Kremlin Rhetoric Hints at Escalation

Kremlin Rhetoric Hints at Escalation

Executive Summary:

• Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov’s admission that Russia’s “special military operation” (SVO) has become a “real war” marks a departure from years of official rhetoric and may signal that Moscow is preparing to escalate rather than negotiate.
• Reports that the Kremlin has resolved to intensify the war, expected mobilization after the September Duma elections, Peskov’s remarks, and a draft law requiring exit visas to prevent draft-age men from leaving Russia point toward this potential escalation.
• Should escalation proceed, Russia’s capacity to sustain it rests partly on an expanding Cossack mobilization network that is forming drone units, conducting reserve exercises, and building a reserve force expected to reach 60,000.

Since the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine, the Kremlin has insisted it is waging something short of a war, a “special military operation” (SVO). In an interview on July 5, Russian Deputy Chief of the Presidential Executive Office and Press Secretary of the President Dmitry Peskov stated that in Ukraine “everything began as a Special Military Operation but now has become a real war” (Gazeta.ru, July 5). Theories have since emerged over the statement’s implications, ranging from speculation that the Kremlin could open a new front against Ukraine from the north to concern that Moscow could launch a hybrid or kinetic attack on a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member state to test the alliance’s resolve. Peskov added that Western material aid to Ukraine has created a situation where “behind Kyiv stand Berlin, Paris, the Hague, Oslo, and regretfully, Washington.” He dismissed the notion that Moscow would strike NATO, expressed hope that U.S.-mediated negotiations would continue, and raised the prospect of Poland annexing part of Ukraine’s territory (Gazeta.ru, July 5). Given the record of Kremlin denials, his words carry little weight. 

At least four additional signals suggest Moscow has chosen escalation over compromise. First, anonymous sources close to the Kremlin and familiar with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s thinking claim he has “resolved to escalate” the five-year-old conflict, confirming warnings from officials such as former U.S. Deputy Assistant to the President Fiona Hill, who said at the outbreak of the full-scale invasion that Putin’s ambitions extended beyond Ukraine (The Brookings Institution, September 19, 2022; Ukrainian National News, July 9). 

Second, widespread speculation holds that Putin will declare full-scale mobilization after the September Duma elections (Obshchestvennaya Sluzhba Novostei, June 24). Putin does not formally need popular consent to govern, but elections still signal to Moscow’s elite that the public broadly accepts the status quo, making elite defection harder to justify.  Peskov’s words may have been a trial balloon intended to prepare the ground for such a move. The regime has used such exploratory tactics before to gauge reaction before full implementation.

Third, a draft law has been introduced that would require Russians to obtain exit visas to leave the country (Fontanka.ru, July 10). While the law initially targets “unfriendly [meaning Western] countries,” any state that refuses to return Russian citizens for military service could be added to that list. Given the mass exodus of draft-age men that followed the 2022 partial mobilization, the Kremlin might be preparing a legal mechanism to keep future conscripts from leaving (see EDM, September 27, 2022). Western analysts have already begun mapping out the likely avenues of escalation (see EDM, June 4).

Should escalation occur, both Russia and the West will need to exhibit resilience against external pressure, and civil defense structures are an important component of that resilience. In Russia’s case, the Kremlin built a nationwide network of Cossack organizations that perform many of the same functions that civil defense agencies handle elsewhere—from informational security to evacuations in response to ecological or military threats (see EDM, July 8). The leader of the All-Russian Cossack Society (VsKO), created in 2018 to centralize the movement, Vitaly Kuznetsov, has worked to shore up morale among Cossack units at the front. He visited the front-line positions of Cossack volunteer BARS (Boeviki Armii Reserv Strany, Боевой Армейский Резерв Страны) battalions, including BARS-1 (named for Zakhary Chepiha), BARS-11 (Kuban Cossack battalion), and BARS-32 (named for Pavel Sudoplatov). The visits included the delivery of humanitarian aid and personally thanking troops for defending the interests of the Fatherland (VsKO, July 7). Kuznetsov also visited Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts, where officials are discussing the creation of a Cossack voisko (host) for the two regions. He noted, with approval, that 30 Cossacks from the oblast have already joined the BARS-Zaporizhzhia combat formation. In that meeting, Kuznetsov framed Cossack services as a moral obligation to “secure Cossack lands, our inheritance from grandfathers and fathers and pass them on to new generations” (VsKO, July 6). Given the broad definition of “Cossack lands,” this may be read as preparing troops for further fighting in Ukraine and Eastern Europe. 

The effort to create a Cossack mobilizational reserve is proceeding apace, giving Russia the means to bring a force of 60,000 fresh soldiers to any emergent conflict. The Terek Cossacks have agreed to form a drone unit called “Pokrov” for incorporation into the reserve, while Ussuriysk Cossacks have taken part in reserve wargame exercises (VsKO, July 9, July 10). Such initiatives could be read as preparations for escalation, though forecasting Russia’s course of action a few months ahead, or reading the proverbial tea leaves, is fraught with uncertainty. For now, escalation seems probable.