Rosoboronexport’s International Arms Sales Status Uncertain
Rosoboronexport’s International Arms Sales Status Uncertain
Executive Summary:
- Russian President Vladimir Putin claims Russia earned over $15 billion from arms exports in 2025, supplying more than 30 countries. Independent estimates cast doubt on the figures. Moscow’s withdrawal from relevant United Nations reporting mechanisms has further complicated independent efforts to assess Russian arms exports.
- Rosoboronexport, Russia’s state arms-export agency, is seeking to sustain international demand by concentrating on markets in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, aggressively marketing Russian weapons at international defense exhibitions.
- Combat experience in Ukraine is reshaping Rosoboronexport’s export portfolio. Alongside established systems such as the Su-57E and Su-35, the company is promoting unmanned aerial, surface, and underwater systems.
Russia’s state-owned Rosoboronexport reported on September 7 that Russia signed $13 billion worth of export contracts for weapons and military equipment for the first half of 2026 (Interfax, September 7). They claim this number equals the entirety of exports in 2025. At the beginning of this year, Russia claimed that its arms exports remained substantial in 2025. This came despite mounting Western sanctions and Russia’s growing diversion of resources toward sustaining its war against Ukraine. On January 30, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated during a meeting of the Commission for Military-Technical Cooperation with Foreign States in Moscow that Russia earned over $15 billion from arms exports in 2025, supplying military equipment to more than 30 countries. Putin emphasized that Russia had fulfilled all of its contractual obligations and said the revenues would be used to “modernize defense enterprises, expand production activity, and fund research and development programs” (President of Russia, January 30).
Data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) casts doubt on the accuracy of Putin’s statistics. SIPRI records indicate that Russian arms exports plummeted between 2021 and 2023, from $14.6 billion to approximately $3 billion (SIPRI, March, 2024; Defense News, February 2). From 2021 to 2025, nearly 74 percent of Russian arms exports went to India (48 percent), the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (13 percent), and Belarus (13 percent). Other buyers of Rosoboronexport weaponry included Egypt, Iran, Indonesia, Türkiye, Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, and South Africa, among others (SIPRI, March 9).
Since the publication of SIPRI’s data, Russia has ceased reporting to the relevant United Nations agencies, complicating efforts to develop accurate estimates of its foreign weapons sales. Other analyses estimate that Russian defense industry revenues grew by 23 percent in 2025, likely because domestic military requirements offset losses from declining arms exports (Future Warfare, February 18).
Rosoboronexport, founded in 2000 and part of the Rostec State Corporation, claims to have signed 150 contracts worth more than $20 billion since 2023, reflecting an expansion of its military-technical support to African nations (RIA Novosti, May 25). The Russian government has prioritized arms sales to Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, regions not directly bound by Western sanctions imposed following Russia’s war against Ukraine. Rosoboronexport has been under U.S. sanctions since 2006, initially imposed over contracts related to the modernization of Iran’s Su-24 frontline bombers (TASS, July 2, 2025).
Over the past 25 years, Rosoboronexport has concluded over 30,000 contracts with partners and exported products worth more than $230 billion (Rostec, November 4, 2025). Rosoboronexport’s activities have expanded beyond arms deliveries to include the licensed production of Russian aircraft, helicopters, armored vehicles, and small arms in client countries. It allows partners to build domestic production facilities and acquire Russian technologies, while Russia retains control over quality and security standards. In January, Rosoboronexport Director General Aleksandr Mikheev said the company’s export order portfolio exceeded $60 billion (TASS, January 30).
Rosoboronexport’s most profitable armaments are its Su-57 and Su-35 fighters. The export version of the single-seat, twin-engine, fifth-generation Su-57E has a maximum takeoff weight of 34 tons and can carry a 7.5-ton combat load, climb to 61,679 feet (11.6 miles), reach speeds of up to Mach 2 (1,482 miles per hour), and maintain a combat radius of 777 miles. The Russian aircraft competes with the U.S. F-22 and F-35 as well as the PRC’s J-20 and J-35 fighters (TASS, July 29). The Su-35, a 4++ generation fighter, has a maximum takeoff weight of 34.5 tons and can carry up to eight tons of weapons. The aircraft’s practical ceiling is 59,000 feet (11.1 miles) with a maximum speed of Mach 2.25 (1,726 miles per hour). It has a range of 2,236 miles at cruising altitude without refueling. The Su-35 has demonstrated its combat capabilities in the Syrian campaign and in Russia’s war against Ukraine. In March 2022, the Russian Ministry of Defense released footage of the Su-35’s participation, showing the aircraft intercepting air targets and striking Ukrainian air defense systems (RBC, March 20, 2022).
Fulfilling export orders has not always gone smoothly. In September 2025, Abolfazl Zohrevand, a member of the Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, confirmed that Iran had ordered 20 Su-35s (The Eurasia Daily, September 24, 2025). Leaked Russian documents published in October 2025 put the order at 48 aircraft. The first batch of 20 fighters, built at the Komsomolsk-on-Amur plant in the Russian Far East, was not reported complete until early July of this year (Kyiv Post, July 3).
Mikheev asserted that the Su-57E and Su-35 fighters continue to attract considerable interest from potential clients. His statement coincided with the release of the first footage showing the Su-57E in service with a foreign operator, the Algerian Air Force (YouTube/@JetlineMarvel, February 23). Algeria is reportedly committed to procuring up to 14 Su-57Es in a contract valued at approximately $2 billion (Militarnyi, February 8).
Beyond fighters, Rosoboronexport’s portfolio includes aviation systems, air defense systems, armored vehicles, small arms, artillery systems, and modern drones. Its cooperation with customers extends to joint and licensed production of small arms, ammunition, air defense systems, such as the Ka-226T helicopters, Su-57E fighter jets, aircraft engines, advanced aviation weapons, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) including the Orlan-10E, Orlan-30, Orion-E, the Kub family of loitering munitions, and UAV electronic warfare systems (National Defense, November 4, 2025).
International arms exhibitions are an important marketing tool for Rosoboronexport, which participated in roughly one exhibition per month in 2026. Rosoboronexport began 2026 by displaying its armaments for the first time at the Unmanned Systems Exhibition and Conference (UMEX) and Simulation and Training Exhibition (SimTEX) 2026, an international exhibition and conference on unmanned systems and simulators, held in Abu Dhabi on January 20–22 (Rosoboroneksport, January 19). Mikheev remarked, “Rosoboronexport is launching its 2026 marketing campaign at UMEX 2026, an exhibition dedicated to unmanned technologies … We forecast that demand for UAVs will grow by 120 percent and for loitering munitions by 400 percent by 2030.”
The following month, Rosoboronexport participated in the World Defense Show 2026, held on February 8–12 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Rosoboronexport organized the Russian display at the exhibition, where several of Russia’s largest defense firms, including Almaz-Antey, ZALA, Rostec’s High-Precision Systems, and Kalashnikov, presented their products. Mikheev commented, “The World Defense Show is one of the largest arms and military equipment exhibitions in the world. For Rosoboronexport, it has become a platform to showcase the latest developments in the Russian defense industry to partners in the Middle East and other key regions of our operations” (The Center for Analysis of World Arms Trade, February 2).
Rosoboronexport participated alongside 1,500 exhibitors in the Defense Services Asia (DSA) 2026 exhibition, held on April 19–22 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (DSA Exhibition and Conference, accessed September 4). Nearing its fourth decade, DSA ranks among the world’s top five defense exhibitions and is Asia’s largest defense and homeland security show.
Rosoboronexport also displayed its weapons domestically at the first International Security Forum, held under the auspices of the Russian Security Council on May 26–29 in Moscow. Organizers invited more than 180 delegations from foreign states and international organizations (Rosoboroneksport, March 12). At another domestic exhibition, Rosoboronexport demonstrated Russian naval products at the Fleet-2026 International Naval Salon, held on June 10–14 in Kronstadt, an important naval base and former headquarters of the Baltic Fleet. Promoting the exhibition, Mikheev observed, “The main focus of Rosoboronexport’s exhibition at the Fleet-2026 salon is on the latest Russian technologies in the fields of shipbuilding, naval weapons, and robotics” (Center for Analysis of World Arms Trade, June 8).
Other marine robotic systems on display included the autonomous unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) MMT-300, Orkan, and Klavesin-1RE (European Defence Review, June 13). Surface ships included the Project 11356 NG frigate, armed with a multi-channel air defense system carrying a combined ammunition load, the Tigr corvette, equipped with the Zaslon multifunctional radar complex, the Karakurt-E corvette, and the Project 12701Aleksandrit-E mine-countermeasure ship.
Promoting the vitality of Russia’s military-industrial complex, Putin stated in January that over 340 joint defense projects with 14 countries are currently underway or in development, and announced further state support for military exports for the 2026–2028 period (President of Russia, January 30). If accurate, these figures suggest that Russia’s ability to maintain arms exports at current levels could raise significant questions about the long-term efficacy of Western sanctions. Many countries in Africa and Asia continue to procure Russian weaponry, attracted by lower costs and long-standing political alignments (Future Warfare Magazine, February 18).
Putin has expressed strong ambitions for expanding Russia’s arms exports. During his January meeting with the Commission for Military-Technical Cooperation, he remarked, “The continued effective use of existing financial and other support mechanisms and tools is crucial, as the volume of military exports is expected to significantly increase in accordance with the 2026 plan.” The Russian president also seeks to expand arms sales among the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) members. Noting that Russia assumed the CSTO chairmanship on January 1, Putin stated that this “requires us to work systematically with our partners, including through comprehensive approaches to expanding military-technical ties” (President of Russia, January 30).
Rosoboronexport’s revenues are unlikely to equal or offset Russia’s lost hydrocarbon export earnings. They provide a source of fiscal revenue for a government facing growing budgetary pressures as it sustains its war against Ukraine. The war has forced a shift in Rosoboronexport’s naval priorities. Ukraine’s successful combat use of USVs and UUVs in the Black Sea has reshaped maritime procurement worldwide, and Rosoboronexport has altered its production lines to produce its own unmanned vessels. Whether these systems perform against Ukraine’s limited Black Sea naval forces remains to be seen. Rosoboronexport’s unmanned vessels are likely to find buyers regardless of how they perform against Ukraine. Iran is the clearest prospect. Heavy losses to its conventional fleet this spring have pushed Tehran further toward asymmetric methods, and Russian low-cost unmanned systems would suit that approach in the confined waters of the Strait of Hormuz. This would present Washington with an additional naval threat, one that could be difficult to counter even with a nuclear aircraft carrier task force.
