Russia Exploits Latvian Vulnerabilities to Undermine Baltic Defenses (Part Two)

(Part One)

Executive Summary:

• Russia is discreetly deploying new motorized rifle divisions and advanced artillery systems, including North Korean equipment, to regions near Latvia, forming a strategic reserve with little public visibility.
• Belarus is being transformed into an operational flank bastion through mobilization, infrastructure upgrades near the Latvian border, and large-scale exercises that simulate offensive maneuvers, indicating deep coordination with Russian strategic plans.
• Infrastructure developments in Russia’s northwest—such as railway and depot upgrades—signal preparations for a potential rapid advance into Latvia.
• The likely offensive axis would bypass strongholds in Latvia to reach logistical junctions, split North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defenses, and isolate Riga, potentially enabling a Baltic foothold.
• Drawing from its Ukraine experience, Russia may implement a “pulsing offensive” using mobile units, electronic warfare, and psychological operations to paralyze command structures and force a destabilizing ceasefire that acknowledges new territorial realities.

Over the past two years, alarming structural changes have been observed in the Russian Armed Forces, especially in areas adjacent to Latvia (see EDM, February 29, May 23, June 17, 2024). In the Leningrad Military District and Belarus, the deployment of entirely new motorized rifle divisions—including the 116th, 72nd, 74th, and 86th motorized rifle divisions (Guards MRDs), among others—has begun, which has not been reported in public communiqués. Their coordination, relocation, and re-equipment are taking place outside the focus of active Western attention, which may indicate that they are intended for a different, alternative campaign. (Telegram/@pozivnoy_kazman, September 1, 2024, April 27)

Simultaneously, Russian echelons carrying the latest artillery systems and Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) platforms, including Malva self-propelled howitzers and equipment of North Korean origin, are being observed moving through Petrozavodsk, Pskov, Tikhvin, and Gatchina in Russia, but not reaching the fronts in Ukraine (VKontakte/milinfolive, April 26). This suggests that a deep strategic reserve is being formed, either to suppress potential internal unrest or for a new theater of operations. The logistics of these echelons are tightly coordinated. Many platforms are covered with tarps, and the accompanying units restrict civilian access to the platforms and stations. This indirectly confirms that this is not about rotation, but about deliberate redeployment (LRT, May 9).

Belarus, in this configuration, acts as an operational flank bastion. In 2024–2025, it intensified the formation of expanded divisional structures based on brigades and mobilized many reservists under the guise of territorial defense. Soviet-era weapons storage facilities, which had been unused for decades, have been reactivated (The New York Times; Ukrainska Pravda, May 10, 2024). In the western part of the country (Hlybokaye, Polatsk, Braslaw), engineering works are being intensified, including modernization of highways and bridges leading to the Latvian border (Belpatriot.by, October 9, 2023; TopWar.ru, April 29). This is a significant sign—if one follows the methodology of Soviet military strategist Alexander Svechin and the Soviet General Staff—of preparations for an offensive operation during its concealed phase (see EDM, April 17, 2024). (To read about Svechin’s military methodology, see his novel Strategy, originally published in 1927.)

An additional indicator of impending operations is the systematic activation of infrastructure in northern and northwestern Russia. In particular, there is the reconstruction and expansion of railway hubs in the Pskov region, the modernization of storage facilities in the areas of Ostrov, Velikiye Luki, and Palkino, and the restoration of logistical sites from the Soviet era, such as auxiliary stations, backup overpasses, and ammunition depots (Pskov Oblast Website, January 30; Informpskov.ru, February 18; RZD-Partner, April 4).

These measures make little sense for supplying the front in Ukraine, but they logically align as preparations for rapid deployment toward the Latvian direction, especially given that these regions border Daugavpils and Rēzekne (see EDM, May 28).

No less concerning is the evolving role of the Belarusian component. The Belarusian Armed Forces have traditionally been viewed as a secondary instrument in Russia’s strategic calculations. In 2024–2025, however, Belarus has deployed territorial defense units involving its mobilization reserve; conducted large-scale exercises simulating the defense of the western direction, which covertly models a strike deep into Latvia and Lithuania; and created temporary-use military bases and headquarters, in which supply depots and medical facilities have been pre-positioned (see EDM, April 17, 2024; VSquare, October 30, 2024).

Indirect strategic indicators of Russia’s restructuring near the Baltics include the disappearance of public information about the movement of certain echelons, including the movement of North Korean equipment in Siberia, GPS and mobile signal jamming in border areas, and the absence of Russia’s usual “showcase” style video coverage of military columns on TikTok and Telegram (see EDM, May 15, 2024; GNSS Jamming, October 28, 2024). This indicates that forces in question are not part of Russia’s rotational mass for Ukraine, but rather an instrument of covert mobilization and stealth redeployment—in full accordance with the classical model of strategic masked offensive operations, as described by Svechin.

Operational Exploitation of Success—Reaching the Sea, Blocking Riga

Based on this author’s extensive experience as a military analyst and combat veteran, the following is a likely path Russian forces will take if Russia is, in fact, assembling forces near the Latvian border for an offensive operation. If Russia manages to seize Daugavpils and Rēzekne, Russian forces will likely not linger to hold eastern Latgale but will instead advance along the trajectory from Rēzekne to Preiļi, then to Jēkabpils, and finally to Jelgava, following the A6 highway and railway lines. This will allow them to shorten logistical distances, outpace potential North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) reserves, and reach operational space leading either toward Tukums or Riga.

If successful at this stage, three strategic effects are achieved simultaneously. First, Russia will have succeeded in dissecting Latvian defenses, blocking the transfer of forces from southern Lithuania to the north, toward the Estonian border. Second, Russia will have achieved a flanking threat to Riga, creating political and psychological instability. Third, Russia will have created a coastal foothold via Tukums or Ventspils on the Baltic Sea, which it could potentially use for transferring reinforcements by sea, either as a show of force or to establish a “Courland Enclave.”

The logic applied here mirrors that of August 1944’s Šiauliai Operation on the 1st Baltic Front, which was not a frontal battle for major hubs during World War II, but rather an envelopment, seizure of critical communication lines, and destabilization of the adversary’s coordination (Russian Defense Ministry, web archive accessed June 3). A modern analogue of this is the use of battalion tactical group “tentacles” in Russia’s war against Ukraine—rapid expansion through weakly defended directions, followed by the inflation of military presence and area coverage (see EDM, March 9, 2022, August 8, 2023).

By analogy with Operation Doppelkopf, where German forces reached Tukums in an attempt to restore contact with Courland, the Russian grouping may employ bypass routes along highways A6 and A8, cutting Riga off from the south and depriving it of logistical support. (For more about Operation Doppelkopf, see Niepold, Gerd. Panzer-operationen: “doppelkopf” und “cäsar”. Kurland-Sommer ‘44. Herford: E.S. Mittler und Sohn, 1987.)  If Russia follows this path, the key objective may not necessarily be to capture the cities themselves but to control junctions and intersections, which would be sufficient to paralyze the movement of reserves, sever communication with Lithuania and the Suwałki Corridor, and force NATO into a rushed and uncoordinated response.

Moreover, considering Russia’s experience from its war against Ukraine, especially its first months, there is likely to be extensive use of electronic warfare (EW) and camouflage, including mobile groups operating without a unified front line (see Black Sea Battleground, August 27, 2021; see EDM, May 24, 2017, May 9, November 11, 2022, February 13, March 3). In such conditions, a temporary loss of command and control in NATO’s Latvian sector is possible, as is a gap between political decisions and operational reality. This creates a window for power projection—a push toward Tukums, a partial blockade of Riga, and possibly the simulation of preparations for an amphibious landing along the coast. From an informational and psychological standpoint, this would be no less destructive than a full-scale occupation.

Based on its experience during the war against Ukraine, particularly the failure of Russian broad-front offensives in a saturated ISTAR (intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance) environment, it can be assumed that this phase will not feature a classic dense offensive formation (Euromaidan Press, May 21). Instead, a “pulsing offensive” model will be applied, in which mobile forward detachments penetrate deep into territory, operating outside a dense logistical framework but with powerful artillery support at the tactical level. This was already employed in 2022–2023 in Ukraine, especially during advances in Zaporizhzhia oblast, when assault companies were deployed, followed by logistical extension along a narrow corridor, without waiting for full stabilization of the flanks (McCrory, Electronic Warfare in Ukraine: Preliminary Lessons for NATO Air Power Capability Development, October 2023; see EDM, July 24, 2024).

In the event of an offensive into Latvia, this would involve capturing or blocking key junctions—including Jelgava, Tukums, and possibly Ventspils—with minimal clearing operations and only targeted control of communications. The primary objective will not be classic territorial control, but operational and political effects, splitting the country and isolating Riga. Russia may then offer an ultimatum: a ceasefire and recognition of a “new status quo” in exchange for opening a humanitarian corridor and halting further mobilization in the Baltics.

Combined with a mass EW campaign—disruption of mobile communications, GPS suppression, and disinformation about an alleged mass government flight—and the presence of “peaceful representatives” on the ground, Russia is probably aiming to create an atmosphere of partial collapse of state vertical power in Latvia (see EDM, May 28). This would repeat not only the Ukrainian scenario of February 2022, but also elements of the reactive pressure model that Russia used in Transnistria, South Ossetia, and Crimea—not taking everything, but cutting off, intimidating, and offering a “negotiated exit” from a “dead end” that Russia itself created.