Purges, Training Reform Affected Pressure on Taiwan in 2025

Purges, Training Reform Affected Pressure on Taiwan in 2025

Executive Summary:

• People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft sorties and naval vessel deployments around Taiwan reached record highs in 2025, but the growth rate of these activities slowed compared with 2024, and activity levels in the second half of the year fell below those in the first half.
• Disaggregated data show decelerating increases in median line crossings, naval deployments, peak activity days, and joint combat readiness patrols, indicating that PLA operations around Taiwan may have reached a near-term saturation point.
• These shifts likely reflect internal changes within the PLA around mid-2025, including leadership disruptions following personnel purges and a reallocation of resources toward joint training rather than sustained gray-zone coercion.
• The apparent stabilization of activity levels does not signal a reduced threat, as improved joint training and operational integration could enable the PLA to exert greater gray-zone pressure or even develop more advanced military invasion or strike capabilities against Taiwan and neighboring countries in the future.

According to data released by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND), People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft sorties and naval vessel deployments around Taiwan reached new record highs in 2025. At first glance, this suggests an intensification of gray-zone pressure compared with 2024. Closer examination of disaggregated data, however, shows that the growth rate of aircraft and naval activity in 2025 was lower than the increase observed in 2024. Aircraft and naval activity in the second half of 2025 was also generally lower than in the first half, which contrasts with patterns seen in previous years.

This shift may reflect a reduced emphasis on gray-zone coercion against Taiwan following the purge of the former Central Military Commission (CMC) second vice chairman He Weidong (何卫东), as well as the PLA’s increased focus on exploring new models of joint operations training. This training emphasis likely redirected resources and forces toward joint training areas located farther from Taiwan, thereby reducing the intensity of PLA air and naval activity in Taiwan’s immediate vicinity.

Trends Indicate a Decline in PLA Activity Levels in the Second Half of 2025

Trend One: Rate of growth slowed compared with previous years.

In 2025, Taiwan detected a total of 5,446 PLA aircraft sorties, of which 3,763 crossed the median line, as well as 2,613 PLA naval vessels operating around Taiwan, all of which represent record highs. [1] More detailed indicators suggest that PLA air and naval activity around Taiwan may have reached a saturation point, as shown in Table 1. This pattern was already observable in 2024 and became more pronounced in 2025 (China Brief, January 17, 2025).

Table 1: Recent PLA Air and Naval Activity Around Taiwan

(Source: Compilation by K. Tristan Tang based on ROC MND press releases)

The annual growth rate of total detected aircraft sorties remained limited and was similar to the previous year’s increase. The total number of aircraft sorties in 2024 increased by just over 108 percent from 2023, while the 2025 total represented an increase of 106.7 percent over 2024.

In contrast, the growth rate of aircraft sorties crossing the median line declined sharply compared with the previous year. In 2024, median line–crossing sorties increased by over 180 percent from 2023, while in 2025 they increased by just under 123 percent from 2024.

A combined examination of total aircraft sorties and median line–crossing sorties shows a clear slowdown in the growth of median line crossings. In 2023, 36 percent of PLA aircraft operating around Taiwan crossed the median line. This share rose sharply to 60 percent in 2024, representing an increase of 1,367 sorties. In 2025, the share increased by a smaller margin to 69 percent, an increase of 693 sorties.

The growth rate of PLA naval vessel activity around Taiwan also declined in 2025. There was a more than 130 percent increase in the number of naval vessels operating around Taiwan in 2024 compared to 2023. This narrowed to less than 105 percent growth in 2025.

Another point worth noting is that in both 2023 and 2024, the number of aircraft sorties and naval vessels detected in the second half of the year exceeded those in the first half. In contrast, in 2025, activity levels were higher in the first half of the year than in the second half, as shown in Table 2.

Table 2: Aircraft Sorties and Naval Vessel Activity Between the First and Second Halves of the Year

(Source: Compilation by K. Tristan Tang based on ROC MND press releases)

Trend Two: Frequency of single-day peaks in aircraft sorties increased, while frequency of single-day peaks in naval activity declined. [2]

The number of aircraft peak days, which are defined as days with more than 30 PLA aircraft sorties, rose from 28 in 2023, to 32 in 2024, and up to 46 in 2025. By contrast, the number of naval vessel peak days, which are defined as days with at least 10 PLA naval vessels in waters surrounding Taiwan, rose from 24 in 2023 to 38 in 2024, but declined in 2025 back down to 32.

The distribution of peak days between the first and second halves of the year also changed in 2025. While peak activity days in both 2023 and 2024 were clearly concentrated in the second half of the year, this pattern switched in 2025. For aircraft activity, 2025 saw 27 peak aircraft days in the first half of the year and only 19 in the second half. For naval vessels, there were 14 peak days in the first half of the year and 19 in the second, as shown in Table 3.

Table 3: Aircraft Sorties and Naval Vessel Peak Days Between the First and Second Halves of the Year

(Source: Compilation by K. Tristan Tang based on ROC MND press releases)

Trend Three: Number and frequency of joint combat readiness patrols did not increase. [3]

In 2025, the frequency of joint combat readiness patrols did not clearly exceed those observed in 2024. According to PRC statements, joint combat readiness patrols are meant to assess the integrated operations capabilities of multiple military branches. The preparations before the exercise are equivalent to combat readiness activities, and the patrols themselves are considered to be conducted in a combat state.

The PLA conducted 40 joint combat readiness patrols around Taiwan in both 2024 and 2025, according to press releases from Taiwan’s MND. This corresponds to an average of one patrol every 1–2 weeks. Instances in which the interval between two consecutive patrols was less than one week occurred 15 times in 2024 and 14 times in 2025.

Joint combat readiness patrols were fairly evenly distributed throughout 2025, though reinforced the pattern of higher activitiy in the first half of the year seen in other PLA activity around Taiwan. While 2024 saw 20 patrols in each half of the year, the first half of 2025 saw 22 patrols, compared with 18 in the second half.

Personnel Changes and Shift to Developing Joint Training

The data reveal two clear trends. First, while PLA air and naval activity around Taiwan increased in 2025 in absolute terms, the rate of growth was lower than in previous years. Second, in a departure from recent years, activity levels in the first half of 2025 were higher than those in the second half. These trends suggest that some important internal factors may have changed around mid-2025, altering the PLA’s operational patterns around Taiwan.

One set of factors that could have impacted PLA activity is political. The past year has seen significant personnel changes within both the CMC and the Eastern Theater Command. These purges likely disrupted operational patterns and reduced the intensity of gray-zone coercion. In recent years, dozens of senior PLA officers have been removed, and the disappearance of He Weidong some time in March 2025, followed by his formal removal months later, appears to have been a critical turning point (China Brief, November 25, 2025).

He’s career background likely led him to place greater emphasis on military pressure against Taiwan than the CMC’s other vice chairman, Zhang Youxia (张又侠), and he could position himself to advance this preference in CMC or other PLA internal meetings. PLA units likely aligned their behavior, at least in part, with his views. There is a meaningful correlation between the decline in intensity and frequency of PLA harassment around Taiwan following his investigation and removal.

He’s first decade or more of service was in reconnaissance units. This likely led reconnaissance doctrines and operational norms to become deeply internalized early in his career and to remain priorities as he rose to senior positions (Eastday, February 13, 2015). According to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Military Terms (中国人民解放军军语), the PLA’s authoritative dictionary, reconnaissance includes combat reconnaissance (战斗侦察), which involves reconnaissance conducted by combat units through offensive operations or feints to induce enemy actions and thereby identify force deployments and firepower configurations. It also includes combat readiness reconnaissance (战备侦察), which consists of reconnaissance activities conducted in peacetime to respond in a timely manner to potential wars or sudden contingencies. [4]

He’s background likely led to him placing strong emphasis at senior levels on rapid force deployment, close proximity to adversaries, and efforts to probe an opponent’s real capabilities and intentions. In the Taiwan context, PLA air and naval gray-zone operations serve a similar function. These activities allow the PLA to assess Taiwan’s response time and operational procedures when PLA forces approach, and they also provide insights into the Taiwan government’s resolve in responding to persistent PLA pressure.

By contrast, Zhang Youxia likely places greater emphasis on rigorous military training and more conventional operational planning. His experience commanding regiment-level units during the Sino-Vietnamese War likely shaped a strong appreciation for the brutality of real combat and the importance of force quality. This background may have inclined him to prioritize disciplined training and readiness over persistent gray-zone pressure.

While He Weidong focused primarily on political affairs during his tenure as a CMC vice chairman, Zhang has overseen operational matters and led major training reform initiatives since 2022. When CMC Chairman Xi Jinping announced the reform of the PLA military training system in 2020 due to dissatisfaction with existing training standards and combat capabilities, he appointed Zhang to take the lead. The new training initiatives included a 2023 on-site conference on basic training (全军基础训练现场会) and a 2024 on-site conference on combined training (全军合成训练现场会) (Xinhua, June 20, 2023; October 22, 2024). While gray-zone operations against Taiwan have allowed PLA air and naval forces to accumulate experience in confronting Taiwan’s military, these activities have also consumed time and resources that could have been devoted to focused training. Zhang likely places greater priority on force training than on sustained gray-zone pressure against Taiwan, especially when compared with He Weidong.

A second set of factors that could have impacted PLA activity around Taiwan in 2025 is military in nature and is directly related to training priorities. The PLA has recently emphasized the exploration and expansion of joint training, and military activities outside the training domain have not been the primary focus during this period. After holding the 2023 and 2024 on-site training conferences, the PLA appears to have identified approaches to basic training and combined training that satisfy senior leadership. However, an effective model for joint training is yet to be fully developed. On May 28, 2025, Zhang Youxia chaired a “training ground construction observation and exchange event” (全军训练场地建设观摩交流活动) in Beijing. The significance of this event lay in laying the groundwork for transitioning PLA training reform from basic training and combined training toward joint training reform (Xinhua, May 28, 2025; PLA Daily, October 10, 2025).

This sequence indicates that the PLA remains in an exploratory phase with respect to joint training and has therefore not yet convened an on-site conference on joint training. This assessment is also reflected in reporting from the PLA Daily. For example, one PLA Navy unit reportedly had conducted only eight joint training sessions at sea with units from other services by early January 2026 (PLA Daily, January 11). Another report has described joint training as something that is “about to become a norm (将成为一种常态),” rather than already being an established practice (PLA Daily, January 13). These accounts indicate that the frequency and depth of PLA joint training remain limited and that a model suitable for force-wide adoption is still under development.

Although past PLA naval and air activities around Taiwan also had training value, current joint training appears focused on overcoming bottlenecks in earlier training models, with many activities likely experimental in nature. Under these conditions, the PLA may prefer to train closer to the mainland rather than near Taiwan, reducing exposure to Taiwanese or foreign forces, lowering accident risks, and limiting external observation of its joint training progress.

Conclusion

The political and military factors that appear to have impacted PLA activity patterns around Taiwan were likely triggered between March and May 2025. This would help explain why PLA activity in the second half of the year diverged from patterns seen in previous years, with PLA air and naval activity around Taiwan falling below first-half levels. It likely also explains why the annual growth rate of PLA operational activity around Taiwan was lower than in previous years.

The current level of PLA pressure represents only a transitional phase. The growth rate of increased air and naval activity around Taiwan may have decelerated in 2025, but this does not indicate a reduction in threat. Rather, it reflects a stabilization of operational output. PLA activity around Taiwan continues to grow in absolute terms, but the key issue lies in the underlying dynamics and future implications concealed beneath these surface-level figures. As PLA joint training becomes more mature and joint operational capabilities improve, the scale and intensity of gray-zone coercion against Taiwan and neighboring countries are likely to increase to levels higher than in the past.

Notes

[1] The data are compiled from Chinese-language press releases issued by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND), and the English wording follows translations from the original Chinese texts. Notably, in its most recent reporting format, MND no longer uses the term “air defense identification zone (ADIZ; 防空識別區).” Instead, it refers only to aircraft “crossing the median line” (逾越中線). Even when aircraft do not cross the officially disclosed coordinates of the median line but enter its extended area or the eastern sector, such movements are still classified as “crossing the median line.”

[2] “Peak incursion periods” in aircraft sorties refer to instances where the number of Chinese military aircraft detected by Taiwan exceeds a certain threshold, causing greater-than-usual pressure on Taiwan through their coercive capacity. In this case, we define the threshold as at least 30 aircraft. This is equivalent to roughly one-tenth of Taiwan’s fleet of approximately 300 main fighter aircraft. (For related analysis published by the author, see: China Brief, January 7, 2025.) In the naval domain, Taiwan’s navy currently operates four destroyers and 21 frigates, for a total of 25 major surface combatants. In practice, however, not all combatants are available for operations at the same time, because warships must regularly undergo maintenance and upgrades at varying levels. On this basis, this article adopts a conservative estimate that roughly 20 major surface combatants are available for deployment at any given time. As a general rule, when the PLA Navy operates around Taiwan, Taiwan’s navy is likely required to deploy a comparable number of ships in response. Accordingly, when more than ten Chinese naval vessels operate around Taiwan on a given day, this situation implies that Taiwan’s navy must commit at least half of its major surface combatants to sea in order to monitor PLA navy activities. (For related analysis published by the author, see: Pacific Forum, September 23, 2024.)

[3] The term “joint” at the very least refers to the involvement of both the PLAAF and PLAN in the combat readiness patrols. (For related analysis published by the author, see: CMSI, March 13, 2025.)

[4] All-Army Military Terminology Committee, AMS [全军军事术语管理委员会，军事科学院], Chinese People’s Liberation Army Military Terms [中国人民解放军 军语], Military Science Publishing House Publication [军事科学出版社出版], 2011. The CMC released this book in 2011. As of December 2023, this edition was still the most recent version (PLA Daily, December 1, 2023). Page 203 provides the definition of combat readiness reconnaissance, and Page 207 provides the definition of combat reconnaissance.