Telegram Outages Spike in Kremlin’s Push for Digital Control

Telegram Outages Spike in Kremlin’s Push for Digital Control

Executive Summary:

• The Russian government widened restrictions on Telegram in February and March, beginning with slowed speeds. By mid-March, widespread Telegram outages have left the platform intermittently inaccessible across much of the country, suggesting a phased move toward a potential full block.
• Over the past year and a half, the Russian government has steadily sought to gain control over the internet, restricting foreign messaging apps and turning off the mobile internet to shut down or restrict internet use in the event of public unrest, as occurred during recent protests in Iran.
• The Kremlin’s restrictions on Telegram met with unexpected opposition from Russian war correspondents, deputies, and other government officials. This pushback demonstrates that the security services’ attempts to cut the population off from communications can also damage regime interests.

Since the beginning of the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Moscow has systematically limited the functioning of foreign messaging apps inside of Russia and more generally expanded its control of the internet (see EDM, November 25, 2024, July 24, November 6, 2025, February 25). In August 2024, Roskomnadzor cut Russians off from Signal, the most well-known app for secure communication. Its audience in Russia was much smaller than that of other apps, but it was used to transmit sensitive information and communicate with users located abroad (Meduza, August 13, 2024). In mid-March, Russians reported Telegram outages across the country following much reduced download speeds on the app in February and other government-imposed limits on the app’s functioning in 2025 (The Moscow Times, March 16).

In August 2025, the Kremlin restricted calls via WhatsApp and Telegram. Despite communication via both services still being possible without the use of a virtual private network (VPN), the government began to block voice calls from Russia. The Russian government explained these blocks as a fight against phone scammers (DW Russian Service, August 14, 2025).

Mobile internet access was also curtailed in many parts of Russia in 2025. Beginning in May 2025, outages became more frequent, larger, and longer with each month. Outages that began in southern and central Russia began to also affect Primorsky Krai, the Amur and Sakhalin oblasts, and Siberia. Internet outages can last weeks, with only occasional reactivations (T-Zh, December 3, 2025).

At the end of February, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law obligating Russian operators to block any communication when ordered by the Federal Security Service (FSB). Putin can personally decide to initiate blockages without explanation under the same law (DW Russian Service, February 21).

The Russian government claims that internet blockages defend against Ukrainian drone attacks. The Russian opposition, however, points out that unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) can carry out their missions without using the mobile internet. Moreover, the fight against drones cannot explain internet shutdowns in Kamchatka or Siberia, where there has not yet been a single Ukrainian attack. One of the leaders of the Russian opposition in exile, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, believes that the internet shutdowns are a “regime rehearsal for instability,” so the government can turn off the internet in the event of protests, as occurred recently in Iran (YouTube/@Mikhail Khodorkovsky, February 17).

In December 2025, Roskomnadzor announced a partial blocking of WhatsApp “for breaking the law” (RG.RU, December 1, 2025). Since February 21, Russians have complained that they cannot send files on WhatsApp in addition to existing problems with calls (@ hi-tech, February 22). At the same time, the authorities began to slow access to Telegram, the most popular messaging app in Russia.

The Russian authorities began the “ideological preparation” for the idea of the need for Telegram outages in February. One of the main pro-regime news sources, “Russian Gazette,” published an article on February 24, “exposing” the founder of Telegram, Pavel Durov. The author asserts that the platform has become “the main tool of the intelligence services of [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] NATO countries and the ‘Kyiv regime’” (RG.RU, February 24). The article says that Telegram “in no way censored” content and facilitated the exchange of coordinates and personal data (RG.RU, February 24). The author goes on, saying, “Since 2022, the number of crimes using Telegram exceeded 153,000,” of which 33,000 were “crimes of sabotage, terrorist, and extremist nature,” including explosions and arson attacks on military recruitment offices. The author did not conceal the fact that the article was based on “FSB materials” (RG.RU, February 24). At the same time, information appeared in the medi—also based on FSB data—that the government had opened a case against Durov for “aiding terrorism” (Vazhnie Istorii, February 24).

Telegram poses a more complicated problem for the authorities compared to other messaging services. It is actively used by Russian propagandists, ultra-nationalist “war correspondents,” and official government agencies. Russian officials and military personnel communicate via Telegram. Several opposition journalists claim the messenger is unsafe for the opposition and is linked to the FSB.

Journalists from “Important Stories” note that all Telegram chats, except for secret ones, lack end-to-end encryption, and therefore user messages are stored on Telegram’s servers. According to these journalists, these servers are maintained by the same people who operate the secret Russian intelligence complexes used to surveil Russian citizens (Vazhnie Istorii, June 10, 2025).

The relationship between the founder of Telegram and Russian intelligence is unclear. In 2018, the Kremlin blocked the service in Russia. Two years later, the block was lifted with the explanation that Durov was ready “to act against terrorism and extremism” (RBC, June 18, 2020). Telegram channels close to the presidential administration deny reports of a criminal case against Durov (Telegram/@russicaRU, February 24). Both the FSB leadership and Durov also deny any negotiations regarding the messaging app’s fate (RBC, February 19).

Telegram outages affect the Russian military most of all. According to pro-Russian war correspondents, the military widely uses Telegram for orders, medical coordination, group evacuations, first aid, and the collection of donations for the needs of the front. With a complete block, the volume of donations could decrease by 70–80 percent (DW Russian Service, February 13).

The Russian army has reportedly banned the use of the domestically controlled “Max” messenger app at the front because it is not secure enough (see EDM, October 7, 2025; Mediazona, February 23). It is revealing that a group of State Duma deputies even considered sending a request to the Ministry of Digital Development regarding the reasons for blocking Telegram (Meduza, February 11).

Analysts close to the presidential administration opine that the Kremlin is not yet prepared to fully block Telegram (Telegram/@russicaRU, February 25). Independent analysts suggest, however, that the Kremlin will continue to slowly throttle Telegram to “squeeze out” the platform’s loyal user base and reduce the political costs of a complete block (Re: Russia, February 20). If Durov does not go along with the Kremlin, the possibility of such a block in the future cannot be discarded. Considering the Russian military and government’s dependence on Telegram, such a decision will primarily affect their performance.