Eurasian Economic Union Struggles to Further Expand in Eurasia

Executive Summary:

• The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) faces growing challenges in expanding its influence, as key neighboring states, including Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, resist full membership.
• Russia’s geopolitical ambitions through the EAEU are hindered by competing regional forces, particularly the People’s Republic of China’s growing investment in Central Asia and Moldova’s shift towards European integration, limiting Moscow’s ability to consolidate power within the trade bloc.
• The EAEU remains a key geopolitical tool for Moscow, initially envisioned as an economic alliance but now struggling to maintain influence over neighboring states amid shifting alliances and economic concerns.

January 1 marked the fifteenth anniversary of the Eurasian Customs Union between Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, a trade bloc designed to function as a free trade zone that evolved into the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in 2015 (see EDM, May 29, 2014; EAEU, accessed February 25). The Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, the organization’s governing body, met in late December 2024 to grant the Islamic Republic of Iran formal observer status in the EAEU with a free trade zone established (Kremlin.ru, December 26, 2024). Events over the past year indicate that efforts in expanding the trade bloc, which now also includes Kyrgyzstan and Armenia, are facing severe challenges in Russia’s immediate neighborhood (see EDM, April 3, 2024).

Akmal Saidov, a senior member of Uzbekistan’s parliament in charge of investigating the country’s EAEU status, announced in October 2024 that, after careful review of over 1,000 documents from the organization, Tashkent would not be joining the union and remaining an observer, a status it has held since December 2020. His statement also underscored the role of sovereignty in the country’s constitution, and he noted that Kazakhstan had received little economic benefit from joining the bloc (Gazeta.uz, October 18, 2024; Constitution.uz, accessed February 25).

This is considered a blow to Moscow’s diplomacy. In February 2024, Russia’s Ambassador to Uzbekistan, Oleg Malginkov, expressed hope that the country would join the union by the end of the year (Rossisskaya Gazeta, March 6, 2024). Russian President Vladimir Putin himself claimed that Uzbekistan, as a land-locked state, would benefit logistically from membership during a visit to the country in May 2024 (RIA Novosti, May 28, 2024).

Russian-language media published via the Kremlin-controlled SputnikNews in Tajikistan has promoted membership in Tajikistan as a method of improving ease of access for Russian work visas and regional transit networks while increasing export opportunities of agricultural products (SputnikNewsTJ, January 4). Nonetheless, Dushanbe has not even pursued observer status in the trade bloc, perpetually claiming to be “studying the issue” (AsiaPlusTJ, July 15, 2022). A deciding factor for Tajikistan’s reluctance to join the EAEU is likely Beijing’s growing influence, with whom it shares a nearly 300-mile border and which is Tajikistan’s largest source of investment and credit (AsiaPlusTJ, October 31, 2024). The People’s Republic of China’s president, Xi Jinping, visited the Central Asian republic in June 2024 to commemorate the opening of a new parliamentary building and presidential palace, which was built with a $220 million gift from Beijing by Chinese construction companies (AsiaPlusTJ, June 1, 2024).

A further concern regarding Tajikistan’s membership in the EAEU is the country’s border with Afghanistan and the amount of cross-border narcotics trafficking that is suspected of to take place. Tajikistan joining the customs union could open up fellow member-states to Afghan narcotics (AsiaPlusTJ, September 20, 2023).

Sputnik’s Georgian publication amplifies pro-EAEU voices, including pro-EAEU economists, who have emphasized what Georgia would gain from access to the trade bloc’s logistics and that it would not be subject to comprehensive political reforms as is the case with EU integration (Sputnik.ge, August 8, 2023). It is unclear whether Georgia will pursue membership in the bloc as relations with the European Union deteriorate (see EDM, December 10, 2024). One of the EAEU’s primary goals, however, is the creation of a free transit zone across the Eurasian space. This includes tenders for the modernization of Georgian state railways that were suddenly altered in 2023 to only allow competition from firms that sold railway technology that conformed to EAEU standards, pushing out Austrian firms and drawing ire from transparency non-governmental organizations (NGO) (Civil.Ge, November 10, 2023).

Moldova has had observer status in the organization since 2018, but has decisively moved toward European integration since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. As Moldova’s former Defense Minister, Anatol Shalaru, noted that joining the trade bloc is now impossible from a logistical point of view, as the landlocked country shares no borders with EAEU members, and exports would need to travel through Ukraine (Nokta.md, August 1, 2024). None of the main candidates for Moldova’s recent presidential election mentioned the EAEU, and the candidates considered formal EU membership inevitable (RTVI, October 19, 2024; see EDM, October 31, 2024).

Russia’s Deputy Premier Minister Aleksei Overchuk reacted to the approval of legislation by Armenia’s Parliament to begin the accession process into the European Union by comparing the move with purchasing a ticket for a trip on the Titanic. He also underscored that the European Union’s free trade zone would be incompatible with the EAEU and warned that energy prices would increase and Armenia’s export market would shrink dramatically (Rossisskaya Gazeta, January 9).

The EAEU was initially proposed by the first President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev. He recognized that his country, a land-locked state sharing a vast border with Russia, would remain dependent on its northern neighbor for pipelines and logistics, leading him to propose the project in 1994 (Kazpravda.kz, accessed February 25). His dream of a free trade zone in a world increasingly dominated by such agreements transformed Putin’s hands into a geopolitical project designed to cement Russia’s influence over Eurasia. Unfortunately for Moscow, events over the past year have underscored the bloc’s inability to draw other states in its immediate neighborhood into formal membership, while fears continue to grow in Moscow that Armenia will decisively exit the organization. The trade bloc remains one of the Kremlin’s most important priorities and should be closely monitored to understand the shifting dynamics and competing interests in the region, as well as potential challenges to Moscow’s dominance moving forward.