Fujian Unveils Incentives for Militia Training for a Cross-Strait Campaign

Executive Summary:

• Fujian Province’s new “Measures for Guaranteeing Militia Rights and Interests” aim to incentivize maximum readiness for forces who likely will be key in any campaign against Taiwan.
• The measures provide financial support and other perks in an attempt to motivate troops and promote the professionalization of the militia.
• The measures do not signal that the PRC will go to war tomorrow, and so far Fujian is the only province to have issued such measures.

If the People’s Republic of China (PRC) decides to attack Taiwan, it will need to leverage the capabilities of all of its armed forces. This not only includes the land, sea, air, and rocket forces of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) or the relevant units of the People’s Armed Police, such as the China Coast Guard. It also includes the third component of the country’s armed forces—its militia.

The PRC’s militia comprises part-time soldiers who, aside from their military duties, typically hold jobs in civilian industries. As members of the militia, they can be mobilized to conduct military operations in both war and peace. Militia members belong to units that are managed by local PLA entities called People’s Armed Forces Departments (人民武装部). Individual militia units often specialize in a skill that is valuable to the PLA, such as cyber warfare or equipment repair.

Ensuring the competence of militia forces has always been a challenge. Militia members do not receive adequate compensation for their work, causing malaise and apathy on the training field and, ultimately, poor performance on the battlefield. This presents a serious risk for Beijing, which may need to rely on its militia forces in the event of a major conflict. In January 2025, Fujian Province, the province opposite Taiwan, took a significant step toward professionalizing its militia units by issuing a document called “Measures for Guaranteeing Militia Rights and Interests” (福建省民兵权益保障办法) (Fujian Government, January 26). If faithfully implemented, it could help ensure that Fujian militia show up for a cross-strait campaign both willing and able to do their duty.

The Wartime Roles of Fujian’s Militia Forces

Fujian militia forces would likely play a significant role in a military assault on Taiwan. The two main campaign scenarios involve either an amphibious invasion across the Taiwan Strait or a blockade of seaborne access to and from the island. Given the centrality of the maritime domain in both campaigns, the PRC would seek to leverage those militia units best positioned to support naval operations in this theater, namely, Fujian province’s “maritime militia” (海上民兵). The vast majority of these militia units comprise men who work in the fishing industry and, when mobilized, operate from large, steel-hulled fishing boats (Andrew Erickson, October 5, 2024; The Diplomat, December 24, 2024).

In a cross-strait conflict, Fujian’s maritime militia forces could be tasked to perform any number of missions. These could include transporting troops and materiel across the Taiwan Strait to support a seizure or occupation; embarking PLA special operations forces for clandestine raids on Taiwanese shipping or targets ashore; or rescuing downed PLA pilots or ship-wrecked Chinese sailors in waters off Taiwan. Alternatively, they could be ordered to sail together with larger Chinese vessels to confound enemy targeting, risking their expendable fishing boats to protect high-value platforms like destroyers, troop transports, or amphibious landing craft. They also might be arrayed around Taiwan to report on enemy movements or the outcome of some PLA operation, or they could participate in blockade enforcement—boarding, inspecting, and taking control of noncompliant vessels—alongside the China Coast Guard and the PLA Navy. They might even be tasked with laying sea mines or, if circumstances dictated, sweeping them. [1]

Fujian’s Financial Incentives Seek to Motivate Militia Forces

All of these missions are extremely difficult and dangerous, and they would test the mettle of the country’s best-trained active-duty soldiers, let alone a part-time force like the maritime militia. To make matters worse, members of the maritime militia only muster for training during a few months each year when the national fishing moratorium keeps them shoreside. As a result, the little training they receive must be intense and focused. However, this has not been the case. Existing policies have generally failed to incentivize militia members to commit to the arduous training needed to perfect their skills. The chief problem has been poor compensation. According to one authoritative report from 2016, the standards for training allowances (训练补助) are lower than the costs of participation, forcing militia members to absorb the difference. Predictably, this meant that “militia enthusiasm for training is not high” (民兵参训热情不高) (China National Defense News, April 20, 2016).

Over the past decade, PLA experts have repeatedly advocated for reforms to national and local policy to ensure that militia members are properly remunerated for their work. For example, in 2018, Senior Colonel Fang Shouxiang (方寿祥), head of the Strategic Construction Department of the Zhejiang Military District, called for the PRC to create economic compensation mechanisms for members of the maritime militia, providing them with rewards for training, stipends for work missed due to training and operations, living allowances, and special compensation for injury or death while on duty. [2] Others have issued similar recommendations. [3] Until now, these appear to have fallen on deaf ears.

On January 26, 2025, the Fujian provincial government and the Fujian military district jointly issued a document titled “Measures for Guaranteeing Militia Rights and Interests” (福建省民兵权益保障办法). This appears to be the first major effort to address significant impediments to professionalizing the militia (Fujian Government, January 26). The new measures, which reflect the Central Military Commission’s desire to “strengthen national defense mobilization and reserve force construction” (加强国防动员和后备力量建设), focus on bolstering militia members’ “sense of honor, sense of gain, and sense of responsibility” (荣誉感、获得感和责任感). According to one official interpretation, they seek to “inspire motivation for militia work” (激发民兵工作内生动力) (Fujian Government, January 27). The measures do this by guaranteeing that individual members receive appropriate rewards—monetary or other benefits—for their service and mitigating the negative impacts of militia service on militia members and their families.

The document contains the following provisions, which apply to all militia members in the province:

• It incentivizes militia members to train hard by promising them “monetary rewards” (奖金奖品) for achievements in province-wide and local “military skills competitions” (比武竞赛).
• It incentivizes high performance in the conduct of “diversified military tasks” (多样化军事任务)—which include “maritime sovereignty enforcement patrols” (海上维权), drills, exercises, and training activities, among others—by offering militia members or their children preference for enlisting in the PLA.
• The measures seek to offset the risks inherent in military operations by requiring relevant organizations to purchase accidental injury insurance (意外伤亡保险) for militia members.
• They also seek to reduce the financial risk of belonging to the militia by compelling employers to continue issuing salaries and other benefits to militia members who have been mobilized for training or operations and prohibiting them from terminating their employment as a result of duty.
• The document provides that militia members hurt or killed while on duty receive pensions and preferential treatment.
• The measures guarantee that militia members who conduct diversified military tasks, carry out emergency response, or engage in wartime tasks receive training and duty subsidies.
• They require local governments to provide support and aid for militia members whose families are facing difficult financial circumstances.

The measures also place special emphasis on rewarding the province’s most elite militia members, called “primary militia” (基干民兵). [4] Most members of the maritime militia—and all those that would be entrusted with wartime missions—fall within this category. Each member receives a Fujian militia credential (福建省民兵证) that entitles them to additional benefits. Presenting their militia cards gives them priority when carrying out business at government offices, preferential treatment at state-owned banks (which comprise the bulk of the PRC banking system), eligibility for special services at public hospitals and clinics, and even employment assistance for those seeking civilian work. Additional benefits for those with militia cards include paying reduced prices or gaining free admittance to state-funded museums, art galleries, parks, expos, historical sites, and scenic spots. The measures stipulate that primary militia members receive prioritized legal support services. Furthermore, the document urges banks and other institutions to create financial products and services for primary militia members and offer them low-interest loans.

One Small Step Toward Military Readiness

The issuing of the “Measures for Guaranteeing Militia Rights and Interests” in Fujian Province is one small indicator that the PRC is taking steps to resolve problems that must be resolved if it is to prosecute a military attack against Taiwan successfully. This does not mean that Beijing is going to war tomorrow. Fujian is the first and only province to have issued such measures publicly. This is probably no coincidence, as Fujian militia forces would likely play a critical role in any major cross-strait conflict. In particular, the province’s specialized maritime militia units could be tasked with a wide range of front-line missions, including reconnaissance, search and rescue, transport, blockade enforcement, deception, and mine warfare.

If Fujian’s maritime militia forces are to acquit themselves well, individual militia members must be properly motivated to join the force, complete onerous training requirements, and answer the call in the event of a conflict. The province’s new measures represent an earnest effort to create the necessary incentive structures for maximum readiness. The document seeks to relieve fears of financial risk for militia members and their families and guarantees them a large set of perks for participating in the militia and doing their jobs well. It reserves the best rewards for members of elite militia units, such as those that would be expected to support a major campaign against Taiwan. Assuming the measures are fully implemented, they could translate into a better-trained and motivated militia prepared to serve as a force multiplier in any campaign to invade, coerce, or subdue Taiwan.

Beyond Fujian’s maritime militia, its land-based militia units could also play important roles in a cross-strait contingency. They, too, will benefit from the measures. Consider the city of Ningde, for example. While it does possess a number of maritime militia units, in recent years it has also funded the development of “new type” (新型) militia forces to include units specialized in “cyber attack and defense, electromagnetic spectrum control, electronic warfare, meteorological and hydrographic [support], and high-tech equipment repair” (网络攻防、频谱管控、电子对抗、气象水文、高新装备维修) (Ningde City, February 14, 2016). Most if not all of these units could see service in the event of a high-end conflict over Taiwan, and their performance will ultimately contribute to the PRC’s success, or failure.

Notes

[1] 全军后勤学术研究中心 [Military Logistics Academic Research Center], 作战后勤保障 [Operational Logistics Support] (Beijing: Military Logistics Academic Research Center, February 2017) p. 184; 刘自力，陈青松[Lui Zili and Chen Qingsong], 海上民兵参加海战的任务与行动[“Tasks and Operations of the Maritime Militia When Participating in Maritime Combat”], 国防[National Defense], no. 11 (November 2018), pp. 50–51.

[2] 方寿祥 [Fang Shouxiang], 以改革创新精神推动新时代海上民兵训练深化发展 [“Promote the Deep Development of Maritime Militia Training in the New Era with the Spirit of Reform and Innovation”], 国防[National Defense], no. 6 (June 2018), p. 58.

[3] See, for instance, 姚淮宁 [Yao Huaining], 着眼形势任务 遵循特点规律 积极探索海上民兵侦察情报建设新模式 [“Focus on the Situation and the Mission, Follow the Characteristics and the Pattern, and Actively Explore a New Model of Maritime Militia Reconnaissance and Intelligence Construction”], 国防 [National Defense], no. 1 (January 2018), p. 47.

[4] The PLA Dictionary of Military Terms translates 基干民兵 as “primary militia,” defining them as the “backbone members” (骨干成员) of militia forces. Within their ranks are former active-duty soldiers, individuals who have completed military training, and/or individuals who possess special technical expertise. Those who are not “primary militia” are considered “ordinary militia” (普通民兵). 中国人民解放军军语 [PLA Dictionary of Military Terms] (Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press, September 2011), p. 32.