Moscow Changes War Rhetoric but Stays War Course

Executive Summary:

• Moscow is altering its narratives on the confrontation with the West and its propaganda campaign on Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in response to recent U.S.-initiated diplomatic activity.
• Russian state media has been instructed to avoid criticizing U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration and instead are emphasizing the divergence of values between the United States and Europe.
• The Kremlin is attempting to exercise strategic patience and gain an advantage in peace talks by refusing to modify its position or provide new concessions as it focuses on fostering relations with the United States and partners in the Middle East while sidelining Europe and Ukraine. 

The whirlwind of U.S.-initiated diplomatic activity in the last two weeks has compelled the Kremlin to alter the tone of its messaging on confrontation with the West and even the substance of its far-reaching propaganda campaign. The cliché of “Anglo-Saxon” hostility, a long-time theme in Moscow’s discourse, has disappeared together with the claim of breaking down the U.S.-dominated world order. In the mainstream media, no criticism of U.S. President Donald Trump’s style of policy-making is allowed, and most “patriotic” bloggers feel obliged to express respect for his ability to make a difference (TopWar.ru, February 19; The Moscow Times, February 21). The discourse on sustaining and prevailing in Russia’s war against Ukraine has, nevertheless, remained unchanged, so that public opinion, while showing increasing support for peace talks, remains confident that the war will end with Russia’s victory (Levada.ru, February 11). 

The surge of enthusiasm about the meeting in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, between the two negotiation teams led by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has subsided and largely been replaced by sober voices examining the substantial differences (see EDM, February 18; Kommersant, February 19). It is apparent that these differences will require much more effort than a single meeting in Riyadh to reach any agreement, especially as Ukraine has thus far been excluded from the talks. Also absent completely from the discussion in Riyadh was any indication of compromises or concessions that Russia could offer or accept in peace negotiations. Russian pundits are eager to elaborate instead on the point that any involvement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in implementing a peace deal or providing security guarantees for Ukraine is unacceptable for Russia (Izvestiya, February 20).

One persistent argument against the proposition of a ceasefire as a starting point for further negotiations is that a pause in hostilities would allow Ukraine to rebuild and even upgrade the combat capabilities of its armed forces, which goes against Russian President Vladimir Putin’s demand for its “demilitarization” (Nezavisimaya gazeta, February 18). The blame for arming Ukraine is now placed squarely on Europe, rather than on the United States as the main driver of Russia’s war against Ukraine, a narrative which has been prevalent until recently (Izvestiya, February 19). Some Russian analysts even advance the hypothesis that Europe may have its own political will and agency, a fact not normally accepted in Moscow, rather than obediently following the United States’ lead. Putin regularly asserted the latter narrative before the split in trans-Atlantic unity became apparent at the Munich Security Conference last weekend (Kommersant, February 20). Against many expectations, it was not a peace plan for Russia’s war against Ukraine that was the focus of debates in Munich, but narratives of the divergence of core values between the United States and Europe (Munich Security Conference, February). Russian commentators now question the survivability of NATO as the alliance was established to protect these values (Nezavisimaya gazeta, February 20).

Arguing for correcting the traditional views on the functioning of the Western alliance, Moscow analysts find corroborating evidence in the Baltic region, an area rarely present in recent U.S. discourse  (RIAC, February 20). The emerging coalition of the Nordic-Baltic states is not waiting for U.S. leadership or participation in joint efforts to strengthen maritime patrols to monitor suspicious Russian activities (Zvezda weekly, February 10; TASS, February 16). Russian pundits are eager to amplify denials of any involvement in the sabotage of critical underwater infrastructure in the Baltic Sea, but they are reluctant to mention the breaks of the main communication cable connecting Kaliningrad with St. Petersburg (see EDM, February 5; Novy Kaliningrad, February 13). The vulnerability of Russian export routes is illuminated by a series of explosions on tankers of its “shadow fleet” in the last few weeks following the sinking of the Ursa Major military transport vessel late last December (The Insider, February 22).

Moscow has expressed a readiness to include actors and issues in the Middle East while forgoing engagement with Ukraine and Europe in its newly launched dialogue with the United States  (TopWar.ru, February 21). Russia’s ability to make a meaningful contribution to the fast-moving reconfigurations in the region is, however, curtailed by the loss of the key ally in Syria (RIAC, February 21). Moscow has attempted to downplay its treaty-affirmed partnership with Iran, which rejects any possibility of talks with the Trump administration (Rossiiskaya gazeta, February 10). Unlike the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which has expressed full support for the Arab position regarding the reconstruction of Gaza, Moscow is reluctant to oppose the initiative advanced by Trump (Interfax, February 21). It is eager to cultivate ties with Saudi Arabia but has little to offer to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who has gained a central position in the talks by cultivating connections with the Trump administration (The Insider, February 19; Meduza, February 23).

The key question for Russian attempts to preserve influence in the Middle East centers on access to its two military bases in Syria (TopWar.ru, January 29). The offer it has made to Ahmed al-Sharaa, who carefully builds his authority as the new president, does not seem sufficiently generous (see Jamestown Perspectives, February 8; TASS, February 19). A small-scale drone attack on the Khmeimim airbase on February 18 has shown that the reduced Russian garrison is exposed to direct pressure (Novaya gazeta Europe, February 18). Moscow suspects that Türkiye has the power to decide the fate of the bases, but it cannot comprehend the complexity of Ankara’s course toward the new regime in Damascus and the Kurdish factions in North-Eastern Syria (Nezavisimaya gazeta, February 19). What came as an unpleasant surprise was Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s meeting with
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on the same day that the United States and Russian negotiators met in Riyadh (Kyiv Independent; RBC; NV.ua, February 18). Russian pundits castigated Turkish duplicity, assuming that the personal chemistry between Putin and Erdogan had dissipated (Profile.ru, February 21).

The speed of political realignments in the Middle East, Europe, and, in particular, Washington D.C. is so rapid that Russian policymakers struggle to keep pace. The Kremlin presumes, nevertheless, that while others are in a rush, it can exercise strategic patience and gain an advantage by refusing to modify its position and harvesting new concessions. Effective combat operations are seen as the main source of strength in this position of intransigence. Russian General Staff reports about 600 square kilometers (231 square miles) “liberated” since the start of the year, as if this miniscule gain constitutes a major step to victory (Interfax, February 20). Russia’s persistence in its invasion of Ukraine should prove to European states the imperative to invest more in their military preparations and support of Ukraine. It also stands as a reminder to the Trump administration that new resources of strength need to be mobilized, as negotiating from a position of weakness is never a winning approach.