Russia Seeks Georgia’s Concession on Breakaway Regions

Russia Seeks Georgia’s Concession on Breakaway Regions

Executive Summary:

• During the 65th round of Geneva International Discussions in November 2025, Russia and the self-proclaimed republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia once again demanded that Georgia sign a “legally binding agreement on the non-use of force” with the breakaway regions.
• Abkhaz and South Ossetian leaders have repeatedly emphasized the need for Georgia to sign this document, even though Georgian leadership, including former President Mikheil Saakashvili, committed not to use force to resolve territorial issues in 2010.
• Tbilisi believes that signing the non-use of force agreement would amount to indirect recognition of the independence of the Russian-occupied regions.

In his New Year’s greeting to Abkhazian President Badra Gunba, Dmitry Medvedev, the former Russian president and current deputy secretary of the Russian Security Council, said that Russian–Abkhaz cooperation “will make a significant contribution to ensuring security in the South Caucasus” (Apsnypress, December 31, 2025). The Kremlin’s actions in Ukraine since 2014—including the invasion of Crimea, support for separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk, and the full-scale invasion in 2022—and its 2008 invasion of Georgia have demonstrated Russia’s version of “regional security.”

On November 12, 2025, immediately following the 65th round of the Geneva International Discussions (GID), the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement emphasizing Moscow’s intention to “ensure lasting security in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.” [1] Russia aims to accomplish this goal “through the adoption of a legally binding agreement on the non-use of force between Georgia and these two republics.” The Russian Foreign Ministry highlighted that “its signing would, in particular, serve as a practical implementation of Tbilisi’s conciliatory rhetoric toward the Abkhaz and South Ossetian peoples” (Russian Foreign Ministry, November 12, 2025). Georgian leaders at various levels, including Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, Parliamentary Speaker Shalva Papuashvili, and influential representatives of Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream party, have repeatedly called Abkhazians and Ossetians “brothers,” expressing a willingness to reconcile and build a common future based on Georgia’s territorial integrity. Georgian Dream founder, billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, apologized to the Ossetian people during the 2024 parliamentary elections for the events of August 2008 (see EDM, September 18, 2024; Georgia Today, September 19, 2024). Ivanishvili was harshly criticized for this apology by the Georgian opposition, which viewed his words as justifying the Russian army’s actions in occupying Georgian regions.

In November 2025, Abkhazian Foreign Minister Oleg Bartsits immediately echoed Moscow’s position. He said, “We once again emphasize our commitment to the peace plan … promoting our initiatives to sign a legally binding agreement on the non-use of military force.” Bartsits has repeatedly asserted that GID’s primary goal is to sign an agreement on the non-use of military force, saying “Attempts from Georgia to ignore the new realities that have developed in the region, namely the existence of two neighboring states—Abkhazia and South Ossetia—are absolutely hopeless. Russian and South Ossetian delegations agree with this thesis” (Apsadgil, November 13, 2025).

After each round of negotiations, Georgia has emphasized humanitarian priorities, including the return of refugees to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Georgian delegation, led by Deputy Foreign Minister Lasha Darsalia, reiterated the need for Russia’s “full implementation” of the EU-brokered 2008 ceasefire agreement, as well as the “safe and dignified” return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees to their homes (Civil Georgia, November 13, 2025). A statement from the Georgian Foreign Ministry explained how Georgia highlighted the issue of “the grave security, humanitarian, and human rights situation in the occupied regions, as well as the destructive actions of the occupation regimes.” The ministry noted that “concern was expressed” over recent actions, such as the unlawful opening of the Sukhumi airport, the launch of regular flights from Moscow to Sukhumi, and the resumption of rail and maritime passenger traffic from Russia to Abkhazia (see EDM, November 20, 2023, March 25, 2025; Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, November 12, 2025). The Georgian Foreign Ministry also said that representatives of Russia and the occupied regimes walked out when the issue of returning IDPs and refugees from the occupied territories to their homes was raised, “as is customary … As a result, the 65th round of negotiations collapsed, just like previous rounds” (Civil Georgia, November 13, 2025).

The occupied regions likely use their persistent demand that Georgia sign a non-use of force agreement to avoid discussing the possible return of hundreds of thousands of Georgian refugees to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In an interview with this author, former Georgian Foreign Minister Irakli Menagarishvili explained Tbilisi’s position, stating, “A state cannot sign such an agreement with its [own] regions” (Author’s Interview, November 10, 2024). 

Tbilisi voiced its commitment to not use force to resolve territorial issues in 2010 during Mikheil Saakashvili’s presidency. On November 22, 2010, in his address to the European Parliament, Saakashvili said:

To prove that Georgia is definitively committed to a peaceful resolution … we take today the unilateral initiative to declare that Georgia will never use force to restore its territorial integrity and sovereignty, that it will only resort to peaceful means in its quest for de-occupation and reunification … Even if the Russian Federation refuses to withdraw its occupation forces, even if its proxy militias multiply their human rights violations, Georgia will only retain the right to self-defense in the case of new attacks and invasion of the 80 percent of the Georgian territory that remains under control of the Georgian government (Civil Georgia, November 22, 2010).

This fundamental commitment remains the main argument of the Georgian side, despite the change of power in 2012 to the Georgian Dream party. The current and previous Georgian governments are on the same page in the view that any document regarding the non-use of force in Abkhazia and South Ossetia could only be formalized with Russia as the force that exercises “effective control” in the occupied territories. Tbilisi will not sign a treaty with its own territories or the occupation authorities, who seek the non-use of force agreement to legitimise their rule. Georgia’s signing of a non-use of force document with regions that almost the entire international community considers part of Georgia’s sovereign territory could be perceived as an indirect recognition of the legal loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s aggressive, revisionist regime.

Note:

[1] The GID was established pursuant to the August 12, 2008, ceasefire agreement, brokered by the European Union. GID is co-chaired by representatives of the Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe, European Union, and the United Nations, and involves participants from Georgia, Russia, and the United States, as well as members of both the exiled Georgian administrations of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia, and the two regions’ Russian-backed authorities, in their personal capacities. Sessions are held in two working groups. The first group discusses peace and security matters, and the second discusses humanitarian concerns. The main issues addressed in the GID are the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, the safe and dignified return of internally displaced persons and refugees to their homes, and the security and humanitarian problems created as a result of the Russian occupation.