Tibet-Aid Program at 30: Driving Tibet’s Development in Xi’s ‘New Era’

Executive Summary:

• The Tibet-Aid Program (TAP), a principal driver of development in Tibet, has ramped up significantly under Xi Jinping’s rule.
• The TAP has, throughout its 30-year history, sought to use material development to placate local tensions that have periodically arisen from the Party’s governance failings in the region. Most recently, the emphasis has been on improving the quality of healthcare and education.
• The TAP is a focus for the Party’s priorities, and the increasing flow of resources to “moderately prosperous” villages on the Indian border could be a cause for concern for neighboring India.
• Tibet remains an unattractive destination for cadres despite copious propaganda suggesting otherwise, which has helped perpetuate a relatively poor standard of governance in the region.

On November 11, 2024, the Tibet Daily reported on a book launch event held in Lhasa to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the Tibet-Aid Program, sometimes also called pairing-up assistance for Tibet (TAP; 对口援藏) (Tibet Autonomous Region [TAR] Government, November 11). The book, written by a cadre sent to Tibet from Zhejiang Province, eulogizes the work of his comrades and the region’s beauty across 110 poems. This is the latest of a string of propaganda efforts this year that have praised the work of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) over the last three decades in bringing the region further under the control of Beijing. Beyond the book launch, websites for positive news stories around the anniversary has been set up by state media outlet Xinhua as well as the TAR government, both of which features as its top article a picture of a smiling Xi Jinping, waving in front of the Potala Palace in Lhasa (Xinhua/TAP 30th Anniversary, accessed November 12; TAR Government, accessed November 12).

The Party has also sought to promote its achievements in Tibet overseas. This week, state-sanctioned Tibetan Studies experts are visiting Latvia and Estonia. In the former, they discussed “the development achievements of China’s Tibet in the new era (中国西藏发展成就),” among other topics. According to the People’s Daily, the parliamentarians were grateful for the visit, as Latvian people “mostly learn about China’s Tibet from American movies and western media, and have accepted too many wrong views about it (多从美国电影和西方媒体中了解中国西藏，接受了太多有关西藏的错误观点)” (People’s Daily, November 11). The overall propaganda efforts have been accompanied by key meetings in Beijing and Lhasa involving senior CCP officials, which have emphasized the TAP’s centrality and the need to further ramping up the program.

Wang Huning Outlines Way Forward in Lhasa

The most important event of 2024 for the Party’s approach to Tibet was the Fourth Tibet-Aid Work Conference (第四次对口支援西藏工作会议), held in Lhasa from August 27–29. [1] The conference marked the TAP’s 30th anniversary, and for the first time the meeting took place in the regional capital of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Wang Huning (王沪宁), the fifth-ranked member of the 20th Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) and Chairperson of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) attended and delivered a speech, in which he signaled TAP’s increased centrality to the governance of Tibet under Xi Jinping’s leadership (TAR Government, August 29). The fact that serving and retired senior officials travelled to Lhasa for the conference and the messages conveyed underscore the growing significance of the TAP in the PRC’s approach to the region.

Wang’s visit sought to underline the CCP’s focus on people’s basic needs. He visited Lhoka People’s Hospital (山南市人民医院) in Nedog district, which receives support from Anhui province, as well as the administrative seat of Southwestern prefecture-level city Lhoka (山南市) along the Indian border (Xinhua, August 29). Projects announced since the Sixth Tibet Work Forum in 2015 have focused on healthcare and education, emphasizing the Party’s aim of ameliorating people’s standard of living in the sparsely populated yet strategically important region.

In his speech, Wang emphasized the “spirit of driving in nails (钉钉子精神).” Translated more euphemistically in official sources as the “spirit of perseverance,” the phrase was first used by CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping at the second plenary session of the 18th CCP Central Committee in February 2013 (State Council Information Office, July 11, 2019). It refers to the necessity of repeating actions multiple times before achieving the required result. As Xi noted at the time, “When we use a hammer to drive in a nail, a single knock often may not be enough; we must keep hammering until it is well in place before proceeding to hammer the next one. If you keep on driving in nails, then you will achieve great results (钉钉子往往不是一锤子就能钉好的，而是要一锤一锤接着敲，直到把钉子钉实钉牢，钉牢一颗再钉下一颗，不断钉下去，必然大有成效)” (Party Member Net, February 28, 2013). In the context of Tibet, the phrase has been used to convey the priority of central government directives in key policy areas such as the “two centenary goals,” stability maintenance, and border area development.

Wang’s speech also echoed much of the official discourse around the 30th anniversary by referring to the “Spirit of Old Tibet (老西藏精神).” Invoked by senior CCP figures, including Xi, since the late 1990s, the phrase is intended to exhort Tibet-Aid cadres take inspiration from the Party’s seizing control of Tibet in the early 1950s to ensure long-term stability, development, and prosperity (TAR CCP, June 26, 2014; Xi Theory, July 2021; People’s Forum, December 21, 2021). [2]

The invocation of this spirit is a nationalist call for mobilizing cadres to serve in the frontier region, which is not a popular destination. Beyond ethnic divisions, the negative attitudes of many Tibetans toward Han officials, low economic development, and—for Tibet-Aid cadres in particular—the harsh climate make it an unappealing place to be sent. Several cadres are known to have died while serving in the TAR due to the hostile conditions. Where appeals to nationalist sentiment have not sufficed, the CCP has resorted to offering cadres better wages, subsidies, and career advancement opportunities. These are attractive, especially for young cadres from poorer central and western provinces that neighbor Tibetan areas.

Early TAP Led to Uneven Development, Local Tensions

Beijing launched the TAP in 1994 on the recommendations of the third Tibet Work Forum in July that year. This followed widespread ethnic tensions from the late 1980s onward borne out of increasing inequality along regional and ethnic lines. The original blueprint for the program drew from earlier mobilization of cadres and resources from inland (内地) provinces during the heyday of Maoist socialism and an array of programs launched after a 1980 visit to Tibet by PBSC member Hu Yaobang (胡耀邦) and that year’s inaugural Tibet Work Forum (China Economy Online, April 8, 2008). Later, TAP also came to supplement the “Great Western Development (西部大开发)” strategy, which was launched in 1999 to channel resources from more prosperous and developed coastal provinces to poorer western provinces (Gov.cn, October 10, 2009).

The TAP has a three-pronged assistance mechanism. These are the direct transfer of funds to the TAR government from partner provinces, centrally administered cities, central ministries, and institutions; the transfer of cadres to the TAR; and investments in specific projects in counties and prefectures in the region. Cadres from partnering provinces typically serve for one or three years in counties and prefectures where the partner province funds projects. According to the latest official statistics, nearly 12,000 cadres across 10 batches have served from 18 provinces, 89 central organs and ministries, and 4 centrally administered cities (People’s Daily Online, August 16, 2022).

Functionally, the assistance projects range from “group style (组团式)” medical and educational assistance to poverty alleviation, urbanization, and infrastructure development in so-called “xiaokang villages (小康村; moderately prosperous villages)” in counties along the border with India. “Group-style” assistance in these villages began in 2015. It is characterized as a “people-centered” policy but is also intended to change the way projects are undertaken. Under this model, dozens of doctors, nurses, and teachers come to select hospitals to train local doctors and teachers and to change how hospitals and schools function at the holistic level (Xinhua, August 23, 2022). The TAR provincial government has undertaken a massive project of developing more than 628 xiaokang villages in border counties along its border with India since 2017; and TAP has played a significant role in funding infrastructure, tourism, educational and health facilities there (Toutiao, July 7, 2023; Tibet.cn, August 26).

In the late 2010s, it became clear that the benefits of the TAP were not being distributed optimally. The structure of subsidies led to a form of “boomerang aid” that helped only a fraction of Tibetan elites and non-Tibetan migrants in urban areas. [3] Tensions flared in 2008, with massive protests in Tibetan areas. This provided the impetus for change. The Fifth Tibet Work Forum in 2010 called for intensifying the TAP as part of developing a “long-term strategy (长久之策).” It was decided that developed provinces, centrally administered cities, and central organs must set aside 1 percent of their fiscal revenue annually to the Tibet-Aid program, as well as emphasizing coordinated development (TAR CCP, 26 June 2014; Qiushi, August 27). This shift has become more pronounced under Xi Jinping, though it is unclear whether the sources of tension from 2008 will be resolved under this new path.

‘New Era’ TAP Focuses on Education, Healthcare, and Unity

Wang Huning’s August conference speech underscored the need to persist in policies across four domains: maintaining stability, increasing development, promoting ecological civilization, and strengthening border areas (People’s Daily Online, August 28). In Xi Jinping’s “new era,” the TAP is the primary vehicle through which these four objectives are to be achieved in the TAR. One of the earliest formulations of Xi’s Tibet policy came at the Sixth Tibet Work Forum in 2015. Xi articulated his priorities for governing the region as “six musts (六个必须),” which align with the approach taken by the TAP Other priorities included strengthening the CCP’s organizational and ideological hegemony, expanding and strengthening local party organizations, and “rallying the peoples’ hearts (凝聚人心)” to promote ethnic unity (Xinhua, August 26, 2015).

Wang’s also made repeated references to Xi Jinping’s earlier emphasis on creating a “new situation for Tibet Aid work (援藏工作新局面),” something that was picked up by official media commentaries (People’s Daily, August 29, 2020; CPC News, August 30). In practice, “new situation” refers to the focus on rural revitalization, health, and education work, as well as the TAP as the key vehicle for achieving the party-state’s political goals of fostering ethnic unity and ensuring Tibetans’ support. It also reflects changes to the structure of the program itself. For example, group-style education and health projects aim to bring about sustainable improvements to health and educational institutions in the TAR, as opposed to sending talents to temporarily make up for the region’s shortage of skilled doctors and teachers (Xinhua, August 6, 2022). Xi’s personal interest in ramping up the TAP is often conveyed through media reports on his involvement in the TAP projects from the days when he worked in Fujian province in the late 1990s (CCTV, September 8, 2015; October 6, 2017; People’s Daily, July 28, 2022).

Media commentaries also referred to the capacity of TAP projects to “transform people’s lives and win their hearts (改善民生凝聚人心).” Xi first articulated this phrase at the Sixth Tibet Work Forum, and refers to ensuring regime stability and loyalty through improving people’s general quality of life (China Daily, September 8, 2015; Xinhua, August 28).

The increase in cadres serving under the TAP has been dramatic during Xi’s tenure. Around 7,000 out of the total 12,000 have served since 2012, and the size of each batch has also risen substantially, from 622 in 1993 to 2,117 in the batch that has been serving since 2021 (Xinhua, August 22). A notable driver of TAP’s expansion came in 2015, when the Central Organization Department—which oversees all personnel matters for the TAP—mobilized the ministries of education and health, as well as the partnering provinces, for “group-style Tibet Aid work (组团式 援藏工作)” focusing on education and health. Since then, the number of projects launched and cadres dispatched under these two sectors have contributed significantly to the visibility and centrality of the program in the CCP’s Tibet policy (Xinhua, August 23).

The expansion of the program to include cultural and educational domains also follows the Party’s gradual shift to “Second-Generation Ethnic Policies (第二代民族政策)” in the last two decades. These refer to efforts by the central government to dilute the ethnic autonomy provisions and rights guaranteed to ethnic groups including Tibetans under the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (中华人民共和国民族区域自治法) (Gov.cn, July 29, 2005; CECC, February 2006; Made in China Journal, September 7, 2020). For example, the Party has introduced a range of policies from increasing mandarin Chinese-language instruction in schools to appointing more Han cadres in contravention to the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (Center of Excellence for Himalayan Studies, September 13, 2023). Educational and legal campaigns also seek to instil trust in PRC laws and regulations over Tibetan Buddhist religious norms and beliefs (TAR Government, February 5). A common thread to the second-generation ethnic policies is “forging a sense of Chinese nation through national, legal, and civil consciousness (铸牢中华民族共同体意识和国家意识公民意识法治意识),” which has become “the key line of ethnic work of the CCP (新时代党的民族工作的主线)” aimed at creating a “unified (统一)” national identity (Qiushi, August 8).

Conclusion

Wang Huning’s presence at this year’s Tibet-Aid Work Conference is the latest of several senior officials’ visits to the TAR in recent times. This could indicate that the Party senses a degree of fragility in its hold over the hearts and minds of ethnic communities. In July, one month prior to the Conference, Wang also visited Tibetan areas in Sichuan in addition to spending time in the TAR (Xinhua, July 7; July 28).

The TAP’s focus on education and healthcare reflects a conscious effort to redress failings in earlier policies by seeking to improve the material benefits that accrue to local Tibetans who have so far been excluded from economic benefits. However, the Party-state’s belief that economic development will create a supplicant and peaceful Tibet could be misguided. By ignoring Tibetans’ cultural and spiritual desires, insisting that they conform to a unified ethno-national identity, and diluting laws and regulations that enshrine their autonomy, Beijing risks following a self-defeating strategy.

The author would like to thank James Leibold for his comments and suggestions on a previous draft of the essay.

Notes

[1] Official state media refers to this as the “Aid-Xizang” program (see CGTN, August 29). This follows a push in recent years to refer to Tibet in English-language propaganda as “China’s Xizang.” This article instead used the traditional English name for the region: Tibet.

[2] The PRC government refers to the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) invasion of Tibet as the “Peaceful Liberation of Tibet (西藏和平解放)” (CCP Member Net, accessed November 12).

[3] Andrew Martin Fischer. The Political Economy of Boomerang Aid in China’s Tibet. China Perspectives, 2009. DOI: 10.4000/chinaperspectives.4842.