The Power Vertical: Centralization in the PRC’s State Security System

Executive Summary:

• Centralizing reforms to the Ministry of State Security probably constitute the most important development in China’s civilian intelligence system since its establishment in 1983. These reforms instituted “vertical leadership,” under which the MSS is empowered to control local bureaus’ personnel affairs, budgets, and oversight.
• Structural changes that began in 2016–2017 mean that local state security bureaus are no longer subject to the authority of local party committees, and so are freer to impose a security-first agenda on other government agencies, leading to a more oppressive political environment.
• The ministry is now better able to direct joint operations between bureaus, exploit pockets of regional expertise, and ensure that local activities serve the strategic intelligence and security requirements of the central government.
• The reforms are part of Xi Jinping’s broader efforts to ensure that the “party center has supreme authority over state security.” The state security system’s further empowerment suggests it is likely to remain a powerful and durable interest group in PRC politics beyond the Xi era.

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On September 25, 2024, newly promoted chiefs of provincial state security bureaus in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) gathered in Beijing for a “training course (培训班)” organized by the Ministry of State Security (MSS). Coverage of the event was characteristically sparse, yet a careful reading of Minister Chen Yixin’s (陈一新) speech at the opening session yields fresh evidence for reform of the PRC’s secret intelligence and counterespionage system (China Peace, September 25).

Chen used his address to analyze the “strengths and ‘shortcomings’ (优势和 ‘短缺’)” of provincial bureau appointees, describing them as “a team that the Party Committee of the MSS has comprehensively considered, carefully selected, and placed high hopes on (国家安全部党委通盘考虑、精心选拔、着力培养、寄予厚望的一支队伍).” Chen then exhorted his audience to “take the lead in implementing vertical management by the ministry’s Party Committee over the work of the entire [state security] system (带头落实部党委对全系统工作的垂直管理).” These comments are striking.

In the PRC’s decentralized polity, the authority to select, examine, and appoint the chiefs of a local state unit typically lies with its local party committee, not its functional superior, such as a ministry. The exception to this rule is a small group of state agencies under “vertical leadership (垂直领导),” where personnel authority rests with the internal party organs of a higher-level unit. This “cadre authority (干部权力)” is a critically important aspect of PRC politics. A party committee’s power to hire, fire, reward, and punish state officials—such as state security bureau chiefs—determines the latter’s lines of command and control as well as its incentives to comply with local over central authorities, or vice versa. As personnel authority also denotes control over budgets, staffing affairs, and oversight, vertical leadership is central to shaping a unit’s capacity.

Chen’s speech is the latest hint of a changing relationship between the MSS and its network of provincial and city bureaus, which are responsible for counterintelligence, political security, and most of the PRC’s foreign intelligence operations using both cyber and human means (IISS, May 2016). Following major reforms in 2000 that centralized the state security bureaucracy up to the provincial level, another round of centralizing reforms in 2016–2017 has ensured that command over operations, resources and oversight for local bureaus now lies squarely with the MSS.

Vertical leadership will strengthen the overall capacity of the state security system, ensure that local bureaus serve the needs of central—not local—government, and reduce local latitude for “rogue” operations at home and abroad. However, as a centralized state security system is no longer subject to the authority of local party committees, local state security bureaus will be freer to impose a security-first agenda on other government agencies, leading to a more oppressive political environment.

The Early Years: Dual Leadership, Decentralization, and its Discontents

The latest instance of state security centralization marks the endpoint in an historical process that began with the MSS’s creation in 1983. For the first seventeen years, local state security bureaus were governed under “dual leadership (双重领导),” whereby authority was nominally shared between the vertical state security bureaucracy and local party committees at each level. [2] In reality, command over state security organs was firmly in the hands of local party committees.

Local authorities were responsible for selecting, assessing, vetting, and appointing members of the bureaus’ leadership. [3] These included the chief, deputy chief, and the leaders of two in-house party organs: the discipline inspection committee and the political bureau. [4] “Administrative expenses (行政费),” including salaries, pensions, subsidies and bonuses, were drawn from local coffers. Local party committees had discretion over “personnel allocations (编制),” including staffing numbers, deployments, and departmental structure. [5]

The MSS struggled to shape matters in its own bureaucracy. The ministry could veto local appointments by withholding its “agreement,” but the final decision still lay with a superior local party committee, not a superior state security bureau. [6] For matters of finance, the MSS supplemented local budgets by covering “operational costs (业务费),” which referred to “funds necessary to perform foreign intelligence and counterespionage investigations.” [7] Yet this paltry contribution bought the ministry little influence. Between 1997 and 2004, a city bureau in Guangxi spent, on average, 40.4 million renminbi (RMB) per year on administrative expenses, compared to RMB 1.43 million for operations (96.5 percent vs. 3.5 percent). [8]

Operations were also partially decentralized. Officially, the MSS stipulated that “leadership over operations gives first place to a higher-level agency.” [9] In reality, the ministry’s administrative authority was superseded by the political writ of local party committees. According to a 1995 MSS source: “Due to its political nature, secrecy, relation to foreign affairs, and other characteristics, state security work—that is, foreign intelligence, investigations and security protection operations—must come under the direct leadership of party committees at each level (由于国家安全工作的政治性, 隐蔽性, 涉外性等特点, 它所主管的对外情报和侦察保卫的业务工作, 要受各级党委的直接领导).” Operations were run through an information loop known as “requesting instructions from and submitting reports to the party committee (向党委请示报告).” [10] Unsurprisingly, local state security chiefs bemoaned the difficulty of “correctly handling the relationship between serving central and local government (正确处理为中央服务与为地方服务的关系).” Zhang Song (张崧), the former chief of Yunnan’s provincial bureau, noted in 1997 that “requests for advice and instructions on all state security deployments must be sent to local party committees. At the same time, it is necessary to give free rein to our subjective initiative and proactively carry out state security operations (凡事有关国家安全工作的部署都向地方党委请示报告。同时, 充分发挥我们的主观能动性, 积极主动地开展各项国家安全业务工作).” [11]

The result of the dual leadership system was widespread defiance of MSS policy. In 1999, the deputy chief (later chief) of Shanghai’s state security bureau, Wu Zhonghai (吴中海), described a “personnel crisis” in the nationwide system evident in “organizational bloat, overstaffing and low efficiency.” The problem centered on the tendency of local party authorities toward “promotions without demotions (能上不能下),” “assigning jobs by seniority (论资排辈),” “a bias toward maintaining stability (偏面求稳),” “looking after one’s own (迁就照顾),” and “nepotism (任人唯亲).” Wu claimed that 58.7 percent of his bureau’s officers were specialist and technical personnel (including foreign language cadres), yet these were “mostly not assigned to roles that fit their training (相当部分不对口)”, indicating failure by authorities to manage staff efficiently. [12]

Decentralized funding, moreover, caused large discrepancies between coastal and inland regions and an inability to procure expensive “technical equipment (技术装备)” used for intelligence operations. [13] Local sources comment on how intelligence officers were chronically underpaid. One city officer quoted his aggrieved colleagues, lamenting that “they always think … ‘we give so much but receive so little’ and that the social status of the state security agencies is low, the material benefits are relatively poor, and they are losing out.” Low pay was believed to increase the susceptibility of officers to recruitment by adversary intelligence services, which was perhaps the most dangerous flaw of the dual leadership model. [14]

In operations, fragmentation of the state security system into self-contained tiers hindered cooperation between bureaus across regions. According to Li Donghui (李东辉), a city bureau chief in Jiangxi, “dual leadership results in a cleavage between duties and responsibilities (事权) and the power to promote and demote staff (用人权), leading to difficulties in truly coordinating efforts across the country and taking full advantage of joint operations.” Local party committees routinely suppressed “bad news reports (报忧信息)” that could discredit the local leadership, causing “bungled opportunities (贻误时机)” and “affecting higher level party committees, governments, and even the central government’s ability to grasp the real situation and swiftly make correct decisions.” [15] Local party officials blocked requests by local bureaus to seed state security officers into other government departments for the purpose of clandestine operations and interfered with bureaus’ scrutiny of foreign investment projects. [16] The bureau chief cited the belief of some local party committees that “strengthening state security work will scare away foreign and Taiwanese businessmen.” [17]

2000 Reforms: Improvements From Partial Centralization

In 2000, the three-tier state security system underwent major changes, instituting “soft centralization” that served as a prelude to the further centralization that was to come in the 2016–2017 reforms. The “dual leadership” model gave way to a system of “vertical leadership, two-level management (垂直领导, 两级管理).” In changes that the Central Organization Department (中央组织部) described as “highly secret in nature (保密性强),” city bureaus were placed under the command of their provincial superiors, becoming “directly subordinate agencies (直属机关).” However, relations between the MSS and the provinces remained decentralized. [18] The effect on operations and oversight was immediate.

Scores of city state security units across the country were “abolished (撤销)” or downsized in accordance with provincial state security bureau demands. [19] For example, Hubei’s provincial government implemented vertical leadership in July 2001, closing four city bureaus and allowing nine to remain. [20] Jiangsu Province, meanwhile, abolished two city-level bureaus, with redundant personnel incorporated into the local public security system. [21] The Baoji City bureau, in Shaanxi, lost nearly 19 percent of its staff and saw the number of internal departments reduced by 38 percent. [22]

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Figure 1: State Security Leadership since 1983

(Source: Created by the Author)

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City bureau chiefs across the country were forced to undergo “re-election” and regular staff underwent “reapproval (重新认可)” through centrally managed examinations, unleashing an outflow of the unqualified and the incompetent. [23] In Shandong, the provincial bureau praised the 2000 reforms for having “promoted operations, … rationalized organizational structure, and regularized activity.” [24] In Nanjing, the introduction of “competitive incentive mechanisms” following vertical leadership “improved structure, cohesion, and combat effectiveness.” [25] In Xiamen, the city bureau noted in 2007 that the “largest scale personnel reshuffle in the bureau’s history” had taken place in recent years, resulting in a flow of staff from “non-core departments (非重点处室)” into operational ones, such as “investigations (侦查部门),” and “foreign liaison and security (外联外保).” The reform outcomes “better suited the requirements of the bureau’s focus on Taiwan work.” [26]

In finance, responsibility for “administrative expenses” was transferred to provincial state security bureaus, leaving local governments with minimal expenditure responsibilities. [27] Centralization prompted some provincial units to launch “thorough investigations of gaps in personnel allocations, funding, and infrastructure.” The Fujian government lauded the reforms for having “helped to resolve historical debt problems” among city-level units. [28] In Guangxi, province-wide state security spending rocketed by over 34 percent from 1999 to 2000, a “seven-year high.” [29] The source attributes the rise to the region’s sudden implementation of centrally mandated policing subsidies, which city governments had apparently failed to provide.

The state security bureaucracy also found itself in a stronger position to root out corruption following the expansion of cadre authority. A state security officer in Ningbo praised vertical leadership for having forced “the group of people with the highest incidence of rule violations … to undergo redundancy and discharge from the state security agencies.” [30] In 2002, the Deputy Secretary of the Central Discipline and Inspection Committee, He Yong (何勇), heralded the “major system readjustment in the state security agencies to implement vertical leadership below the provincial level.” The reforms had helped “to seize the key nodes of power in this system and strengthen supervision and constraints; and had had important effects on preventing and managing corruption.” [31]

Vertical Leadership by the MSS

The PRC’s three-tier state security system was placed under vertical leadership by the MSS circa 2016–2017. This severed the commanding role that provincial governments previously had held over their local state security bureaus.

Direct evidence of these organizational reforms has been sparse. Over the past decade, rumors have circulated of major reform to the PRC’s state security services. From 2013–2014, foreign media and a former CIA counter-intelligence analyst commented on rumors in Chinese cyberspace that state security would soon undergo “administrative restructuring” (The Diplomat, January 23, 2013). In 2017, a report by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) noted that “since 2014, Chinese and Taiwanese interlocutors have expected some undefined reform of the MSS” (Government of Canada, May 17, 2018). Shortly after, Radio France International (rfi) reported that, beginning in 2017, provincial state security bureaus had inexplicably “disappeared one-by-one (一个个地 … 消失)” as provincial governments released plans for bureaucratic restructuring after the “Two Sessions (两会)” meeting that year (rfi, October 30, 2018).

In official sources, traces of the reforms are widespread. A 2019 article by then-chief of Sichuan’s State Security Bureau Zhao Jian (赵坚), who now holds the same position in Guangdong, described his “modern and strong department” under a so-called “new leadership system” of “vertical leadership by the central government, with local governments as assistant managers (中央垂直领导, 地方协助管理)” (Sichuan Pary Building Net, August 6, 2019). A 2017 annual report by the Guangxi provincial government mentions “reform to the leadership system of the state security agencies” as a key development. [32] Today, senior MSS officials, state legislation, and even members of the Chinese blogosphere routinely refer to the state security system as “vertically-led” (Guancha, August 30, 2018; Xinhua, September 1, 2023; Baijiahao, October 10, 2023).

A relative lack of data on the 2016–2017 reforms precludes a comprehensive assessment of the latest changes to the organizational structure of the MSS. However, historical developments offer some compelling clues. As command and control no longer lies with local party committees, the ministry is better able to direct joint operations between bureaus, exploit pockets of regional expertise, and ensure that local activities serve the strategic intelligence and security requirements of the central government.

Control over personnel and funding enables the MSS to precisely deploy staff to strategically significant provinces and to directly control their dispatch overseas, offering greater flexibility in how the system as a whole responds to regional, national, and international threats. As with the 2015 reforms to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), centralization of state security has probably led to personnel downsizing, freeing up resources for larger staff subsidies, bonuses, and investment in equipment and infrastructure. The MSS’s control over staff intake and training programs will strengthen skills, security vetting, and political loyalty.

The counterintelligence agencies of the PRC’s foreign adversaries must still contend with a complex and dispersed threat actor comprising dozens of provincial and city-level units. Post centralization, provincial and city-level state security bureaus have retained seats on local political-legal affairs commissions (政法委), as well local state security committees (国安委), suggesting that local security units still accept tasking from local governments, in addition to central requirements. The nature of vertical leadership, however, implies that accountability for local operations now lies solely with the MSS.

Implications for domestic politics are of equal importance. Free from local party control, local state security bureaus are well-placed to serve as the central government’s “eyes and ears,” a role played by other vertically led information bureaucracies, such as local branches of Xinhua News Agency. [33] Vertical leadership over state security may strengthen the central government’s ability to detect local corruption and malfeasance. Conversely, untrammeled scrutiny of local affairs by the centrally-led state security agencies may also induce caution, fear, and discourage local government discretion, autonomy, and risk-taking—the key ingredients of the PRC’s economic and societal development.

Local party committees were once empowered to block operations by their local state security bureaus. Today, the authority to do so lies with the MSS. For a local agency—or citizen—to challenge the legality or proportionality of a local state security operation, they must now escalate the dispute to the ministry itself, an onerous process that may invite unwanted central scrutiny (Xinhua, September 1, 2023). It is possible that local state security bureaus will face fewer obstacles in prosecuting their missions from now on, such as surveillance, vetting of “foreign-related (涉外)” investment projects, and ensuring that data providers comply with state security legislation (MSS, accessed November 8).

Conclusion

Vertical leadership is a critical, yet overlooked, element in Xi Jinping’s broader efforts to ensure that the “party center has supreme authority over state security (国家安全大权在党中央)” (Qiushi, April 15). Given the profound institutional consequences of centralization and the winners and losers it creates, the state security system is likely to remain a powerful and durable interest group in PRC politics beyond the Xi era. The secrecy that surrounds the country’s state security agencies makes tracing the political and operational implications of centralization extremely difficult. Analysts should be no less attentive to their importance.

Notes

[1] Luo Xiangyi and Chen Youwen, 国家安全行政与管理 [State Security Administration and Management] (时事出版社, 1994) [Current Affairs Publishing], p. 69.

[2] Luo and Chen, p. 69; p. 177

[3] 组通字41号 (1999年7月22日), [Organization Department Circular No. 41, 22 July 1999], ‘中共中央组织部，中共中央政法委，关于适当调整地方政法部门领导干部双重管理办法有关问题的通知’ [Notice from the Organization Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Political-Legal Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China: On Issues Related to the Appropriate Adjustment of Dual Management Measures for Leading Cadres of Local Political-Legal Departments], in 中共辽宁省委组织部编, 干部人才工作常用文件选编” [The Organization Department of the Liaoning Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China: A Selection of Commonly Used Documents for Cadre and Staff Work], (辽宁人民出版社, 2007) [Liaoning People’s Publishing], pp. 384–385.

[4] Luo and Chen, p. 69; p. 177.

[5] 组通字41号, p. 384.

[6] Luo and Chen, p. 69. See also: 财文字744号 [Ministry of Finance Notice No. 744], ‘财政部，国家计划委员会，国家安全部: 关于进一步明确国家安全机关经费管理体制的通知 (概要)’ [Ministry of Finance; State Planning Committee; Ministry of State Security Notice: Further Clarification of the Funding Management System of State Security Agencies] in 河南省财政厅编 [Henan Province Finance Bureau (ed.)] , 社会文教行政财务制度选编1993.1–1994.1 ] Volume 11 [Selected Editions of Social, Cultural, Educational, Administrative, and Financial Systems, January 1993 to January 1994, Volume 11], (河南省财政厅编, 1995) [Henan Provincial Finance Bureau (ed.)], pp. 739-740.

[7] 广西壮族自治区地方志编纂委员会编 [The Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region Local Chronicles Compilation Committee], 广西通志财政志 [Guangxi Chronicles Financial History], (广西人民出版社, 2014) [Guangxi People’s Publishing], p. 159.

[8] Luo and Chen, p. 59.

[9] Luo and Chen, p. 59.

[10] Zhang Song, “努力深化国家安全机关的改革” [Strive to Deepen Reform of the State Security Agencies] in Zhai Qiyun (ed.), 中国党政干部改革论坛 [China Party and Government Cadre Reform Forum], (改革出版社,1997) [Reform Publishing], p. 129

[11] Wu Zhonghai. “积极探索国家安全机关选人用人的新机制” [Proactively exploring new mechanisms for selection and recruitment in the state security agencies]. In: 现实问题的理论思考: 中央党校97级中青年干部培训班学员论文集 [Theoretical thinking on real problems: collection of papers by students of the 1997 training course for young and middle-aged cadres of the Central Party School], (北京: 中共中央党校出版社) [Beijing: Central Party School Publishing House], 1999, pp.1343–1345.

[12] Li Donghui, ‘关于加强国家安全工作几个问题的思考’ [Thoughts on Issues Relating to Strengthening State Security Work], in Wang Yongji and Wang Jiangling (eds.) 光晖的历程 [The Glorious Journey], (中国社会出版社, 1999) [China Society Publishing], p. 197. See also: 财文字744号 (Note no. 7)

[13] Cao Jun, 新形势下国家安全机关党风康政建设的思考和对策 [Thoughts and Countermeasures on the Building of Healthy Government among the State Security Agencies under the New Situation], in 中共宁波市直属机关工作委员会编著 [Compiled by the Work Committee for Offices Directly Under the Ningbo Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China], 争做新世纪合格党员 纪念建党八十周年征文集 [Striving to Become a Qualified Party Member in the New Century: Collection of Essays to Commemorate the 80th Anniversary of the Founding of the Party], (2001), p. 84–85. Low pay continues to be a complaint among cyber workers contracted by the MSS, according to documents leaked earlier this year (China Brief, March 29).

[14] Li Donghui, p. 197.

[15] Luo and Chen, p. 54.

[16] Li Donghui, p. 197.

[17] 组通字20号 (2000年7月20日), [Organization Department Circular No. 20, 20 July 2000], 中共中央组织部关于国家安全机关领导体制调整后干部管理和党的关系移交等有关问题的通知 [Notice from the Organization Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China: On Relevant Issues such as Cadre Management and the Transfer of Party Relations after Leadership System Adjustment among the State Security Agencies], in 中共辽宁省委组织部编, 干部人才工作常用文件选编” [The Organization Department of the Liaoning Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China: A Selection of Commonly Used Documents for Cadre and Staff Work], (辽宁人民出版社, 2007) [Liaoning People’s Publishing], pp. 392–395.

[18] 组通字20号. See also, 中共枣庄市委组织部, 中共枣庄市委党史研究室 [The Organization Department of Zaozhuang City Communist Party Committee; The Party History Research Office of Zaozhuang City Communist Party Committee], 中国共产党枣庄市组织史资料: 1987.11.2006.12 [Information on the Organizational History of the Communist Party of China in Zaozhuang City: November 1987 to December 2006], (中共枣庄市委组织部出版社, 2007) [The Organization Department of Zaozhuang City Communist Party Committee Publishing], pp. 132–133.

[19] Hu Yunzhao (ed.). 湖北省年鉴2001第3卷 [Hubei Provincial Yearbook 2001, Volume 13], (湖北省年鉴编辑委员会出版, 2001) [Hubei Province Yearbook Editorial Committee], p. 57.

[20] 无锡市史志办公室编 [Wuxi City Historical Records Office]. 无锡年鉴2001 [Wuyi Yearbook: 2001], (方志出版社, 2001) [Fangzhi Publishing], p. 99.

 

[21] Zhao Zhonghu (ed.). 宝鸡年鉴总第四期 [Baoji Yearbook, 2002, Fourth Quarter], (陕西人民出版社, 2002) [Shaanxi People’s Publishing], p. 117.

[22] See notes [22] and [24].

[23] 山东省国家安全厅机关党委 [The Party Committee of Shandong Province State Security Bureau]. 全面加强党的建设, 确保国家安全干警 “对党绝对忠诚” [Comprehensively Strengthen the Construction of Agency Party Groups; Ensure that State Security Police are “Absolutely Loyal to the Party”]. In: Zhang Jinshou (ed). 机关党建工作经验汇编 [Compilation of Experiences of Agency Party Building Work], (北京: 中央党校) [Beijing: Central Party School], 2007, p. 82.

[24] Fang Yaguang. 江苏年鉴, 2001 [Jiangsu Yearbook, 2001], (江苏: 江苏省年鉴杂志社) [Jiangsu: Jiangsu Province Yearbook Periodical Agency], 2001, p. 131.

[25] 厦门市国家安全局课题组 [Xiamen State Security Bureau Research Group]. 创新基层思想政治工作的思考与实践 [Thinking and practice on innovating ideological and political work at the grass-roots level] in, 中共厦门市委直机关工作委员会编 [Work Committee for Directly-led Agencies, Xiamen City Committee of the Communist Party of China], 厦门市机关思想政治工作成果汇编 [Compilation of achievements of ideological and political work in Xiamen municipal organs], 2009, pp.153–154.

[26] 湘财行 (2001) 29 号 [Hunan Finance and Banking Notice No. 29], 湖南省财政厅, 湖南省国家安全厅关于认真做好国家安全机关管理体制改革后经费上划工作的通知 [Hunan Provincial Finance Department and Hunan State Security Bureau Notice: On Conscientiously Completing the Budget Allocation Work After Management System Reform among the State Security Agencies], 22 May 2001, Web Archive, accessed 12 December 2024: https://web.archive.org/web/20201105015917/https://www.lawxp.com/statute/s1207575.html. See also: 贵财行4号 [Guizhou Finance and Banking Notice No.4], 自治区财政厅关于调整国家安全机关行政经费共给的通知 [Notice: Autonomous Region Finance Department on Adjusting Administrative Funding of the State Security Agencies], in 广西壮族自治区财政厅预算处编 [Compiled by the Budget Department of the Department of Finance of Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region], (广西人民出版社, 2004) [Guangxi People’s Publishing], p. 282.

[27] 编纂委员会 [Editorial Committee], 福建财政年鉴 2001 [Fujian Financial Yearbook 2001], (福建热敏出版社, 2001) [Fujian People’s Publishing], p. 82.

[28] 广西壮族自治区地方志编纂委员会编 [see Note 8], p. 158.

[29] Cao Jun, p. 83.

[30] 中华人民共和国检查部编 [Ministry of Supervision of the People’s Republic of China (Ed.). ‘何勇同志在中共中央政法机关源头治理工作座谈会上的讲话’ [Speech by Comrade He Yong at a Central Political-Legal Agency Work Forum for Governance at the Source]. 中国检查年鉴, 1998-2002 [China Supervision Yearbook 1998-2002]. (北京: 中国方正出版社) [Beijing: China Fangzheng Press], 2007, p. 1951.

[31] 自治区编办 [Autonomous Region Publishing Office], 全面关切落实党的十九大精神, 奋力开创机构编制和绩效考评工作新局面 [Comprehensively and Diligently Implement the Spirit of the 19th Party Congress and Strive to Create A New Situation in Organizational Structure and Performance Evaluation Work] in 中共广西区委执政纪事编委会编纂 [Compilation of Governance Records by the Guangxi Regional Committee of the Communist Party of China], (广西人民出版社, 2019) [Guangxi People’s Publishing], p. 131.

[32] Tsai Wen-Hsuan, “A Unique Pattern of Policymaking in China’s Authoritarian Regime: The CCP’s Neican/Pishi Model,” Asian Survey (2015) 55 (6): 1093–1115. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2015.55.6.1093