Iran and Russia Seek to Reshape Global Hegemony with New Bilateral Agreement

Executive Summary:

• Cooperation between Iran and Russia has improved incrementally since 2022, especially in the military sphere. The two countries are expected to sign a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement toward the end of this year. 
• Moscow and Tehran have faced challenges due to Western sanctions and are eager to introduce an agreement that would reflect their evolving partnership and shared opposition to the collective West.
• The rise of transnational organizations such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization marks a new era in global geopolitics, with Russia and Iran positioning themselves as ascending powers.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met in Kazan, Russia, during the latest BRICS (a loose political economic grouping originally consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) summit, held on October 22–24 (Kremlin.ru, October 23; see EDM, October 28). This follows an earlier meeting between the two leaders on bilateral ties in Ashgabat on October 11 (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, October 11). Given that Iran has recently inaugurated a new president who seeks to improve foreign relations, the bilateral agenda was quite expansive, accounting for both countries’ interest in developing closer ties in light of their respective conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East. Both sides have found themselves in a similar position—isolated by the West, targeted by sanctions, and eager for new allies—and look to establish closer political and military cooperation. Moscow and Tehran are motivated to introduce an agreement that would reflect their changing preferences and underline their shared opposition to the collective West. 

Cooperation between the two countries has seen incremental improvement across various fronts since 2022 despite mutual distrust. This trend is expected to culminate in the signing of a comprehensive agreement that promises to redefine the scope of their strategic partnership (Amwaj, September 19). Although an exact date for such a signing has not yet been established, both Moscow and Tehran will likely look to ratify some sort of treaty by the end of the year, as both sides are eager to quickly sign an agreement, demonstrated by their ambitious designs in bilateral ties (see EDM, September 18). 

The exact contents of what would be in this agreement are unknown. Compared with a previous treaty signed by the two countries more than twenty years ago, the expected agreements will likely involve much more extensive political, economic, and cultural ties (Russian Council, July 22, 2021). A heavy emphasis will likely be placed on military and security cooperation, as this is the cornerstone of their expanding relationship (see EDM, July 22, December 12, 2022, March 6, 2023, February 22). More precisely, drone and missile production is sure to top Moscow and Tehran’s agendas, given that their respective conflicts with Ukraine and Israel have proven to both the importance of such weapon systems (see Terrorism Monitor, November 4, 2022; see EDM, July 22, 2022, September 14, 2023, October 16). The two sides are also likely to double down on greater training assistance and Iran’s purchase of Russian Su-35 fighter jets and potentially S-400 missile systems (Euronews, October 25; Kyiv Post, October 27). 

Outside of defense, the new agreement is also set to extend collaboration into areas such as trade, media, education, space exploration, cultural exchange, and a common payment system (see EDM, December 13, 2021, May 1; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, August 10, 2022; Iran International, December 15, 2023; The Moscow Times, November 4). Moscow and Tehran will also be eager to resolve disagreements impeding the construction of major gas pipelines in Iran, implementing liquified natural gas projects, and undertaking swap operations involving natural gas and oil products (Iran International, October 14, 2023; The Moscow Times, October 1).

Infrastructure will be a critical topic of discussion. Moscow and Tehran have tried to improve and expand the vital International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) (see EDM, June 7, 2023, March 6; Tehran Times, September 17). Running along the Caspian Sea and connecting Russia with Iran’s southern ports, creating access to the Indian Ocean and South Asian markets, this corridor has been a historic trading route between Russia and Iran since the sixteenth century, used by both to bypass Ottoman influence and access distant markets across the region. 

While Iran and Russia have been historical adversaries more often than not—having vied for influence in the Caucasus and Middle East throughout the imperial era—their cooperation does have historical roots. In the late sixteenth century, Safavid Iran and the Russian Tsardom joined forces to counter Ottoman expansion. Similarly, in today’s context, Russia and Iran’s warming relationship is driven by shared grievances against the West and their common desire to challenge the world order. Tehran’s support for proxy regimes throughout the Middle East and Moscow’s support for the Syrian regime have both been viewed as examples of their efforts to counter Western influence in the region (see EDM, July 31, 2017, February 5, July 29, October 7; Anadolu, September 28).

For Iran, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and its subsequent isolation from Western diplomatic institutions acted as a defining moment that pushed Russia into closer relations with the Islamic Republic. Isolated from Western trade and facing heavy sanctions, Russia’s pivot to the Middle East and Asia has made Iran an indispensable partner. Iran has supported Russia with advanced weaponry, and these budding ties even extended to proxy conflicts, such as Moscow’s alleged support for the Houthis in Yemen, even at the risk of damaging Russia’s relationships with other regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which have traditionally opposed the Houthis (see EDM, August 8, October 7).

Moscow’s shift to a more pro-Iran stance has become much more pronounced in recent years. Even so, direct military support in Iran’s conflicts, particularly with Israel—which harbors a large Russian population— remains unlikely. Nevertheless, leaders in Iran and Russia envision a multipolar world premised on challenging Western geopolitical and economic hegemony. This fits into a more comprehensive continuum of countries, China being the principal actor, looking to create alternative alliance networks and key geopolitical leaders globally. The rise of transnational organizations such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization marks a new era in global geopolitics, with Russia and Iran positioning themselves as ascending powers (see EDM, July 15, October 16; see China Brief, July 12).