Russia Pursues Economic and Diplomatic Relations with Bolivia

Russia Pursues Economic and Diplomatic Relations with Bolivia

Executive Summary:

• Since 2022, Russian–Bolivian relations have become more centered on diplomatic coordination, nuclear infrastructure, and lithium projects as Russia seeks to leverage Bolivia as a political and economic foothold in South America.
• The El Alto Center for Nuclear Research and Technology represents Moscow’s most tangible achievement in Bolivia, serving as a showcase for exporting high-technology infrastructure and expanding long-term institutional ties.
• Lithium cooperation reflects Russia’s need for external critical resources. Moscow faces strong competition from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and remains a secondary player in Bolivia’s high-stakes resource sector.

Rodrigo Paz’s victory in Bolivia’s presidential election in October 2025 generated unease among Russian political observers and commentators. Under previous socialist administrations, Moscow secured significant economic agreements, and the government in La Paz consistently supported Russia’s foreign policy positions (TASS, April 26, 2024). Paz ran as a member of the Christian Democratic Party, a centrist or center-right party. Russian media expressed particular concern over Paz’s pledge to “make agreements transparent” with Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), including lithium development contracts  (Pravda.ru, October 22, 2025). Russian concerns were partially alleviated in January 2026, following an official ceremony in Bolivia marking Russia’s delivery of 1,400 tons of humanitarian grain assistance valued at approximately $2 million (Tvbrics.com, January 15). While the actual amount of the donation was insignificant, this step was positively viewed in Russia, with the Russian Embassy in Bolivia describing the shipment as “strengthening Bolivia’s national food security” (RIA Novosti, January 30). Russian officials interpreted the gesture as confirmation of continuity in the bilateral strategic partnership—formally declared at that level in 2025 under former Bolivian President Luis Arce—and a hope that previously concluded agreements would remain in force regardless of Bolivia’s domestic political alterations (TASS, July 6, 2025; Komsomol’skaya Pravda, January 14).

Warming Russian–Bolivian relations date back to the 2000s–2010s during the presidency of Evo Morales (2006–2019). At this time, Bolivia’s leftward political shift and distancing from the United States made Russia appear a “natural” partner in anti-hegemonic discourse (Kolarov, Эво Моралес – лидер левых политических сил в Боливии и Латинской Америке,” 2015). Despite pompous rhetorical campaigns about friendship and closeness of positions on many global issues, the practical component of Russian–Bolivian relations before 2022 remained very limited. Since 2022, Russian–Bolivian relations have become more centered on political coordination, nuclear infrastructure, and lithium projects as Russia seeks to leverage Bolivia as a foothold in South America.

Converging narratives and Global South symbolism have contributed to political and diplomatic coordination between Russia and Bolivia. Since 2022, Bolivia’s public diplomacy has increasingly emphasized the concept of a multipolar world while positioning Russia as a convenient symbolic partner. Ideologically, this has been inseparable from anti-Western and anti-U.S. rhetoric. This fully supported Moscow’s agenda and made Bolivia a natural partner in Latin America (RG.ru, October 24, 2024). Russian academic literature on Bolivia noted that debates within the country framed multipolarity in terms of competition among major powers, including Russia and the PRC, which was commensurate with Kremlin-generated narratives (Konovalova, “Современная Боливия и представления о многополярном мире,” 2024). For Moscow, strengthening ties with Bolivia provided a diplomatic asset in Latin America, reinforcing the narrative that Russia remains a relevant and engaged actor in the region despite Western efforts to isolate it. Russian President Vladimir Putin and former Bolivian President Luis Arce had an official phone conversation in March 2023, during which they discussed trade, economic, technological, and energy partnerships, as well as scientific and educational cooperation. This conversation was followed by in-person negotiations in Russia at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum in June 2024, where Putin and Arce discussed various forms of cooperation, including Rosatom’s implementation of nuclear research and technology centers in Bolivia (President of Russia, March 27, 2023, June 6, 2024; Vedomosti.ru, March 17, 2023).

Bolivia and Russia have also expanded hi-tech and “soft infrastructure” through nuclear, medical, and scientific cooperation. The most tangible and sustainable dimension of this type of cooperation is the Center for Nuclear Research and Technology in El Alto. Discussions about this project go back to 2016 when the two governments signed an intergovernmental agreement to construct the facility (Atomic-energy.ru, July 11, 2016). Following a period of slow development, in August 2022, Rosatom announced the commissioning of the center’s first facilities. The project also includes plans for a research reactor, which will form the new core and be a central component of the complex (Rosatom, September 26, 2023). Russian language sources documented the opening of irradiation centers and the practical application of locally produced radiopharmaceuticals (Neftegaz.ru, October 25, 2023). Despite Bolivia’s strategic priority for the center, the project faced significant delays due to international economic sanctions against Russia following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine (Bolivian Agency of Nuclear Energy, November 4, 2025; RIA Novosti, February 9). Russian-language sources pointed to numerous factors that, if successfully implemented, the project would benefit from. These include the export of long-term technological services such as construction, maintenance, and training; consolidation of Rosatom’s brand in Latin America with potential geographic expansion; accumulation of soft-power capital through healthcare and scientific cooperation; and the development of local professional networks and institutional linkages (Kopylova et al., “Присутствие России в Латинской Америке: проекты Росатома,” February 2025).

Russia has also pursued cooperation with Bolivia in lithium. After 2022, lithium emerged as the highest-stakes component of bilateral relations between Russia and Bolivia. This trend took concrete form in June 2023, when Rosatom subsidiary Uranium One Group signed an agreement with Bolivia’s state-owned YLB for a lithium extraction project, which the media frequently described as involving hundreds of millions of dollars in investment (Vedomosti, June 29, 2023). Russian academic analysis underscores lithium’s strategic importance and acknowledges limitations in Russia’s domestic resource base, necessitating external partnerships (Boyarka et al., “Сырьевой Потенциал Лития России,” 2022).

The nascent “lithium partnership” underscored limitations of Russia’s regional influence. In 2023, Russian sources reported that Rosatom lost the lithium race in Bolivia to the Chinese investor CATL Brunp & Cmoc/CDC, which the local government ultimately selected for the development of the country’s lithium industry. Russian sources suggested avoiding further contestation with the PRC in this industry, given “[its] active support with hi-tech equipment provided to Russia after the outbreak of the SVO [Special Military Operation] in Ukraine” (Neftegaz.ru, January 20, 2023). Russia’s defeat on the lithium front and the PRC’s victory may both turn out to have a time-sensitive application. Analysis of publications by the Bolivian expert community often presents a pragmatic, and often quite critical, view of foreign participation in lithium projects. In 2025, institutions including Fundación Jubileo and CEDIB warned that contracts with Russian and PRC companies posed “high risks” to the state, citing potential imbalances in benefits and insufficient transparency (El Deber;  Fundación Jubileo, February 4, 2025).

Russia is likely to continue strengthening its involvement in Bolivia’s nuclear sector, which appears to face little domestic opposition and is not contested by other significant non-Western stakeholders—notably the PRC. The El Alto nuclear research and medical complex functions as a demonstrative project. If completed and sustainably operated, it provides Moscow with a concrete example of its ability to deliver integrated, non-military, high-technology infrastructure in Latin America (see EDM, September 19, 2025). Such a reference case strengthens Russia’s credibility when negotiating similar projects elsewhere in Latin America, particularly in sectors perceived as socially beneficial and politically low risk.

Russia may need to adjust its initial Bolivia-related plans in response to internal factors, including political changes and external dynamics, particularly the PRC’s growing involvement in the region. The lithium race demonstrates how Bolivia balances involvement and avoids direct competition in Latin America between Russia and the PRC. Depending on future developments, however, competition for the extraction of lithium and other critical resources could become a source of friction for Russian corporations against other foreign competitors.