Moscow Increases Pressure on Separatist Abkhazia Ahead of Presidential Elections

Executive Summary:

• Abkhazia, a break-away territory controlled by Russia, is preparing for decisive presidential elections on February 15, which could determine the future trajectory of the separatist region’s foreign policy and relationship to Moscow.
• Russia is supporting pro-Moscow candidate, former vice-president Badra Gunba, in the presidential race, hoping that if elected, he will fulfill Moscow’s demands for the construction of Russian settlements in Abkhazia and the privatization of Abkhazian property by Russian oligarchs.
• Fearing a change in Abkhazia’s foreign policy if opposition candidate Adgur Ardzinba wins, Moscow has lifted sanctions on Abkhazia and resumed financial transfers and the supply of electricity to the region to sway Abkhazia’s position in Moscow’s favor.

On February 15, Abkhazia, which broke away from Georgia in 1993, will hold snap presidential elections. They were called after the ousting of the previous president, Aslan Bzhania, at the end of November 2024. He was forced to flee the Abkhaz capital of Sukhumi to eastern Abkhazia, where he announced his resignation after thousands of supporters of opposition leader Adgur Ardzinba forcibly occupied the presidential palace and parliament building (see EDM, November 26, 2024). The opposition accused Bzhania and his administration of making concessions to Russia that were unacceptable to Abkhaz society. One of these concessions included allowing the construction of Russian settlements in Abkhazia, which could change the demographic situation in favor of Russians (see EDM, July 31, 2024). In response to the latest Abkhaz revolution (the fourth since 2004), the Russian government stopped financial aid to Abkhazia, refused to supply electricity during the cold winter, and began stripping some opposition leaders of their Russian citizenship (see EDM, November 26, 2024). The presidential elections on February 15 are considered historic both in Sukhumi and in Moscow as they will signal the future trajectory of Abkhazia’s foreign policy.

Ardzinba is the main rival of former Vice President Badra Gunba in this election (Ekho kavkaza, January 6). According to pre-election polls, Gunba is projected to receive 42.3 percent of the vote, while Ardzinba is projected to receive just 27.3 percent of the vote (Wciom.ru, February 4). It is very likely that the other three candidates, Shamil Ardzinba, Oleg Bartsits, and Adgur Khurkhumal, will support the pro-Moscow candidate in the second round of elections (Apsadgil, January 12).

Moscow is trying to ensure Gunba’s victory in the first round so as not to risk its position and influence in Abkhazia. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with Gunba on February 6, demonstrating Moscow’s support for his candidacy (Apsadgil, February 6). Additionally, on January 31, Sergei Kiriyenko, First Deputy Chief of Staff of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s Executive Office, urgently flew to Abkhazia to meet with Gunba (Apsnypress, January 31). After Kiriyenko’s negotiations with Gunba, Moscow resumed the transfer of electricity to Abkhazia and began paying salaries to Abkhaz teachers, doctors, and police officers (Russian Government; Meduza, February 6). These transfers to the Abkhaz budget were interrupted after the “Abkhaz revolution” and Bzhania’s resignation in November 2024 (see EDM, November 26, 2024).

At the initiative of Kiriyenko, who replaced Deputy Prime Minister of Russia Dmitry Kozak as “curator of Abkhazia,” a test flight from Moscow to Sukhumi was made for the first time in 32 years (see EDM, November 20, 2023; RIA Novosti, February 2). This transition was likely made because Kozak had taken a tougher stance toward Sukhumi than Kiriyenko. With these steps, the Kremlin appears to be attempting to strengthen Gunba and his team’s position in the election, hoping that if he wins, he will fulfill Moscow’s demands on the construction of apartment-hotels for Russians and approve a “large privatization” program. This program will allow Russian oligarchs to purchase all the valuable assets that remained in Abkhazia after the collapse of the Soviet Union (see EDM, July 31, 2024).

Moscow warned Abkhaz oppositionists “not to interfere with the future president of Abkhazia” and took tough measures to try to control them. For example, opposition leaders Kan Kvarchia and Levan Mikaa were deprived of Russian citizenship. This means they will not be able to travel to third countries with a Russian passport, and they may not even be allowed to leave Abkhazia for Russia (Ekho kavkaza, February 7).

A campaign against Ardzinba has begun in Kremlin-controlled media. He is accused of being “pro-Turkish.” Türkiye does not recognize Abkhazia’s independence, and unlike Russia, Ankara still views Abkhazia as part of Georgia (Ekhokavkaza, February 3). As “proof” of Ardzinba’s pro-Turkish inclination, Russian propagandists cite information from Ardzinba’s biography, including that he studied at a Turkish college and often traveled to Türkiye, where he met with representatives of the large Abkhaz diaspora (Ibid). 

Paata Zakareishvili, who served as the Georgian State Minister for Reconciliation and Civic Equality from 2012 to 2016, said in his February 11 interview with this author that despite Moscow’s actions, the situation in Abkhazia before the elections is very tense. Gunba is not guaranteed victory in either the first or second round of elections. Zakareishvili stated, “The authorities and the opposition do not trust each other. Supporters of Moscow’s favorite may try to falsify the election results in Gunba’s favor because it is the Kremlin’s order” (Author’s Interview, February 11). He further argued, “Moscow supports Gunba and is trying to strengthen him, hoping for the fulfillment of the promises that President Bzhania gave to the Russian leadership about the construction of apartments and large-scale privatization in Abkhazia” (Ibid). Zakareishvili is confident that if Ardzinba wins the elections, then at least the implementation of Russian projects in Abkhazia will be questioned. He further expressed regret that Georgia has not responded to what is happening in Abkhazia. “Tbilisi has not responded to the start of direct flights between Moscow and Sukhumi or Kiriyenko’s visit to Sukhumi,” Zakareishvili asserted (Ibid).

David Avalishvili, from the independent outlet Nation.ge, expressed doubt that after Gunba’s victory in the presidential elections, the Abkhaz elites will fulfill all of Moscow’s demands. He stated in an interview with this author, “Aslan Bzhania played a diplomatic game, not wanting to build Russian settlements in Abkhazia and sell Abkhaz assets to Russian oligarchs. Gunba will likely play the same diplomatic game” (Author’s Interview, February 11). In his opinion, as long as the Abkhaz elites show loyalty to Moscow on the strategic issue of Russian military bases on the territory of Abkhazia, Russian border vessels in the sea area and support Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, Putin will tolerate “the performances that are being played out in Sukhumi by various groups of Abkhaz elites” who “refuse to fulfill Moscow’s demands on secondary, less important issues” such as apart-hotels and privatization (Ibid). Whether or not Abkhazia capitulates to Russia’s demands for the break-away region will be clearer following the election’s results.