Kremlin Promotes Nationalist Ideologies to Retain Support Amid War

Executive Summary:

• Government sources report that the Kremlin is considering repositioning the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) as an ultra-nationalist party to attract war veterans and anti-immigrant groups, centralizing far-right radicalism.
• Far-right nationalists and religious fundamentalists do not have substantial popular support in Russia, but the Kremlin sees radicals as its main political ally in Russia’s war against Ukraine and therefore makes disproportionate concessions to them.
• The Kremlin is fueling grassroots radicalism by promoting far-right views through education and propaganda, increasing anti-migrant sentiment, and risking social instability if nationalist violence slips further from state control.

For some time, the so-called “Liberal Democratic Party of Russia” (LDPR) was known for its radical right-wing declarations, largely driven by the extreme views of its leader, Vladimir Zhirinovsky. After Zhirinovsky’s death in 2022, the LDPR became one of the parties loyal to the Kremlin, indistinguishable from “United Russia.” At the beginning of May, independent journalists from the Verska portal reported that Kremlin political strategists are discussing making the LDPR a “Russian party,” designed as a “collection point” for nationalists and “passionate veterans” of the “special military operation (SVO),” what the Kremlin calls its war against Ukraine (Verstka, May 5). Political strategists believe that such a party will be able to control the growing “audience of SVO veterans” and the contingent of Russians who support the war against Ukraine.

The level of anti-migrant sentiment in Russia is growing at the grassroots level, primarily on social media. In 2023, the staff of the National Accent Project of the Guild of Interethnic Journalism recorded a sharp increase in anti-migrant, nationalistic posts on VKontakte and Telegram (Natsionalniy Aktsent, April 27, 2023). Politically, the current leader of the LDPR, Leonid Slutskiy, already plays an active role in the anti-immigrant movement and is conducting a series of secret negotiations with movements such as “Russian Community” (Verstka, May 5). The “Russian Community” is one of the most active ultra-right organizations that commits acts of physical violence, most often against non-ethnically Russian people and non-Russian citizens (see EDM, October 15, 2024, May 27). On the night of May 3, for example, activists of the movement broke into an apartment in Vsevolozhsk, killing an Armenian citizen (Fontanka.ru; Novaya Gazeta Evropa, May 5).

Despite the growth of radical patriotism due to the war, sociologists note that ethnic issues are not of great concern for most Russians. Even the pro-government Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) reported last year that 60 percent of respondents think that Russia being a multi-ethnic state “makes the country stronger,” while only 7 percent think it weakens Russia (VCIOM Novosti, July 18, 2024). The Kremlin has tried to create far-right parties, but the percentage of popular support for such parties has always been small (Verstka, May 5).

Religious radicalism is also not popular with ordinary Russians. Independent researchers note that despite the heavy-handed propaganda promoting the Russian Orthodox Church and “traditional values,” religious growth in Russia is limited (Re: Russia, April 23). Russia is a country with a relatively low level of religiosity compared to other Orthodox countries—only 52 percent of Russians claimed that religion was very or somewhat important to them in a 2024 poll (Levada Center, April 27, 2024). Among young people, fewer than half consider themselves Orthodox, and the frequency of church attendance in Russia is lower than in countries with a comparable level of religious conviction (Re: Russia, April 23).

Moscow’s flirtation with radical nationalists is not reflective of public sentiment. Instead, it demonstrates the symbiosis between the Kremlin and radical nationalists that arose with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The Kremlin made an unspoken deal with the fundamentalists of demarginalization in exchange for loyalty. The regime made radical conspiracy theorists feel that “their time” had come and that “the government has adopted their platform,” using their slogans and fulfilling their expansionist policy goals in Ukraine (Tsargrad, July 31, 2023). The radicals, in turn, swear allegiance and recognize Russian President Vladimir Putin as the savior of Russia in the battle with “the World Secret Government.” Previously, ultra-right political groups viewed Putin as a “compromise option” or lesser evil (Russkaya Narodnaya Liniya, January 27, 2022).

Moscow also uses the Russian Orthodox Church as a tool to promote pro-war and radical values in Russia. Orthodox priests who oppose the war rightly note that the Russian Orthodox Church does not simply compromise with the state, but supplies the ideological fuel for Russia’s “holy war” against Ukraine (see EDM, January 30, 2023, August 5, November 15, 2024; RFI, October 15, 2024). As a result, it is the radical part of society that has become the main support base for the Kremlin’s war.

Moscow imposes radical ideology “from above” (Tsargrad, March 2). While the possibility of a nationalist revolt “from below” following the return of war veterans from Ukraine frightens some government officials and citizens, nationalist ideology is primarily driven by the Kremlin. Together with this emphasis on the militarization of education, Russian school curricula are increasingly focusing on family values and “traditional upbringings” (see EDM, August 18, 2023, February 13, 27, October 1, November 13, 2024, February 20, April 2). In some regions, a curriculum about “traditional” Russian values is being developed and is set to be introduced nationwide next year (see EDM, September 9, 2024).

Students are taught the value of large families and the importance of “raising patriots.” In some schools, lectures on gender relations are given by nuns, and boys and girls are taught a clear division of gender roles. Girls are often told outright that their only purpose in life is to get married and have children, and that abortion is the gravest “fall from grace” (Novaya Gazeta Evropa, May 4). In some regions, underage schoolgirls receive 100,000 rubles (about $1,000) for registering for pregnancy and birth, and officials repeat the radicals’ harsh statements about migrants (Novaya Gazeta Evropa, December 22, 2023; see EDM, April 17; Tsargrad, April 30).

Top-down encouragement of radical sentiments is likely to worsen the state’s loss of monopoly on violence, which is already seen in modern Russia (see EDM, September 24, 2024). The increase in violence from radical forces may lead to popular discontent and create new hotbeds of tension in an already divided Russian society.