Alekseev Assassination Attempt Reveals Russian Security Service Cracks

Alekseev Assassination Attempt Reveals Russian Security Service Cracks

Executive Summary:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin has instructed the Federal Security Service (FSB) to strengthen protection for key military figures following an assassination attempt on Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseev, the first deputy head of Russia’s military intelligence service (GRU) in February.
• The Kremlin used the assassination attempt to promote the narrative of “Ukrainian terrorism,” creating an opportunity to present any internal elite confrontations as Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) operations.
• The incident strengthens the “party of war” in Russia and can be used as an instrument of pressure on peace negotiations, justifying Moscow’s rhetoric of escalation. It is a demonstration that the war against Ukraine has long since extended beyond the front line.

On February 24, Russian President Vladimir Putin instructed the Federal Security Service (FSB) to strengthen protection for high-ranking Ministry of Defense officials, the Russian defense industry, opinion makers, journalists, and volunteers “who are constantly threatened by the ‘Kyiv regime’” (Vedomosti, February 24). An assassination attempt against Lieutenant General Vladimir Alekseev, the first deputy head of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (GRU), in Moscow on February 6, prompted Putin to make this decision. In a residential building entrance on Volokolamsk Highway, a hitman fired at least three shots at Alekseev and escaped (Vedomosti, February 6). The Russian general received severe injuries but survived and regained consciousness. The perpetrator of the crime managed to fly to the United Arab Emirates, where he was detained at Russia’s request (Interfax, February 9). According to the FSB’s official reporting, the assassination attempt allegedly had a “Ukrainian trace,” and the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) promised the detained perpetrator, Lyubomir Korba, $30,000 if he succeeded.

This incident became a painful reminder of the inability of Russian security services to ensure the safety of key military figures inside Russia. The would-be assassin caught Alekseev in an ordinary residential complex without visible round-the-clock security or access-control systems capable of preventing the intruder from entering under the guise of a food delivery courier. Russian war correspondents and pro-war Telegram channels openly criticized these obvious security gaps (Meduza, February 6, 2026). This is not the first time in the past two years that a high-ranking Russian military figure was attacked. In December 2024, the head of the Russian Radiation, Chemical, and Biological Protection Troops, Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov, was killed in Moscow (Meduza, December 17, 2024; see EDM, January 13, 2025). Putin described the incident as a serious failure of law-enforcement agencies (RBC, December 19, 2024). Two such cases within a year and a half indicate a systemic vulnerability in Russia’s top military leadership, which, according to the Russian elite and law enforcement agencies, undermines trust in the FSB as the guarantor of their personal security.

The consequences of the assassination attempt on Alekseev go far beyond a single episode. First, the attempt nearly derailed the negotiation process between Moscow and Kyiv mediated by the United States. Ukrainian sources claimed that after the attempt on Alekseev, the negotiations stalled for several weeks (Ukrainska Pravda, February 23). The Kremlin immediately used the incident to reinforce its standard narrative, accusing Kyiv of “terrorism,” which could have justified withdrawing from the peace dialogue. The negotiations have continued, however. Moscow was unlikely to close this channel completely, as it is not interested in a sharp deterioration in relations with Washington. Such a high-profile incident did not outweigh Russia’s strategic interest in a pause or at least in reducing the intensity of hostilities.

Second, Russian pro-military circles have actively discussed the possibility of an internal assassination order against Alekseev. Alekseev was closely involved in the creation and coordination of the Private Military Company (PMC) “Wagner” in its early days. In June 2023, he was caught on camera during former Wagner leader Evgeny Prigozhin’s mutiny when he attempted to dissuade “Putin’s chef” from marching on Moscow, but at the same time was prepared to hand over the then-leadership of the Ministry of Defense—Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Valery Gerasimov and then-Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, who now serves as the secretary of the Russian Security Council (Telegram/@beregofic, February 6).

After the liquidation of the PMC “Wagner,” Alekseev played a key role in placing several other military groups under GRU control. These included PMC “Redut” and the “Storm Z” program, which involved large-scale recruitment of prisoners to fight in the war. Under Alekseev’s coordination, the GRU also took control of dozens of mercenary and volunteer formations, which caused sharp dissatisfaction among other law enforcement agencies (Telegram/@arbat, October 7, 2024).

One of Alekseev’s projects was a volunteer unit of Russian football fans, the PMC “Española,” which in the autumn of 2025 was forced to self-dissolve under pressure from above (Telegram/@spainrus, October 2, 2025). A few months later, in December 2025, the leader of “Española,” Stanislav Orlov, also known by his callsign “Spaniard,” was killed during his arrest (CurrentTime, December 22, 2025; see EDM, January 29). “Española” was one of Alekseev’s favorite units, and its members were personally loyal to him (Telegram/@neoreshkins, February 6). Many in pro-war circles believe that the liquidation of the unit was a direct blow to Alekseev’s network.

Being a career intelligence officer and a combat general, Alekseev was not part of Shoigu’s team. After the arrest of Deputy Defense Minister Timur Ivanov in 2024, reports claimed that Alekseev had long been in conflict with Ivanov, and the amount of evidence against him played a decisive role in the arrest (Telegram/@logikamarkova, April 25, 2024; see EDM, April 29, 2024). Ivanov, in turn, was closely associated with Shoigu, having served as his deputy for a long time—dating back to Shoigu’s tenure as governor of the Moscow oblast in 2012—and he oversaw major Ministry of Defense construction projects, including the Main Cathedral of the Russian Armed Forces. Alekseev’s activity was disliked by many in security agencies, which led to bureaucratic and information attacks against the general aimed at removing him from his position amid the redistribution of money and influence among elites within the Ministry of Defense (Telegram/@arbat, October 7, 2024; Telegram/@ejdailyru, December 28, 2025). Alekseev was born in Ukraine, which, in the current atmosphere of paranoia, adds a convenient scapegoat. Under the current conditions, any internal confrontations can be conveniently masked as SBU operations.

The assassination attempt on Alekseev may have several long-term consequences for the Russian security establishment. This will probably lead to a set of structural changes. The most obvious is the accelerated creation of closed residential complexes for the top military leadership, the strengthening of personal security for key figures, and the expansion of the FSB’s counterintelligence powers within the security structures. Politically, the incident strengthens the “party of war” and is used as an instrument of pressure on peace negotiations, justifying the rhetoric of escalation. The assassination attempt has become yet another demonstration that the war against Ukraine has long since extended beyond the front lines and has turned into a multi-layered struggle among intelligence services, clans, and groups of influence. Under these conditions, even the personal security of the highest-ranking figures is not guaranteed.