Armenia and Azerbaijan at Odds Over Peace Process

Executive Summary:

• Amid the ongoing peace process, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan published an op-ed on Armenia’s perspective where he rejected Azerbaijan’s claims of Armenian aggression, proposing reciprocal arms control for stability.

• Armenia and Azerbaijan remain divided over third-country military presence and legal disputes. Pashinyan considers withdrawing lawsuits conditionally, but Armenian civil society opposes it, citing accountability for ethnic displacement and Azerbaijan’s revisionist tactics.

• Azerbaijan’s “Western Azerbaijan” claims are seen as threatening Armenia’s sovereignty, fueling concerns of future conflict. Pashinyan urges de-escalation, emphasizing that conditions for peace already exist.

On February 10, the Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, published an op-ed offering Yerevan’s perspective on the peace process and its defense policies (Armenpress, February 10). Pashinyan argues that Azerbaijan is promoting the narrative that “Armenia is arming itself, preparing to attack Azerbaijan” in order to justify Baku taking “preventive measures” against such an attack. Yerevan has proposed to Azerbaijan the establishment of a reciprocal arms control mechanism, including quotas, restrictions on certain weaponry, and a joint mechanism to investigate ceasefire violations, aimed at fostering regional stability and trust, as well as start (Armenpress, February 10). Pashinyan’s article and earlier interviews are a reaction to President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev’s renewed preconditions and demands to Armenia for a peace agreement in his recent interviews with “Rossiya Segodnya” on December 18, 2024, and to local Azerbaijani channels (President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, December 18, 2024, January 7).

Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement refuting Pashinyan’s claims, describing them as distortions intended to mislead the international community and called for Armenia to abandon insincere postures and actions that undermine regional stability and peace efforts (Republic of Azerbaijan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 13). On February 25, Armenia’s Foreign Ministry stated that Yerevan has received Baku’s response on the peace agreement, but proposals on unblocking transport links and mutual arms control sent in November last year remain unanswered (Factor TV, February 25).

Baku appears concerned that Armenia’s efforts to restore its defense capacity could strengthen its deterrence capabilities (Nerses Kopalyan, January 31). Aliyev issued a demand to halt Armenia’s “militarization” and return the armaments received from France and India over the past two years (see EDM, November 6, 2023, August 6, September 12, 2024). Pashinyan responded that if Azerbaijan does not intend to attack Armenia, the likelihood of escalation in the region is zero (Armenpress, December 19, 2024).

Pashinyan refutes the possibility that Azerbaijan’s claim that Armenia is preparing to attack stems from genuine belief. Instead, he argues that it serves as a pretext for Azerbaijan’s own aggressive intentions. Pashinyan reaffirmed Armenia’s commitment to the 2022 Prague Statement, which established mutual recognition of territorial integrity within the administrative borders of Soviet republics based on the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration (Alma-Ata Declaration, December 21, 1991; European Council, October 7, 2022; Armenpress, February 10).

Pashinyan has reiterated that Yerevan does not seek to use its armed forces outside of Armenia’s internationally-recognized borders. Additionally, it does not seek to retake over 200 square kilometers (77 square miles) of Armenia’s border areas occupied by Azerbaijan in 2021–2022 through military means. Instead, he affirmed that Armenia will rely on the delimitation process. He emphasized that Armenia’s defense reforms align with the inherent right of every sovereign state to self-defense and questioning this right constitutes a violation of international law (The Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, December 19, 2024).

In December last year, Yerevan confirmed that Armenia and Azerbaijan had made progress on 15 of the 17 articles in the draft peace treaty (Armenpress, December 9, 2024). Two provisions remained unresolved—Azerbaijan’s demands for the non-deployment of third-country forces along the border of the two countries and withdrawal of lawsuits in international courts. In interviews, however, Aliyev revived old demands and escalated new ones, presenting them as further non-negotiable preconditions. He said, “If Armenia does not need a peace treaty, we do not need it either. We can live and conduct our own policy without signing one” (President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, January 7).

Pashinyan has indicated Armenia’s willingness to consider withdrawing international lawsuits, provided this process aligns with progress on key elements of the peace agenda and is contingent on Azerbaijan abandoning its historical revisionism tactics. Most Armenian human rights defenders, political analysts, and civil society, however, are opposed to the withdrawal of lawsuits from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (Transparency International Armenia, January 14). They believe Baku demands the lawsuit’s withdrawal to evade accountability for the displacement of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, which has been characterized as ethnic cleansing by Armenians and some international actors (Freedom House, 2024; Panorama.am, March 8, 2024; Evnreport.com, May 7, 2024; Factor TV, February 7.)

Armenian legal experts assess that Armenia has a strong case and a high likelihood of success in its ICJ lawsuit against Azerbaijan (Voice of Yerevan, January 7; Voice of Yerevan, January 15). Recently the ICJ dismissed Azerbaijan’s objections in the case Armenia v. Azerbaijan, allowing Armenia’s lawsuit to proceed in full (ICJ, November 12, 2024). In contrast, the ICJ partially upheld Armenia’s objections, significantly reducing the scope of Azerbaijan’s lawsuit (ICJ, November 12, 2024). Azerbaijan recently filed a lawsuit against Armenia at the Permanent Court of Arbitration, alleging that ICJ had dismissed environmental damage under the Berne Convention. The Armenian side expressed confidence that Armenia will prove the claim politically motivated and legally unfounded (Office of the Representative on International Legal Matters, February 14).

Additionally, Baku is advancing its “Western Azerbaijan” narrative through a state-sponsored organization of the same name, laying expansionist claims to 60 percent of Armenia’s territory (AERTAC, October 1, 2024). Aliyev claimed that 300,000 Azerbaijanis were deported from Armenia in the late 1980s, arguing that their numbers are even higher with their descendants, and demanded their return under “secure conditions.” Pashinyan denounced the use of the term “Western Azerbaijan” to refer to Armenian territory, emphasizing that it should apply only to Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized borders. He characterized this narrative as an attempt to undermine Armenia’s sovereignty and a pretext for future escalations (Armenpress, January 9, 2024).

Initially, international officials, as reflected in the farewell interview of Toivo Klaar, the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus, implied that Azerbaijan was obstructing discussions on the return of more than 100,000 Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians following their 2023 exodus by bringing up issues of “Western Azerbaijan” (JAM News, August 4, 2024). According to Klaar, these are “ completely distinct questions that cannot be mixed” (JAM News, August 4, 2024). Armenian officials opted not to raise the issue of the return of displaced Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians while Baku escalated its “Western Azerbaijan” narrative further, leading Armenians to believe that Azerbaijan is laying the groundwork for offensives against Armenia. Recently, Baku also reactivated its demand for an extraterritorial corridor through Armenia to connect with its exclave, Nakhichevan, disregarding Yerevan’s alternative “Crossroad for Peace” proposal for regional connectivity, and its first proposed step to reopening railway links to facilitate transit between and through both countries (The Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, 2023; see EDM, April 15, 2024; Eurasianet, January 17).

There is no justification for further escalation, according to Pashinyan, as all necessary conditions for peace already exist (Armenpress, February 10). He reaffirms Armenia’s firm commitment to lasting peace and urges Baku to de-escalate. Restoring a constructive dialogue between Yerevan and Baku is essential to ensure a lasting resolution that benefits both Armenia and Azerbaijan and secures the stability of the region as a whole.