Russia Leverages Economic Ties to Exert Political Pressure on Ecuador

Russia Leverages Economic Ties to Exert Political Pressure on Ecuador

Executive Summary:

• Estonia’s seizure of a Bahamas-flagged ship suspected of links to Ecuador–Russia smuggling highlights Moscow’s continued economic engagement with Latin America, one way that Russia sustains influence in the region despite sanctions and political friction after 2022.
• After its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia shifted its Latin America policy away from ideology, prioritizing economic channels for political leverage, with Ecuador demonstrating how Moscow can pressure distant, export-dependent economies to reverse decisions viewed as unfriendly.
• The 2024 “banana-flower” dispute showed how Moscow successfully uses even relatively small economic ties to exert political pressure. Ecuador reversed a decision to transfer Soviet-era military equipment to the United States that may have ended up in Ukraine to avoid losing access to Russian markets for its bananas.

On February 4, the Estonian Investigation Department of the Tax and Customs Department, police, and navy detained the Bahamas-flagged Baltic Spirit container ship. Estonia seized the vessel, which was traveling from Ecuador to Russia and stopped in Estonia’s waters to refuel, on suspicion of connections to smuggling (Unian, February 4). The crew of 23 sailors, all Russian citizens, did not resist. Estonian authorities said that the vessel is not linked to Russia’s “shadow fleet” and is not subject to EU sanctions. This episode shows that Russia continues pragmatic—and evidently not always lawful—engagement with selected Latin American countries, despite periodic political disagreements (Unian, February 4).

After 2022, Russia’s foreign policy in Latin America became less rhetorical and more practical. Moscow moved away from rhetorical support toward a pragmatic, result-oriented approach. After its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s Latin American policy has focused on maintaining external economic channels, preventing partners from taking steps Moscow deems hostile, and demonstrating that Russia retains functional links beyond the Western sanctions perimeter. Ecuador is one of the most intriguing examples of how, despite limited economic and political leverage, the Kremlin can affect a remote and seemingly distant Latin American state (Eluniverso, accessed February 6).

In early 2024, a crisis in Russia–Ecuador relations known as the “banana-flower” conflict illustrated this dynamic (see EDM, February 12, 13). In January 2024, Ecuadorian authorities publicly announced a deal to transfer a batch of former Soviet military equipment to the United States in exchange for about $200 million of modern weapons. The United States indicated that this Soviet equipment would likely have been shipped to Ukraine (The Moscow Times, February 6, 2024). The reaction from Moscow was stern, and Russian officials warned that the step would be interpreted as an unfriendly gesture, claiming that Ecuador had a contractual obligation not to transfer Soviet military equipment without Russia’s consent (RBC, January 11, 2024; The Moscow Times, February 6, 2024). Ecuador asserted that the material was “scrap” and non-operational, but Moscow used its decades-proven strategy of economic strangulation through a checks and controls mechanism to apply pressure on Ecuador’s decision-makers. Russia suspended purchases of Ecuadorian bananas from five major companies, 25 percent of Ecuador’s total fruit exports to Russia, and planned restrictions on Ecuadoran flower imports (Primicias, February 4, 6, 2024). In response, Ecuador immediately reversed its decision to transfer the equipment to the United States, saying that its “position is not to send weapons and ammunition to hot zones, but to promote the settlement of conflicts … with diplomatic tools” (RIA Novosti, February 17, 2024).

This episode demonstrated Russia’s ability to pressure a geographically distant but economically dependent Latin American actor with poorly diversified foreign trade and limited capacity to rely on alternative revenue streams. Moscow used regulatory and economic leverage to reverse Ecuador’s decision, targeting its most critical exports—agricultural products. Moscow not only halted imports of Ecuador’s bananas and threatened to ban imports of its flowers, but also rapidly took steps to switch to alternative suppliers. Russian sources mentioned India’s willingness to replace Ecuador’s share on the Russian market, signaling to Ecuador that its goods are replaceable (Newizv.ru, February 6, 2024)

The Kremlin exerted informational and psychological pressure on Ecuador through media and diplomatic channels. Ecuadorian media reported that Moscow saw Quito’s decision as “irreflexive” (reckless) (Teleamazonas, February 4, 2024; Primicias, February 6, 2024). Moscow’s information campaign targeted the Ecuadorian government, business elites, and public opinion, actors with an interest in maintaining exports and that have a stake in relevant political decisions. Moscow’s informational campaign made it clear that it would inflict economic damage if Ecuador transferred arms that could end up in Ukraine, a conflict that has negligible effects on Quito.

Russia’s strategy for impacting Ecuador’s foreign policy combined administrative leverage, public signaling, and reversible escalation. Russia’s punitive measures and threats to increase them did not appear conclusive. In effect, Russia demonstrated that there was a clear path to restore “normal” relations if Ecuador acquiesced.

Russia used Ecuador’s dependence on banana exports to influence its interactions with the United States during this 2024 episode. Even though the United States is Ecuador’s overall largest trading partner, Russia accounted for approximately 19 percent of Ecuador’s banana exports in 2024, while the United States accounted for only around 12 percent (International Tropical Fruits Network, January 28, 2025). Ecuador’s logic was quite straightforward. Sanctions against Russia or explicit gestures in support of Ukraine would have limited domestic support but could seriously harm the economy (Eluniverso, accessed February 6). Russian sources emphasized that Ecuadorian suppliers would struggle to replace the Russian market without losses, reinforcing the sense of dependence and limited room for maneuver (RIA Novosti, February 17, 2024).

Ecuador has faced a severe security crisis in recent years, and much of the government’s political capital is consumed by countering violence and organized crime. Under such conditions, foreign policy decisions that can worsen economic stability or heighten social volatility are especially risky. In 2024, Ecuadorian media explained the government’s reversal on the “equipment-for-Ukraine” issue—economic losses and resulting social repercussions would have greatly exceeded a symbolic but practically irrelevant move (Expreso, February 19, 2024).

Other Latin American countries closely followed this dispute as an example of how trade partnerships with larger powers can come with political strings attached. For example, a Peruvian outlet, El Comercio, characterized Ecuador’s decision as a “diplomatic retreat” driven by rising costs and a clear example of Moscow’s ability to compel partners through trade instruments (El Comercio, February 25, 2024). Peru’s deepening economic engagement with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the past few years—reflected in the construction of the Chancay megaport—has made it much more dependent on the PRC (see China Brief, March 15, 2024). Russia’s ability to end a U.S.–Ecuadorian agreement, even through relatively small economic ties, serves as a practical warning. Many countries in the region may not be prepared or able to curtail their ties with the PRC, whose economic weight and regional footprint are rapidly expanding, and whose economic significance is far greater than Russia’s (see China Brief, December 30, 2022, November 10, 20, 2023, June 21, 2025).

Since February 2022, Russia–Ecuador relations have evolved into what could be called a “pragmatic coexistence.” For Moscow, Ecuador has become a valuable case proving how targeted economic and informational pressure can rapidly shape a partner’s behavior.