Türkiye Builds Nuclear Plant With Russia to Boost Energy Security

Executive Summary:

• Türkiye is moving ahead with its first nuclear power plant in Akkuyu in partnership with Russia to expand domestic energy production and meet economic growth.
• Financing delays and sanctions-related challenges are testing the resilience of the Türkiye-Russia nuclear partnership, as the two countries seek to keep the project on track for a 2028 launch.
• The $20 billion plant is the first in the world to be constructed under the build-own-operate model by Russia’s state-owned nuclear corporation, Rosatom. This raises questions about long-term Russian influence in Türkiye’s energy infrastructure.

On May 26, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan discussed the situation at Türkiye’s first nuclear power plant (NPP) with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow (President of Russia, May 26; TASS, May 27). According to Fidan, the two discussed “how we can resolve financing issues” of the NPP, which is facing “sanctions and some problems arising” (TASS, May 29). The problems Fidan referred to are Türkiye’s $7 billion payment delay to Russia’s state-owned nuclear corporation, Rosatom (Türkiye Today; Habertürk, May 27). Türkiye has reportedly not met Rosatom’s requests for financial concessions, including exceptions from withholding tax on the payments (Türkiye Today; Habertürk, May 27). If the financing problems are resolved, Ankara will be on schedule to operate its first NPP by the end of 2028 (Anadolu Agency, December 12, 2024). The Akkuyu NPP will be the first in the world to be constructed using the build-own-operate (BOO) model by Rosatom, which gives the Russian company the right to construct and operate the project. As Rosatom is ultimately controlled by the Kremlin, this creates a potential security risk for Türkiye and its Black Sea neighbors, while undermining Ankara’s position in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The construction of the Akkuyu Turkish NPP on the Mediterranean coast continued in 2024. In December, the reactor pressure vessel for Unit 3 was assembled, and during the same period, Rosatom’s subsidiary TVEL delivered the first batch of nuclear fuel for Unit 2 (Akkuyu Nükleer Anonim Şirketi, December 30, 2024). Upon completion, the plant will house four reactor units with a combined capacity of 4.8 gigawatts (GW), producing approximately 10 percent of Türkiye’s electricity requirements (World Nuclear Association, December 17, 2024; Akkuyu Nükleer Anonim Şirketi, accessed June 11).

The NPP helps resolve Türkiye’s long-standing concerns as a net energy importer regarding its energy security and status as a Black Sea power (International Energy Agency (IEA), accessed May 22). To propel its economic development, Türkiye’s energy consumption doubled in the past two decades, the fastest growth among member states of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed May 22).  According to the IEA, to power this rapid growth, Türkiye imported nearly 72 percent of its energy requirements (IEA, accessed May 22).

In 2023, Türkiye was the second-largest importer of Russian natural gas, after the European Union, and the fourth-largest importer of Russian crude oil (Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air, January 23, 2024). Türkiye’s reliance on energy imports, particularly oil and gas, forced Ankara to emphasize market liberalization and energy security in its energy policy (IEA, March 2021). To meet these ambitious objectives, Ankara will expand domestic production, build out associated infrastructure, and reduce consumption through greater efficiencies. Included in the state energy strategy is the desire to position itself as a regional energy hub, primarily in natural gas (Republic of Türkiye, 2022). Türkiye is also investing in renewables to achieve its decarbonization goals and develop green energy sources (IEA, March 2021; IEA, March 11, 2021). It considers nuclear energy essential for meeting its projected energy production and decarbonization targets, given its reputation as a cleaner alternative to hydrocarbons and its advantages as a domestic, rather than imported, energy source (Hurriyet Daily News, April 26, 2024; Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, accessed June 11).

In the early 2000s, national security concerns stemming from increased energy imports prompted renewed interest in civilian nuclear energy solutions that had dissipated after the 1986 Chornobyl disaster (Energy Policy, January 2020; Daily Sabah, June 20). These solutions involved constructing three NPPs with a combined capacity of 15 GW to be operational by 2023 (World Nuclear Association, December 17, 2024). After years of failed discussions with Western companies to introduce civil nuclear energy, and with Russia seeking to export its nuclear energy expertise to offset the effects of sanctions, the first intergovernmental agreement was signed in 2010 with Rosatom to construct a 4.8 GW NPP in Akkuyu using the BOO model (Rosatom, April 1, 2014; Daily Sabah, June 20).

The BOO model entails that electricity generated by the NPP will be sold to the Turkish electrical grid, and that Rosatom assumes financial, construction, operation, and decommissioning responsibility for the NPP’s lifetime (International Atomic Energy Agency; Rosatom via WebArchive, accessed June 11). Unlike most NPPs, which are constructed under turnkey contracts—where the owner is given the “key” once the contractor completes the project—Türkiye adopted the BOO model due to its inability to attract investors (The Turkey Analyst, July 5, 2018; International Atomic Energy Agency, accessed June 11). Under this agreement, Russia financed $20 billion for the Akkuyu NPP, with Rosatom retaining the right to sell up to 49 percent of the NPP’s shares to other investors and maintaining responsibility to operate the reactors for their service lifetimes—60 years with further extensions likely by 20 years (Akkuyu Nükleer Anonim Şirketi, accessed June 11). While NPPs exist in EU and NATO member states that were constructed during the Soviet period using what is today considered Russian technology, the Akkuyu NPP will be the first NATO member state to host a Russian designed, constructed, operated, owned, and, eventually, decommissioned NPP (SIPRI, February 2019; Nature Energy, February 27, 2023).

This is not the first time that tensions between Ankara and Moscow have affected progress at the Akkuyu NPP. When Türkiye shot down a Russian warplane that strayed into Turkish airspace in 2015, Rosatom suspended construction at the plant (RBC, December 9, 2015). As bilateral relations normalized, Türkiye eventually granted Russia substantial tax advantages by designating Akkuyu as a strategic investment (Rosatom, April 3, 2018). Subsequent events, such as the failed 2016 coup attempt in Türkiye, the COVID-19 pandemic, and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, have all delayed the project. Turkish and Russian officials acknowledged that sanctions on Russia have affected the initial Akkuyu timeline to become operational by 2023 (Al Jazeera, May 16, 2022; Fakti, August 20, 2024).

More recently, the Wall Street Journal reported in February that the U.S. Department of Justice found that Russia transferred more than $5 billion via J.P. Morgan and Citigroup as an apparent payment for the Akkuyu NPP construction, which, in reality, evaded U.S. sanctions on Russia’s Central Bank (Wall Street Journal, February 2). As of writing, $2 billion of the funds are frozen at J.P. Morgan, and it is unclear if Washington has released or plans to release them.

Beyond sanctions evasion, the presence of a Russian-owned NPP in Türkiye is concerning, especially in the context of heightened tensions between NATO and Russia (Turkish Minute, October 21, 2022; The Electricity Hub, May 22, 2025). Collaborative NPPs, such as Akkuyu NPP, require long-term and stable bilateral relations between the parties (International Atomic Energy Agency, October 2006; de Blasio, Nephew, “The Geopolitics of Nuclear Power and Technology,” March 2017). Russia being the sole owner of an NPP on Turkish territory will leave Türkiye dependent on Russian technology, skilled labor, nuclear fuel, and operational expertise (Telli, “Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant from the Perspective of Energy Security: A Solution or a Deadlock?,” December 2016). Because Russia does not hesitate to use energy as a geopolitical weapon, it is realistic to assume that Moscow may one day exploit Ankara’s dependence (DIIS, January 9, 2024).