Putin Expands Federal Protective Service

Putin Expands Federal Protective Service

Executive Summary:

• The expansion of Russia’s Federal Protective Service’s (FSO) central apparatus by 12 percent since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine points to growing concern in the Kremlin over Putin’s personal security.
• The repeated expansion of the president’s security apparatus reflects the regime’s growing distrust of other security structures and its perception of internal risks as real. This is turning the FSO into Putin’s personal “guard” and one of the centers of influence within the system.
• In the long term, strengthening Putin’s inner security perimeter makes the Russian regime more fragile. The more resources it takes to protect one individual, the more clearly it signals the regime’s uncertainty about its own stability and the loyalty of the elites.

On August 31, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree increasing the authorized headcount of the central apparatus of the Federal Protective Service (FSO) from 785 to 812 personnel. This was the fourth increase in the service’s staffing since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022 (The Moscow Times, March 31). The process began in late 2022, when the headcount was increased to 760. It rose again to 775 on January 1, 2024, and to 785 on January 1, 2025. Overall, the central apparatus has grown by 12 percent over the four years of the war. Before 2022, the size of the FSO’s central apparatus had remained unchanged for almost 13 years. Since 2010, it had stood at 725 personnel.

Formally, an increase of 27 positions may seem insignificant. For the first time in many years, however, the decision was made not at the end or beginning of the calendar year, but in the middle. This is one indicator of how Russia’s power architecture is changing. As the regime wages a prolonged war, it continues year after year to expand precisely the service responsible for the personal security of senior officials and the protection of key facilities.

The FSO is one of Russia’s most secretive security agencies and is overseen personally by the president. Its primary task is protecting senior government officials and their families. The service also provides secure communications, protects official residences, and handles transportation for senior officials. During the full-scale war, the FSO’s role has expanded beyond conventional protection. Its personnel stay close to Putin, have access to sensitive information about senior officials, and have effectively become one of the system’s centers of influence.

The continued strengthening of Putin’s immediate security perimeter also reflects the state of the regime—both its level of trust in other security agencies and its assessment of internal risks. The FSO is not directly responsible for protecting against external threats such as long-range drone attacks or acts of sabotage. The expansion of the service therefore has no direct connection to those risks. Rather, it appears aimed at controlling the space immediately around Putin—screening those who can approach him, strengthening security perimeters around residences and government facilities, and expanding the pool of loyal personnel.

The phased expansion of the FSO’s central apparatus cannot be explained solely by an increased workload or bureaucratic inertia. There had been no apparent need for such expansion for more than a decade before 2022. In recent years, however, staffing increases have coincided with periods when the regime faced internal challenges, such as the Prigozhin mutiny in 2023, purges at the Defense Ministry, and conflicts among various groups within the security establishment (see EDM, July 24, 2023, May 13).

Putin has publicly stated that he has “never been afraid of anything” (TASS, August 11). His daily routine, however, is organized in such a way that an ordinary person simply cannot get near him. Every event involving the president in Russia is planned down to the smallest detail, including participants’ pre-approved remarks. The circle of people granted access to him is also extremely limited. Since spring, reports emerged that the ban on phones around Putin has been supplemented by a requirement to also hand over watches before private meetings with the president, both electronic and mechanical (Telegram/@mozhemobyasnit, May 8). This new security measure does not apply to members of Putin’s inner circle, particularly long-standing associates such as Rostec CEO Sergei Chemezov. Putin himself, judging by video footage, also tries to remove his watch during meetings, although he does not always do so.

At the same time, the FSO is pushing for the creation of a security zone around the Kremlin gas station on Volkhonka Street, 300 meters (984 feet) from the Cathedral of Christ the Savior and the only operating gas station inside the Garden Ring serving government vehicles (Telegram/@ejdailyru, July 21). The proposed zone covers more than 6,000 square meters (64,583 square feet) and would prohibit tourist activities, mass events, and drone use. No formal reasons have been given, but the logic appears straightforward—tighten security around the president and minimize any uncontrolled points near the Kremlin.

The expansion of the FSO’s staffing is taking place amid reports that the balance of power within Russia’s security establishment is shifting. In particular, Putin may have granted significantly greater powers to the Federal Security Service’s (FSB) Second Service, including a free hand to control the internet, block messaging services, and put pressure on Telegram (SFG Media, August 7). This strengthens the security services’ position and could intensify conflict with the Kremlin’s “civilian” factions, such as Sergei Kiriyenko, the first deputy head of the Presidential Administration.

In May, reports emerged of Kremlin concerns about possible attempts at internal destabilization, including some involving Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu, his circle, and other members of the elite (Important Stories, May 4). The FSO serves as Putin’s counterweight and personal “guard,” tasked with protecting him not only from the outside world but also from the security services themselves.

The increase in the FSO’s central apparatus may also have a long-term political dimension. In modern Russia the FSO has become not only a security agency but also a key personnel service for the president (see EDM, June 5, 2023). After serving as a personal aide or bodyguard, FSO officers can receive what amounts to a “ticket to rule.” The most prominent examples from previous years are Viktor Zolotov, head of the National Guard; Alexei Dyumin, now State Council secretary and presidential aide; and Alexander Kurenkov, head of the Emergency Situations Ministry. The service will apparently continue expanding its political presence, acting as a personnel filter and placing trusted individuals in positions of responsibility. Putin is not only building a new tier of personally loyal officials who can replace the old elites if necessary.

Expanding the FSO’s staffing can serve several purposes at once. First, it allows Putin to strengthen his physical protection and increase the number of people entrusted with access to the president. Second, amid competition among the FSB, National Guard, and Defense Ministry, strengthening his personal security reduces Putin’s dependence on other players within the security establishment. The FSO’s political weight is also important. Its constant presence alongside the president gives its leadership unique access and influence.

In the long term, this dynamic does not strengthen the regime’s stability. Rather, it makes it more fragile. A regime that devotes ever more resources to strengthening its inner security perimeter is demonstrating a lack of confidence in its own elites. Such uncertainty usually brings increased repression, purges, and even greater secrecy in decision-making. This reduces the predictability of Russia’s actions and increases the risk of irrational moves. The growing size of Putin’s security apparatus is a visible sign of his growing vulnerability. The more FSO personnel are required to protect one individual, the less stability remains at the foundation of the entire Russian power structure.