The Commander of Hezbollah’s Second Front Threatening Israel—Hajj Hashem
The Commander of Hezbollah’s Second Front Threatening Israel—Hajj Hashem
Since the start of the Syrian civil war, Iran’s expanding presence in southwestern Syria has been apparent, building upon its material capabilities and networks. Aiding Tehran to this end has been various proxy groups, with Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed political and militant organization primarily based in Lebanon, at the heart of operations. Hezbollah was one of the main actors that fought in defense of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, providing logistical and practical support to the pro-government forces (Asharq Al-Aswat, January 12).
With the civil war allowing Hezbollah troops to entrench themselves in territorially strategic locations throughout Syria’s southwest, Israel has perceived this as a deliberate provocation. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) has undertaken a sustained bombing campaign against positions, infrastructure and military convoys suspected of being linked to Hezbollah or the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) (Arab News, November 15). Certain locations, such as the vantage point of Tel al-Hara on the Syrian side of the border near the disputed Golan Heights, have been repeatedly targeted by Israeli forces owing to the alleged presence of Hezbollah assets (al-Monitor, July 26).
Iranian forces have not attempted to dispel this narrative, with Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces Brigadier-General Mehdi Rabbani claiming that “Our defensive depth has stretched to the Mediterranean Sea and our front has extended to the borders of the Zionist regime,” while referencing the growing strength of Hezbollah (Jerusalem Post, August 5). Out of the myriad Hezbollah assets entrenched in Syria attempting to forge the second front against Israel, few have been as central as Hajj Hashem, a Hezbollah commander who has been embedded in the region since 2017.
Hezbollah’s Man in Syria
Hashem, born Munir Ali Naim Shaiti, is commanding the Syrian Army’s “Southern Command” in the Hauran region of Daraa (Israel National News, July 1). Elements of his role are disputed and unclear, but Hashem’s likely remit is to lead Hezbollah operations south of Damascus. Information regarding Hashem and his activities is scarce. It should be noted that reporting from southwestern Syria is similarly sparse, with both Syrian and Iranian news sources rarely offering information that could be relied on as on-ground realities, and the bulk of reporting is provided by the Israeli media, which has its own agenda and biases.
Thought to be around 52 years old, Hashem is a father of four from southern Lebanon. During the second Lebanese war, he commanded a combat front and gradually became an influential figure within Hezbollah. Prior to deployment in Syria, he was the deputy chief of the Bader Brigades, a division of Hezbollah assigned to operations north of the Litani River in Lebanon. Hashem was deployed to Syria following the assassination of Mustafa Badreddine, and given command of Hezbollah in southwestern Syria (Ynet, October 25, 2017).
The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) publicly identified Hashem in 2017, with numerous news sources covering his profile, role, and command objectives (Haaretz, October 29, 2017). The IDF has a history of deliberately leaking the profiles of enemy actors to the media, largely so it can claim a propaganda victory when the individuals are neutralized, as was the case with Jihad Mughniyeh and Samir Kuntar, two members of the Hezbollah network in Syria who were killed in 2015. By making Hashem’s profile public, the IDF was also likely hoping operatives in Syria would be able to expedite his demise. Despite this, Hashem remains operational in 2019.
He is a unifying figure in Syria, coordinating Hezbollah operatives, IRGC networks, and the Syrian forces under his command. Communication and operational instructions from IRGC Quds Forces leader Qassem Soleimani are increasingly key, as Soleimani is ordering Hashem to increase the size of the Iranian-backed forces close to the disputed Golan Heights (Israel Today, October 24). Hashem is proving successful at implementing Iran’s goal of regional consolidation in southwestern Syria, expanding its territorial and material influence, prompting a significant operational response from Israel, which recently declared its staunch military goal of preventing further Iranian consolidation (Jerusalem Post, November 20).
The Syrian Advantage
The current situation on the ground in Syria is conducive to expansion. In Quneitra Governorate, Iranian forces are embedded into the local community and have set up military bases in four strategic locations—Daraa city, al-Lajat, the Brigade 52 base and the al-Sabr base (Asharq as-Awsat, October 2) Hezbollah assets have also started to utilize discontinued military infrastructure in the area previously occupied by the Syrian Army.
Hezbollah has been actively recruiting in the area, and increasingly is not discriminating along sectarian or ethnic lines. Since it became apparent that Assad has managed to consolidate his position, Hezbollah and Iranian operatives have widened their recruitment drive to include Sunni Muslims, Christians, and members of the Druze community. The IDF has attempted proactively to counteract this, by promising to protect Druze towns on the Syrian side of the border near Majdal Shams, in order to ingratiate themselves with the Syrian civilian populous and push back against the spreading influence of Iranian networks among Syrian communities. Some communal leaders recently declared allegiance to Israel (Breaking Israel News, November 10).
The narrative surrounding recruitment has also changed of late. Recruitment drives used to focus on the threat posed by Islamic State, but since that group’s territorial defeat in Syria, the focus has shifted towards military capabilities near the Golan Heights and a second front with Israel. Even members of Sunni Islamist militias have been successfully recruited, with Hezbollah operative Ali Musa Daqduq actively recruiting beleaguered Islamists (Israel National News, July 1). A large part of this is due to the instability the civil war has created: Hashem is offering $250 a month to recruits, creating a financial incentive that for many takes precedence over ethnic or religious considerations. Hezbollah and Hashem have had little difficulty in recruiting locals to their cause (Times of Israel, June 24).
Integration within the Syrian Army is also aiding operations. Hashem is suspected of commanding large swaths of the Syrian Army units in the area, giving him access to an unprecedented amount of intelligence and resources (Israel National News, July 1). Although it is unclear if Hashem himself has direct control over military units or is part of a wider network assisting Syrian military operations, it demonstrates how Hezbollah has managed to weave itself into the heart of military operations in southwestern Syria.
Military Considerations
The implications of Hezbollah expanding its territorial entrenchment in southwest Syria are significant. In terms of its military capabilities, the Israeli media has claimed that the Syrian army is stockpiling heavy weaponry in the area, including surface-to-air and anti-tank missiles, which could be rapidly deployed during kinetic operations against Israeli forces, settlements, and assets (Israel National News, July 1). Hezbollah has also been suspected of helping to set up manufacturing warehouses on the Syrian side of the border to produce and distribute weaponry (The Jerusalem Post, February 7). Training barracks have also opened to house the Iranian-backed militias that are now embedded in the area, with Hashem overseeing operations.
Iran’s significant presence in Syria has allowed it to increase land supply chains to Hezbollah in both Syria and Lebanon, a long-time goal for Tehran. The transfer of precision missiles to Lebanon has led Israel to become concerned that Tel Aviv’s military advantage over Hezbollah is gradually declining. If conflict between Lebanon and Israel escalated, Hezbollah’s ability to attack Israel on two fronts would create a whole new dynamic for any military confrontation, especially as the group has significant capabilities established on the newly-formed southern front.
Owing to the increased tensions, Israel is proactively attacking Iranian and Hezbollah targets in Syria. In June and July of this year, unidentified aircraft bombed suspected Hezbollah infrastructure in the aforementioned Tel al-Hara area of Syria. It is highly likely the IAF carried out those attacks (al-Monitor, July 26). The conflict in and around the Golan Heights has thus far not escalated into a wider confrontation; all parties involved are keen to avoid total warfare owing to their respective agendas, and tit-for-tat reciprocal attacks in the Syrian proxy theater are likely to continue without significant escalation.
Israel is not only carrying out airstrikes. In July, Zidan Mashour, a Druze resident of the village of Hader, was killed when his vehicle exploded. According to reports, Mashour had close ties to Daqduq and was involved in Hezbollah’s recruitment drive (al-Monitor, July 26). The assassination was likely a “targeted killing” by the IDF, indicating Israeli forces are able to penetrate the Syrian Golan and target high-profile Hezbollah and Iranian actors. Despite this, they have not yet been able to neutralize Hajj Hashem.
Conclusion
Hashem is known to be cautious, and always travels with a security detail. This has perhaps allowed him to avoid being targeted by the IDF, which has dedicated significant resources to tracking his actions and movements. In the event of any conflict between Lebanon and Israel, Hashem would highly likely be given control of the southern front, making him a crucial actor. With Hashem alive, active and dictating Hezbollah’s expansion in the Syrian Golan, his operational importance will only continue to grow.
