Russia Transitions to Nuclear Intimidation
Executive Summary:
- Since the launch of Moscow’s large-scale war against Ukraine in 2022, Russia has consistently escalated its nuclear posture from a predominantly defensive deterrence model toward offensive nuclear deterrence and intimidation.
- Russian offensive nuclear deterrence goes beyond signaling and prescribes demonstrative, selective, or limited nuclear strikes against selected critical facilities to instill fear among Western countries of large-scale and potentially uncontrolled nuclear escalation.
- Predeployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons and strategic offensive systems in Belarus, updates to the 2024 Basic Principles of State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence, and preparations to resume nuclear testing manifest and support a practical transition to this concept.
- The Kremlin’s preparations to resume nuclear testing were intended to reinforce the credibility of Russian nuclear threats and technically prepare for the potential nuclear weapons use in combat conditions.
On November 5, during a special session of the Russian Security Council, Defense Minister Andrei Belousov justified preparations for potential nuclear tests, citing Moscow’s view that U.S. actions undermine strategic stability. The Kremlin emphasizes the need to maintain the ability to inflict “unacceptable damage” on adversaries under any conditions (President of Russia, November 5). Russian intelligence and military officials argue that uncertainty over U.S. intentions—reinforced by statements on potential U.S. nuclear tests—necessitates readiness for nuclear testing at Novaya Zemlyato preserve credible deterrence. The Kremlin blames the U.S. withdrawal from arms control agreements, the modernization of nuclear forces—Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), Columbia-class SSBNs, B-21 Raider bombers, Trident II missiles—the expansion of missile defenses, and the development of intermediate-range systems, such as the hypersonic “Dark Eagle,” planned for deployment in Europe. Regular U.S. strategic exercises reportedly include preemptive nuclear strike scenarios. Combined with forward deployment of tactical nuclear weapons and strategic offensive systems in Belarus and doctrinal revisions lowering the nuclear-use threshold, preparations for nuclear testing indicate Russia’s transition to offensive nuclear deterrence or nuclear intimidation.
Following Russia’s withdrawal from the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 2023, domestic debate on renewed nuclear testing intensified. Russian President Vladimir Putin instructed the Ministry of Defense and the state-owned nuclear corporation Rosatom to ensure technical readiness for potential tests, stressing that Russia would respond to a U.S. resumption of nuclear testing. Experts argued that potential test detonations at Novaya Zemlya could serve strategic signaling and represent the first demonstrative step (strike) up Russia’s nuclear escalation ladder (see EDM, October 24, November 8, 2023).
Russian General Staff Retired Colonel Mikhail Khodarenok notes that modern nuclear tests require minimal preparation, as Soviet-era data already documented nuclear effects. They require only drilling a shaft, placing a kiloton-class device, and detonating it. Such tests could verify the reliability of existing warheads or support the development of new nuclear munitions, serving as technical preparation for combat employment (Gazeta.ru, November 6).
After the failure of Russia’s initial full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Putin placed strategic deterrence forces, including the nuclear triad, on special combat duty on February 27, 2022. This was aimed at deterring direct Western intervention and signaling Moscow’s willingness to escalate if external involvement threatened Russian objectives (RBC, February 27, 2022). Since then, Russia has attempted to influence Western military and technical support to Ukraine with nuclear signaling. It contributed to delays in weapons deliveries, hesitation over troop deployments, and indirect constraints on Ukrainian counteroffensive operational planning (Novaya Gazeta Evropa, November 19, 2024). Despite these efforts, Western support expanded to include tanks, combat aircraft, and long-range missile systems that Moscow had previously considered “red lines.”
This situation prompted debate among Kremlin-aligned analysts, including Dmitry Trenin, Sergey Karaganov, Sergey Avakyants, Fyodor Lukyanov, Dmitry Suslov, and others (Russia in Global Affairs, September 26, 2022; Argumenty i Facty, October 5, 2023; Profile, May 29, 2024; Interfax, June 2, 2024; Interfax, October 30). They argue that Russia’s traditional defensive nuclear posture is ineffective in its war against Ukraine, which they describe as a Western proxy war, because the West perceives Moscow’s nuclear threats as non-credible bluffs.
To address this, Kremlin-aligned analysts advocate for offensive nuclear deterrence to instill fear in Western governments by demonstrating readiness for nuclear use, signaling resolve, and contemplating limited strikes against states supporting Ukraine. The objective is to coerce Western governments into negotiations and force acceptance of Russian terms.
Professional military voices reinforce this approach. Lieutenant General Igor Kolesnikov, head of the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense (12th GUMO), and retired Major General Vyacheslav Kruglov emphasize monitoring alleged U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) preparations and maintaining maximum readiness of nuclear forces and their support infrastructure (Kolesnikov and Kruglov, Voennaya Mysl, July 2024). Admiral Aleksandr Moiseyev, commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy, suggests selective, limited use of sea-based non-strategic nuclear weapons—against aircraft carrier strike groups or critical maritime infrastructure—could compel de-escalation without triggering a full-scale nuclear strategic exchange (Moiseev, Voennaya Mysl, September 2024). State Duma deputy and retired Lieutenant General Andrey Gurulyov argues that nuclear use does not necessarily lead to “Armageddon,” highlighting distinctions between strategic and tactical weapons and varying yields. He asserts that credible nuclear employment against Ukraine strengthens Russia’s deterrence and international position (Telegram/@agurulev, October 31).
The Kremlin’s most evident shift toward offensive deterrence is in Belarus, where Russia has deployed tactical nuclear infrastructure and advanced missile systems in close proximity to NATO and Ukraine. Since 2022, construction near Asipovichy of hardened shelters, ammunition storage, and barracks for launchers from the 465th Missile Brigade has supported the deployment of Iskander-M missile systems. Satellite imagery indicates readiness to support a new missile brigade with up to twelve nuclear-capable launchers. Nearby, the modernized 1405th Artillery Ammunition Base—a potential storage site for tactical nuclear warheads—has been upgraded into a 12th GUMO Repair and Maintenance Base (RTB). The 12-kilometer (7.5 miles) railway line between RTB and the missile brigade enables rapid nuclear operational combat employment (see EDM, March 13, April 17).
Joint Russian-Belarusian non-strategic nuclear exercises between May and August 2024 confirmed a wartime 30-minute decision-making-employment cycle. Belarusian units operating Iskander-M and modernized Su-25/Su-30 aircraft, alongside 12th GUMO personnel, rehearsed wartime procedures under high alert, with nuclear munitions pre-positioned near launch platforms and carriers for immediate operational use (see EDM, May 24, June 17, August 15, 2024). During the Zapad-2025 joint exercises, the Joint Command/Nuclear Planning Group of the Russia–Belarus Regional Troops Grouping (RTG) conducted command-staff exercises on missile and nuclear strike planning against pre-designated and reconnaissance-identified targets, including employment of the Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) (see EDM, September 15).
In December 2024, the Kremlin announced plans to deploy Oreshnik to Belarus. Oreshnik is capable of conventional and nuclear warheads and has an estimated 5,500-kilometer (3,418 miles) range capable of threatening targets across Europe. Construction is underway at a site likely designed to host the Oreshnik system approximately 60 kilometers (37 miles) south of Minsk, in the Slutsk district near the village of Pavlovka.
Minsk and Moscow frame the deployment as defensive Union State deterrence. The forward-based posture, mobile combat duty readiness, ongoing war against Ukraine, and preparations for a direct military conflict with NATO, however, signal Russia’s offensive intentions and preparation for potential preemptive strikes against European targets (Valdai, July 24).
Targeting, authorization, and employment decisions rest with Russian military-political leadership. Minsk plays a secondary, enabling role within the RTG Joint Command. At most, Belarusian military leadership may participate in activating Permissive Action Links at the final stage of the command chain, but lacks effective veto power (see EDM, June 26). By not contesting Minsk’s claims of unilateral target selection and joint decision-making, Moscow effectively distributes political responsibility for potential nuclear use to Belarusian leadership (see EDM, February 3). If Moscow genuinely anticipated a NATO attack, deploying such systems deeper inside Russian territory under layered air and missile defense coverage would be more rational than stationing them in Belarus.
The updated Basic Principles of State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence lowers the nuclear-use threshold and reflects Moscow’s narrative of escalating Western involvement. On November 19, 2024, the Kremlin approved a revised nuclear doctrine following Western authorization for Ukraine to strike targets inside Russia and extended its provisions to Belarus, meaning attacks there could trigger a Russian response (see EDM, October 2, November 26, 2024, June 26). The doctrine, while framed as defensive, expands the range of potential adversaries to include states and coalitions with nuclear or significant conventional capabilities, as well as any country supporting actions against Russia. Aggression by a military bloc member or by non-nuclear states backed by nuclear powers is considered a joint attack, clearly targeting NATO and Ukraine. Russia also reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to reliable intelligence on major aerospace attacks, including missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, or hypersonic systems crossing the Russian border.
These developments mark a clear escalation in Russia’s nuclear posture. Forward combat-ready deployments, doctrinal revisions, and readiness for testing fit within Russia’s escalation-for-de-escalation concept (Levshin, Nedinn, and Sosnovski, “On the Use of Nuclear Weapons to De-Escalate Hostilities,” Voennaya Mysl, 1999). This effectively prescribes the selective and limited use of nuclear weapons to coerce adversaries, signal resolve, and influence the end of the conflict on Russia’s terms without immediate transition to full-scale nuclear war.
