent workforce expansion across major explosives and gunpowder plants since 2021, with up to 57 percent increases at some key sites, underpins the rise in production, but further gains are constrained by outdated infrastructure.
- Modernization of Russia’s military-industrial complex is underway, but not yet transformative, with Russia focusing on sustaining output rather than achieving exponential growth. Future increases in manufacturing will likely face rising costs and logistical challenges.
The actual production rates of artillery shells, as well as mines, aircraft bombs, and conventional warheads in Russia are difficult to assess. It is possible, however, to analyze basic trends in the manufacturing of gunpowder (propellants) and explosives by examining available statistical data. This author had previously assessed the average annual production rate of artillery shells in August 2022 (The Insider, August 30, 2022).In the late 2010s, Russia produced approximately 1.1 million shells of all types and repaired 570,000 old shells of all types a year. Consequently, Russia acquired approximately 1.6–1.7 million artillery shells per year (The Insider, August 30, 2022).
The known data and previous assessments could provide an approximate understanding of the actual increase in arms production rates that depend on the gunpowder (propellants) and explosives industry. An attempt to analyze this data is even more important, as there have been published journalistic investigations regarding Russia’s import of cellulose nitrate, a key ingredient in the manufacturing of gunpowder (OCCRP, December 21, 2023; BBC-Russian Service, January 30, 2024).
Import of Cotton Lint, Cotton Pulp, and Cotton Cellulose Nitrate
Cotton cellulose nitrate is crucial for the manufacture of gunpowder. There is no significant domestic cotton cultivation in Russia, and most cotton lint, cotton pulp, and cotton cellulose nitrate have recently been imported from Uzbekistan, India, Malaysia, and Türkiye. In previous years, the list of suppliers was extensive, including Kazakhstan, the People’s Republic of China, Indonesia, and several European countries. As a result, available data on Russia’s import of these products provides the following picture:
Table 1: Russia’s import of cotton lint, cotton pulp, and cotton cellulose nitrate, 2013–2024, in tons
(Sources: UN Comtrade Database, accessed May 30, 2025; and Federal Customs Service of Russia*)
| Cotton lint
Trade code: 5201 |
Cotton pulp
Trade code: 470610 |
Cellulose nitrate (cotton)
Trade code: 391220 |
|
| 2013 | 66,500 | 1,464 | 684 |
| 2014 | 70,700 | 1,617 | 582 |
| 2015 | 53,300 | 1,961 | 723 |
| 2016 | 55,500 | 2,566 | 1,057 |
| 2017 | 28,400 | 4,403 | 994 |
| 2018 | 30,300 | 3,540 | 1,039 |
| 2019 | 22,100 | 3,391 | 1,416 |
| 2020 | 19,600 | 2,751 | 1,288 |
| 2021 | 25,000 | 2,460 | 1,809 |
| 2022 | 15,894 | 5,116 | 2,266 |
| 2023 | 15,113 | 7,722 | 3,009 |
| 2024 | 428 | 6,020 | 988 |
* Data on the import of cotton lint in 2013–2021 only
The data available in public international databases may be incomplete and/or updated with significant delays, but these numbers still demonstrate major trends. The selected time range is based on available data and encompasses two major turning points in Russia’s military activity in 2014 and 2022.
The dynamic import of cotton lint demonstrates both efforts of the Central Asian countries to process larger volumes of it domestically before export and the transformation of domestic cotton fabric manufacturing in Russia. For example, in 2013, Russia produced 1.311 billion square meters of cotton fabric, and in 2023, the production reached 928 million square meters. The lowest output was in 2016, when only 685 million square meters of cotton fabric were produced. In comparison, 1.542 billion square meters of cotton fabric were produced in Russia in 2010 (Kazpravda.kz, November 2, 2017; Rosstat, accessed on May 21).
Russia lacks a proper industrial base for extracting cotton pulp or cellulose from cotton lint. The efforts of Russia’s gunpowder factories in previous decades were focused on acquiring cotton pulp or cotton nitrate cellulose directly from Central Asia without the development of domestic manufacturing of the cotton pulp. Moreover, Russian companies, universities, and research institutes were attempting to develop technologies for extracting cellulose from linen and hemp fiber (cannabis) and alternative methods for extracting wood cellulose (see Newsko.ru, August 14, 2001; RG.ru, September 14, 2015; Noc.rf, December 27, 2021; New.ras.ru, April 28, 2022; Kommersant, April 8, 2024).
Whether Russia will be able to completely abandon the use of cotton cellulose in the foreseeable future is unclear. Cotton cellulose has a specific structure and properties that make it ideal for gunpowder manufacturing. Additionally, the domestic production rates of linen and hemp fiber in Russia are too low and unstable to support a complete switch to alternative sources of cellulose for the gunpowder industry. Nevertheless, efforts in this direction are ongoing (Government.ru, May 13, 2022; Pole.rf, May 7; Vestnik Kazanskogo Technologicheskogo Universiteta, 2015, No. 2; Rosstat, accessed on May 23). That means that only the data on the import of cotton pulp and cotton cellulose nitrate is relevant for assessing the actual state of Russia’s gunpowder industry. The amount of imported cotton lint can be ignored for our analysis.
Domestic Manufacturing of Cotton Cellulose Nitrate
There are two main types of cotton cellulose nitrate: pyroxylin No. 2 (nitrocotton, trinitrocellulose), needed for gunpowder manufacturing, and colloxylin (dinitrocellulose), needed for propellant (ballistite powder) manufacturing as well as for coatings and paints, inks manufacturing, etc. This explains the significant growth in the import of cotton pulp and cellulose nitrate since 2014, particularly since 2022. Russia has been trying to increase production rates of gunpowder to substitute for paints and inks previously imported from Europe and other countries (Vedomosti, March 19, 2024).
Available statistical data indirectly confirm the issue of substitution. The total production of coatings, paints, and inks increased from approximately 1.3 million tons in 2014 to over 2.2 million tons in 2022. There is no detailed information on the types and proportions of these products, however, because only part of them contain cellulose nitrate (Rosstat, accessed May 21).
Nitration of one ton of cellulose pulp gives 1.42 tons of colloxylin or 1.54 tons of pyroxylin No. 2. Roughly speaking, one ton of cellulose pulp gives 1.5 tons of cellulose nitrate. A share of gunpowder manufacturing in the consumption of cotton cellulose nitrates is about 7.5–8.5 percent in countries such as Germany and the United States. Presumably, this data can be extrapolated to Russia with an increase to 10 percent (Khimicheskie Volokna, 2020, No. 3, accessed May 22; Vestnik Kazanskogo Technologicheskogo Universiteta, 2015, No. 18, accessed May 23).
Consequently, the balance of cotton cellulose nitrate available for gunpowder manufacturing in Russia may be calculated as follows:
Table 2: Potential domestic manufacturing of cotton cellulose nitrate in Russia and the total amount of available cotton cellulose nitrate considering known import supplies, tons
| Potential production | Import (trade code: 391220) | TOTAL | |
| 2013 | 2,196 | 684 | 2,880 |
| 2014 | 2,425 | 582 | 3,006 |
| 2015 | 2,941 | 723 | 3,664 |
| 2016 | 3,850 | 1,057 | 4,906 |
| 2017 | 6,604 | 994 | 7,598 |
| 2018 | 5,311 | 1,039 | 6,350 |
| 2019 | 5,087 | 1,416 | 6,503 |
| 2020 | 4,126 | 1,288 | 5,415 |
| 2021 | 3,691 | 1,809 | 5,500 |
| 2022 | 7,674 | 2,266 | 9,940 |
| 2023 | 11,582 | 3,009 | 14,591 |
| 2024 | 9,030 | 988 | 10,018 |
It should be noted that Russian companies maintain stockpiles of cotton cellulose and cotton cellulose nitrate for at least a 1–1.5-year period and do not use all the supplied materials immediately. Nevertheless, the calculation testifies that Russia doubled the average annual production and consumption of cotton cellulose nitrate in 2022–2024 compared to the average annual production and consumption in 2016–2021.
Assessment of Gunpowder Production Rate
Neither pyroxylin No. 2 (trinitrocellulose) nor colloxylin are gunpowder or propellants themselves. First, pyroxylin No. 2 is mixed with pyroxylin No. 1, which is usually made from wooden sulfite pulp. The proportion of pyroxylin No. 1 and pyroxylin No. 2 differs from one type of gunpowder to another, but usually it is made in a range between 80 percent pyroxylin No. 1 and 20 percent pyroxylin No. 2, and 71 percent pyroxylin No. 1 to 29 percent pyroxylin No. 2, respectively. Simply speaking, wood cellulose nitrate dominates, and Russia has enough wood:
Table 3: Available data on the production of wood cellulose and wooden sulfite pulp in Russia, tons (Source: Rosstat, accessed May 30, 2025)
| Wood cellulose (total amount) | Incl. sulfite pulp | |
| 2013 | 7,200,000 | |
| 2014 | 7,503,000 | |
| 2015 | 7,871,000 | |
| 2016 | 8,204,000 | |
| 2017 | 8,587,000 | |
| 2018 | 8,578,000 | |
| 2019 | 8,250,000 | |
| 2020 | 8,765,000 | |
| 2021 | 8,825,047 | 355,382 |
| 2022 | 8,769,491 | 350,650 |
| 2023 | 8,553,576 | 341,681 |
| 2024 | 8,537,666 | 344,713 |
This blended pyroxylin is processed into gunpowder. Colloxylin also comes in different types that are processed into propellants or various civil products. If the mentioned share of gunpowder (propellant) manufacturing in the consumption of cotton cellulose nitrate is correct and does not exceed 10 percent, Russia’s production of gunpowder would be the following:
Table 4: Approximate amount of blended pyroxylin produced in Russia, tons
| Approximate amount of
pyroxylin No. 2 and colloxylin |
Approximate amount of blended pyroxylin for gunpowder and colloxylin for propellants | ||
| 10 percent of the total amount of cotton cellulose nitrate | Minimum | Maximum | |
| 2013 | 288 | 993 | 1,440 |
| 2014 | 301 | 1,037 | 1,503 |
| 2015 | 366 | 1,263 | 1,832 |
| 2016 | 491 | 1,692 | 2,453 |
| 2017 | 760 | 2,620 | 3,799 |
| 2018 | 635 | 2,190 | 3,175 |
| 2019 | 650 | 2,242 | 3,251 |
| 2020 | 541 | 1,867 | 2,707 |
| 2021 | 550 | 1,896 | 2,750 |
| 2022 | 994 | 3,428 | 4,970 |
| 2023 | 1,459 | 5,031 | 7,295 |
| 2024 | 1,002 | 3,454 | 5,009 |
The amount of blended pyroxylin in gunpowder is 90–95 percent, and the amount of colloxylin in propellants (ballistite gunpowder) differs from 45 percent to 57 percent. Propellant charges for artillery shells, however, usually use gunpowder made of blended pyroxylin. Colloxylin propellants (ballistite gunpowder) are typically used for Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) rockets and consume a minor part of the cellulose nitrates available for gunpowder (propellant) manufacturing.
That means the conservative assessment of total gunpowder output can be based on two presumptions: a) that Russia produces the maximum amount of blended pyroxylin and colloxylin; and b) that Russia produces the maximum amount of pyroxylin gunpowder with 90 percent of blended pyroxylin. As a result, the total gunpowder output would be the following:
Table 5: Approximate pyroxylin gunpowder output in Russia, tons
| Maximum amount of pyroxylin gunpowder output | |
| 2013 | 1,440 |
| 2014 | 1,503 |
| 2015 | 1,832 |
| 2016 | 2,453 |
| 2017 | 3,799 |
| 2018 | 3,175 |
| 2019 | 3,251 |
| 2020 | 2,707 |
| 2021 | 2,750 |
| 2022 | 4,970 |
| 2023 | 7,295 |
| 2024 | 5,009 |
Consequently, Russia would be able to double the average annual production of gunpowder in 2022–2024 compared to the previous decade. This calculation allows for the presumption that the production rate of new artillery shells would also have doubled in 2022–2024 from the average 1.1 million per year to up to 2.2 million per year. This amount does not cover Russia’s consumption of artillery shells in Ukraine, however. It explains why Russia has been dependent on supplies of millions of artillery shells from North Korea since the fall of 2023 (The Insider, April 15; Hani.co.kr, May 30). Without these supplies, there would be at least parity in artillery between Russia and Ukraine.
Assessment of Explosives Production Rate
Besides gunpowder, the dynamics of explosives manufacturing is also crucially important for the approximate assessment of Russia’s actual military capabilities. This dynamic can be estimated through statistical data related to the basic components needed for this industrial sector. The problem is in the depth of the Russian statistics here compared to the data on cellulose nitrates. This decade-long dynamic, however, is available for analysis:
Table 6: Production of components for explosives manufacturing, tons (except aluminum powders)
(Sources: Rosstat and industrial data)
| Toluene | Ammonium nitrate | Potassium nitrate | Concentrated nitric acid | Sulfuric acid (oleum) | Aluminum powders, percentofthe previous year | |
| 2013 | 131,600 | 10,300,000 | ||||
| 2014 | 300,000 | 9,817,000 | ||||
| 2015 | 369,865 | 10,395,000 | ||||
| 2016 | 354,331 | 11,600,000 | ||||
| 2017 | 356,397 | 9,000 | 90,000<100,000 | 12,400,000 | 99.2 | |
| 2018 | 333,181 | 9,298,000 | 11,000 | 13,100,000 | 101.4 | |
| 2019 | 320,964 | 9,800,000 | 10,000 | 13,400,000 | 94.2 | |
| 2020 | 307,163 | 11,102,800 | 14,000,000 | 107.8 | ||
| 2021 | 273,174 | 11,006,400 | 12,397 | 76,196 | 14,498,590 | 123.9 |
| 2022 | 330,655 | 11,691,389 | 12,074 | 85,263 | 15,191,722 | 94.0 |
| 2023 | 370,305 | 11,729,828 | 12,140 | 85,519 | 15,565,428 | 86.3 |
| 2024 | 387,914 | 11,817,436 | 53,561 | 105,341 | 15,940,687 | 87.1 |
The numbers above demonstrate a noticeable increase in production rates of all components required for various types of explosives, as well as solid rocket propellants, ballistite, and gunpowder, except for aluminum powders.
Three major factors determine the increase in toluene and concentrated nitric acid: a) recovery growth after a decline in the late 2010s; b) import substitution policy boosted by the sanctions; and c) growing needs for explosives themselves. For example, the typical share of explosives manufacturing in total production and consumption of toluene was about 9 percent during the 2010s (HSE.ru, July 6, 2019). That means 31,000–33,000 tons of toluene were used for explosives manufacturing a decade ago, when there was a previous peak of toluene manufacturing.
For the purpose of conservative assessment, we can presume that the explosives production rates were relatively stable in 2018–2021, and the consumption of toluene for military purposes was stable, respectively, regardless of the decline in total toluene manufacturing. We can also presume that all the growth of toluene output in 2022–2024 was driven by military needs. Consequently, the toluene output for military needs would be about 51,000 tons, or 1.5–1.6 times more than before 2022. The reality, however, would be more complicated.
The previous peak in toluene production rates, which occurred in the mid-2010s, correlates with the peak in gunpowder (propellants) production rates of the same period. Additionally, the current growth of toluene production correlates with the visible increase in gunpowder production. The correlation does not necessarily imply a direct relationship, but it is highly probable. If true, that the toluene output in 2024 is only 5 percent higher than the toluene output in 2015, should be noted. As a result, approximately 35,000 tons of toluene would be used for explosives manufacturing in Russia in 2024.Briefly speaking, there is a range of between 35,000 tons and 51,000 tons used in Russia for manufacturing military explosives these days.
The presented calculations also correlate with the output of concentrated nitric acid. Two main factories in Russia manufacture concentrated nitric acid for gunpowder and explosives production: the Azot branch of Uralchem, located in Berezniki, Perm oblast, and NAK Azot, a subsidiary company of EuroChem Group, located in Novomoskovsk, Tula oblast. The decline in concentrated nitric acid output that occurred after 2017 was primarily attributed to a decrease in production rates at the NAK Azot plant. For example, the plant produced 40,000 tons of concentrated nitric acid in 2017, but only 19,000 tons in 2021(Chemtech.ru, July 25, 2018).
Since that time, NAK Azot has restored its production rate of concentrated nitric acid, and the Azot branch of Uralchem has increased its production rate of concentrated nitric acid by 15 percent. That means the growth of concentrated nitric acid by 38 percent in 2021–2024 was a recovery growth. The real growth compared to the previous peak of the mid-2010s was 5–17 percent by the end of 2024. This also shows the limits of Russia’s capabilities to scale arms manufacturing and explains Moscow’s dependency on arms supplies from North Korea and Iran and its bet on cannon fodder.
Additional Indicator: Number of Employees
The available data and calculations based on this data do not mean that the risk of analytical mistakes is absent or at least low enough. There is, however, still a significant amount of manual labor in the Russian gunpowder and explosive industries. Therefore, the increase in production rates must be related to the inevitable growth of personnel. Even though the number of employees on the Russian gunpowder and explosives factories and plants is fragmented, some conclusions are possible:
Table 7: Approximate number of employees at Russian gunpowder and propellant plants in 2021 and in 2025 (Source: Author’s calculations based on open-source data)
| Military products | 2021 | 2025 | ||
| 1 | Aleksin Chemical Plant | Gunpowder, explosives | 1,000 | 1,000 |
| 2 | Anozit | Propellants (for missiles) | 1,300 | 1,300 |
| 3 | FRPC Altay | Propellants (mostly for ICBMs/SLBMs) | 1,000 | 1,500 |
| 4 | Kamensky Plant | Propellants | 3,500 | 3,500 |
| 5 | Kazan Gunpowder Plant | Gunpowder, explosives | 2,100 | 3,300 |
| 6 | Perm Gunpowder Plant | Propellants (MLRS and missiles) | 4,000 | 4,400 |
| 7 | Samara Plant “Kommunar” | Gunpowder (black) | 500 | 500 |
| 8 | Solikamsk Plant “Ural” | Gunpowder, propellants | 1,700 | 1,700 |
| 9 | Sverdlov Plant (including Biysk Oleum Plant) | Explosives | 6,700 | 8,000 |
| 10 | Tambov Gunpowder Plant | Gunpowder, explosives | 1,800 | 2,500 |
| TOTAL | 23,600 | 27,700 | ||
The visible average increase of personnel among all gunpowder, propellants, and explosives manufacturing companies has been 17 percent since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. If only the major plants producing gunpowder and explosives for artillery—the Kazan and Tambov gunpowder plants and the Sverdlov Plant in Dzerzhinsk, together with its branch in Byisk—are taken into account, the increase is 57 percent, 39 percent, and 19 percent, respectively. Such an increase in personnel, especially in Kazan and Tambov, together with extended work shifts, could hypothetically increase actual production rates by up to 70 percent.
Nevertheless, the further increase in production rates requires not only more people but also a complete modernization of these factories, considering the poor state of the facilities and outdated equipment (see EDM, July 25, August 1, November 27, 2024). Major modernization of the Kazan Gunpowder Plant has been ongoing since 2022. Modernization of the Biysk Oleum Plant, the Perm Gunpowder Plant, and other plants is also ongoing. This process, however, still needs time, and outcomes of these efforts will only be visible in the coming years (Kommersant, December 26, 2022; Realnoevremya.ru, July 8, 2023; TASS, July 30, 2024; Kommersant, February 19; Meduza, May 8).
Russia is trying to renew its gunpowder and explosives industry while considering the prospect of a long war or even multiple wars. Russia aims to achieve stable production rates at current levels, without years-long periods of decline. Moscow, however, will likely attempt to increase the actual rates further.
Conclusion
The available statistical data indicate that Russia was able to nearly double its gunpowder manufacturing capacity during 2022–2024, and consequently, double the total output of artillery shells compared to the previous decade. The known number of those in the workforce at the main gunpowder and explosive plants, together with the available amount of toluene and concentrated nitric acid, however, suggests that the increase would be more moderate, at 70 percent or even less.
The amount of manufacturing chemical components, such as toluene, concentrated nitric acid, and potassium nitrate, as well as some existing stockpiles of explosives, likely gives Russia room for maneuver in this industrial sector, allowing for increased output of prioritized artillery shells, MLRS rockets, and mines, corresponding to the increase in visible gunpowder output.
The available workforce questions a further increase in production rates, the current state of gunpowder plants, modernization programs, and the production rates of necessary chemical components. As for this year, there is no “manufacturing miracle.” Russia’s industrial capabilities are not endless, and any further attempts to increase the output of gunpowder and explosives would be more costly and risky for the industry.
