Central Asia Faces Potential Water Shortage as Afghanistan’s Canal Project Nears Completion

Executive Summary:

•  Afghanistan has completed over 80 percent of the second phase of the Qosh Tepa Canal—an irrigation project funded by the Taliban aimed at ensuring the country’s grain self-sufficiency by utilizing water from the Amu Darya River.
• The canal could divert up to 20 percent of the Amu Darya’s flow, significantly reducing water supply to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan as well as raising concerns over agricultural sustainability and potential regional conflicts due to worsening water shortages.
• Afghanistan is not part of existing Central Asian water-sharing agreements, increasing tensions with neighboring countries. Without international oversight or a formal management plan, disputes over water distribution could escalate into broader regional instability.

By the end of 2024, Afghanistan had completed more than 80 percent of the second phase of the Qosh Tepa Canal’s construction, an irrigation project promising Afghanistan’s self-sufficiency in grain production (Ariana News, December 27, 2024). The project is currently being funded by the Taliban and is projected to be a cornerstone of Afghanistan’s development. The canal is estimated to be 285 kilometers (177 miles) long, 8.5 meters (28 feet) deep, and 100 meters (328 feet) wide. The cost of the canal project has been estimated at $684 million, and it is scheduled to be completed by 2028 (Prodrobno.uz, December 14, 2022). Afghan development officials are also working on a plan to use about one million acres of land along the Qosh Tepa Canal route to construct agricultural and industrial complexes (Tolo News, January 14). The Qosh Tepa Canal project is bound to raise concerns over potential water scarcity in the region and exacerbate existing disputes over water allocation in Central Asia.

The Qosh Tepa Canal could divert up to 20 percent of the flow of the Amu Darya River, a key source of water in Central Asia (see EDM, March 7, 2024). Flowing through Tajikistan and Afghanistan, it supplies water downstream to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. With the construction of the Qosh Tepa canal, Uzbekistan’s water supply from Amu Darya could decrease by 15 percent, and Turkmenistan could face up to an 80 percent reduction in its water share (Daryo, July 26, 2023, October 7, 2024; see EDM. July 11, 2024). 

The Central Asian countries have two main concerns regarding the Qosh Tepa canal project. First, there will be increased water shortages in Central Asia, as water will be diverted from Amu Darya to the canal, decreasing water flowing to downstream communities by at least fifteen to twenty percent (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, December 19, 2023; Kazinform, April 10, 2024). Moreover, there is a lack of credible data available on how much water the canal would take from Amu Darya (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, December 19, 2023). Second, there are concerns about the quality of construction, as there have been reports that the canal is leaking in some sections (Ibid).

Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which border Afghanistan, could be the worst affected by the canal project. Both countries already face severe water shortages for agricultural needs. The canal project will affect agriculture in Turkmenistan, which relies on the Amu Darya for about 90 percent of its water supply. An estimated 1.25 million hectares of land in Turkmenistan are irrigated with water from Amu Darya. The Qosh Tepa canal could exacerbate the problem of fluctuations in the river level in Turkmenistan, where the agriculture sector consumes more than 90 percent of water resources. Water scarcity could threaten food security in the Central Asian nation (Progres, August 18, 2023).

Similarly, the water shortage due to the canal project could be disastrous for Uzbekistan’s agriculture, with nearly 40 percent of the country’s population directly or indirectly associated (see EDM, March 7, 2024). Cotton is Uzbekistan’s primary crop, which accounts for 17 percent of its GDP (gross domestic product). The cotton plantations sprawled across the Bukhara and Khorezm regions and the autonomous republic of Karakalpakstan are the country’s key cotton plantation areas, which could be severely affected by water shortage due to the construction of Afghanistan’s grand canal (Cabar.Asia, July 22, 2023).

In 2023, Uzbekistan’s President, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, expressed his concerns over the canal being constructed by the Taliban government at the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea. He said, “[The canal’s] introduction could radically change the water regime and balance in Central Asia.” Further stating that there must be a joint working group to study the construction process of the canal and how it impacts the water flow of the Amu Darya (President of Republic of Uzbekistan, October 15, 2023).

Afghanistan is not a part of water-sharing agreements rooted in the Soviet era. Under the Soviet Union, water allocation in Central Asia was guided by “Protocol 566” signed by the Soviet officials. Presently, water is distributed among Central Asian nations based on a 1992 agreement on water resource management (Icwc-aral.uz, December 16, 2024; see EDM, March 7, 2024).

The management of water resources has been a large reason behind the escalation of tensions, sparking conflicts among Central Asian countries. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have had over 150 conflicts on their shared borders over issues related to water management in the past decade (Cabar.Asia, February 15, 2021; see EDM, May 19, 2021, December 12, 2022).

Water is vital to the Central Asian economies. The Central Asian countries need water resources to meet their agricultural and energy needs. The region needs water to set up hydropower plants, which can generate electricity for domestic consumption as well as for energy exports to other countries. A key reason for the disruption of water distribution in Central Asia is the environmental change causing rise in temperatures and melting of glaciers in the region (Astana Times, August 22, 2024; Caspian Post, September 20, 2024). Experts predict that environmental changes will continue to turn the region dryer. Central Asia witnessed the worst droughts, leading to chronic water shortages for irrigation in the past decade (Ibid; see EDM, December 12, 2022). 

Conflicts over water are resolved under the UN Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses. Afghanistan’s Taliban government, however, is not recognized at the international legal level. This means that the UN Convention cannot play the same disaster risk reduction role it does in other countries (Geneva Environment Network, accessed February 9). Experts from Uzbekistan argue that Afghanistan should become a member of the convention, which would help determine how the water should be distributed to lower the risk of conflict (Kun.uz, February 13, 2023). The experts contend that water will be sufficient for both countries if the regional countries handle it in an equal relationship. For this, all countries should establish a system of efficient use of water (Ibid). The Taliban argues that they have the right to build the canal as water from Amu Darya passes through Afghan territory (Ibid). There is no agreement on the distribution of the Amu Darya’s waters between the Central Asian nations and Afghanistan. 

The Qosh Tepa canal project, while promising to boost Afghanistan’s agricultural self-sufficiency, threatens to exacerbate existing water scarcity issues in Central Asia. In the absence of a water management agreement, conflicts might erupt between Afghanistan and neighboring Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Without a formal water-sharing agreement, the project risks escalating tensions between Afghanistan and its neighboring countries, potentially leading to conflict over vital water resources.