Russia’s Virtual Retreat in War Against Ukraine is Accelerating

Russia’s Virtual Retreat in War Against Ukraine is Accelerating

Executive Summary:

• Perceptions of Russia’s war against Ukraine are shifting, as the impression of stalemate gives way to Ukraine’s growing military-technological edge and Moscow’s visible strategic drift.
• The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in Ankara, U.S. President Trump’s silence toward Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Türkiye’s alignment with allied deterrence have compounded Russian setbacks in Crimea and the deepening fuel crisis.
• Elite discontent, spreading repression against business magnates, and public fatigue in Russia suggest that mobilization, strategically necessary to sustain the war, could instead trigger a domestic meltdown.

Perceptions are a major force affecting the course of information-age wars. Russia’s 1,600-day-long war against Ukraine has registered a distinct shift in mood among all directly and indirectly involved parties. The prevailing impression of a stalemate is changing into new hopes for—or worries about—Ukraine’s edge in pursuing a strategy for victory, while Russia has none. Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to consider himself a master of information warfare, but he is apparently at a loss for answers to Ukraine’s remarkably effective virtual offensive. He keeps asserting that the main dynamic of the war is driven by the relentless attacks from Russian troops, which only reinforces the widespread suspicion that he is entirely out of touch with the real situation in the expanding “kill zone,” with the deepening economic crisis, and with the evolving international context (Re: Russia, June 30).

A major recent development in the international context was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in Ankara. Moscow tried to influence the proceedings by delivering two massive missile strikes on Kyiv (see EDM, July 6; Argumenty i Fakty, July 7). Putin had counted on instigating transatlantic disagreements, and while the discussions were not without tense moments, the allies maintained unity and projected determination to deter Russian aggression (Radio Svoboda, July 9). The main output of the summit, according to Russian propaganda, was supposed to be U.S. President Donald Trump’s call to Putin, following up on the conversation on July 4, but the Kremlin waited in vain (Izvestiya, July 11). Trump met with  Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and expressed support for the Ukrainian air campaign but found no need to share his updated views with Putin (RBC, July 10). Russian threats to assess the scope of support for Ukraine by particular “instigators” and take measures against them were effectively canceled by U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham’s visit to Kyiv and his presentation of the final version of the Sanctioning Russia Act (Current Time; Rossiyskaya Gazeta, July 10). Graham, who passed away on July 11, is mourned in Ukraine as a true friend.

Mainstream Russian media describe the NATO summit as a success for Ukraine and concede that Türkiye has harvested significant political gains (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, July 8). Moscow for years cultivated a strategic partnership with Ankara and is now reminded that Türkiye is a loyal NATO member, which embraces without reservation all guidelines for deterring Russian aggression (Izvestiya, July 11). Türkiye pioneered military-technical cooperation with Ukraine and expects to partake in the deep integration of the Ukrainian and European defense industries (The Insider, June 10). Trump’s warm embrace of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has shown Putin that his efforts at building personal ties with the Turkish leader are worth only so much (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, July 7).

The war dynamic of special relevance for Türkiye is Ukraine’s strategy of interdicting all transport corridors leading to and from Crimea, which has effectively curtailed Russia’s strategic ambition of dominating the Black Sea theater (The New Voice of Ukraine, June 27; Re: Russia, July 8). In May, Ukrainian drone strikes systematically degraded Russian air defense systems on the peninsula, allowing Kyiv to deliver a series of strikes on its energy infrastructure and logistical hubs (Topwar.ru, July 9). The fuel and electricity crisis in Crimea became so severe that Putin took note and ordered emergency measures, which amounted mostly to the evacuation of tourists (Krym.Realii, July 10). Having gained air dominance, Ukraine has proceeded to destroy mid-size tankers and other shadow fleet vessels in the Sea of Azov, bringing all maritime traffic in this presumably “internal” Russian basin to a complete standstill (see EDM, July 8; The Moscow Times, July 11).  

While Crimea constitutes a special strategic and economic case, it also fits the pattern of the unfolding fuel crisis in Russia, which drives inflation up and the stock exchange down (The Bell, July 11). The Ukrainian drone strike on the Omsk refinery in western Siberia delivered a painful shock even to the jingoist commentators, but Putin still tries to downplay the effects of the profound degradation of the Russian oil industry (Topwar.ru, July 8; see EDM, July 10). Figures on contracting the budget revenues indicate the depth of the crisis, and long lines at gas stations in all major cities, even in Moscow, expose the falsity of official discourse to millions of drivers (The Moscow Times, July 8; Kommersant, July 9).

The vision of ever-deepening recession and Ukraine’s irresistible military-technological edge generates discontent among Russian elites, particularly business magnates outside the narrow circle of Putin’s aging courtiers (see EDM, July 7; RIAC, July 10). Debates over an article by Andrei Melnichenko, one of the richest Russian entrepreneurs, which was reprinted in full in one of the dailies, revealed the intensity of the angst (RBC; Forbes.ru; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, July 9). Some factions of the Kremlin administration certainly sanctioned Melnichenko’s long conversations with The Economist, and his argument on the crucial importance of sovereignty for Russia is generally in tune with mainstream pundits (RIAC, June 26; The Economist, July 9). The contrast with Putin’s rigid orders on staying the war course is apparent, and the emphasis on Russia’s predictable post-war behavior departs far from the ideological guidelines on irreducible confrontation with the West (Novaya Gazeta Europe, July 9; Kommersant, July 10). Escalating repression against business elites, which has spread to the empire of Arkady and Boris Rotenberg, shows the anxiety of Putin’s enforcers about the potential interplay between the dissent of the oligarchs and the strong preference in society for ending the war (Carnegie Politika, July 10).

Alongside hard facts on the casualties in the “kill zone” and dry statistics on economic capabilities are major determinants of the outcome of the war. Impressions, however, also shape Russia’s ability to sustain the war’s burden. Putin used to excel at conjuring political phantasms that answered the dreams of most of the Russian polity, but presently his performances depart too far from the increasingly disturbing reality. The stream of negative daily experiences flows in the same direction as perceptions of external developments, as Zelenskyy adds new energy to his posture of defiance, Trump apparently loses interest in communicating with Putin, and NATO produces a convincing show of unity. Russia’s material degradation is accelerated by mental fatigue, so the mobilization, which is strategically necessary for keeping the war going, could instead produce a meltdown.