Moscow Confuses U.S. Reductions of Key Russia-Watching Organizations as Signs of Weakness Rather Than Readiness for Genuine Dialogue

Executive Summary:

• Russian media has misinterpreted the U.S. reductions of organizations such as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) as signs of U.S. weakness rather than signals that Washington is prepared for genuine dialogue with Moscow.
• Kremlin-aligned figures celebrate the reduction as a blow to U.S. soft power and influence in post-Soviet states, particularly Central Asia and Moldova, where RFE/RL played a prominent informational role.
• Russian commentators interpret the changes as part of U.S. President Donald Trump’s anti-bureaucracy agenda, offering Moscow new openings in information warfare, rather than presenting new opportunities to improve diplomatic relations.

Russian state media and political elites have mistaken U.S. signaling that Washington is ready for genuine dialogue by rolling back major Russia, Europe, and Eurasia-focused analytical and broadcasting outlets. While combating “genuine enemy propaganda” remains a priority, the U.S. has signaled that it will do so “with the fundamental truth that America is a great and just country whose people are generous and whose leaders now prioritize Americans’ core interests while respecting the rights and interests of other nations” (U.S. Department of State, January 22) Instead of interpreting these signals as signs of respect for Russia’s rights and interests, the rollbacks are being portrayed in Russian media as signs of weakness.

On March 14, U.S. President Donald Trump issued an executive order reducing the “statutory functions and associated personnel” of the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), Voice of America (VOA), and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) (White House, March 14; RFE/RL, March 15). These actions were aligned with the “America First Policy Directive to the Secretary of State” and a “a foreign policy centered in [U.S.] national interest” (U.S. Department of State, January 15; The White House, January 20). These actions imply an easing of pressure on Russia as the Trump Administration edges toward negotiating a peace agreement between Moscow and Kyiv. Similar actions to this end have been the suspension of several U.S. national security agencies’ work on offensive cyberoperations against Russia (AP, March 3). Russian media, however, have not interpreted Washington’s withdrawal from Russia’s information space as the administration’s pursuit of peace, and instead are portraying these actions as signs of U.S. weakness.

State commentators and media personalities aligned with security services have expressed cautious optimism, while others warned of continued competition with the United States in the information space, particularly in Central Asia. Margarita Simonyan, the editor-in-chief of the Russian state-owned news agency RT, called the reduction of RFE/RL and VOA “a holiday for my colleagues in RT and Sputnik” (RIA Novosti, March 16). Konstantin Malofeev, a Kremlin-connected media tycoon, celebrated the reduction as the end of an “Orwellian brainwashing machine that has been working non-stop for 80 years” (Tsargrad.tv, March 18). State Duma deputy and member of the United Russia party, Vitaliy Mironov praised the closing of the two outlets, connecting their existence to “American nostalgia for the 1980s” (RT, March 16). Russia designated VOA, RFE/RL, and its branches as “foreign agents” in 2017 (RFE/RL, December 5, 2017).

The elimination of RFE/RL, which reaches around 50 million followers in 27 languages across 23 countries, would disproportionately damage news coverage in Russia’s ethnic minority regions. In addition to the Russian Service (Radio Svoboda), the organization offers regional coverage through Sever.Realii (northwest Russia), Sibir.Realii (Siberia), Idel.Realii and Azatliq Radiosi (middle Volga, including Tatar and Bashkir), and Kavkaz.Realii (the North Caucasus). If new funding does not materialize, their demise would coincide with an uptick in xenophobic rhetoric toward minorities in Russia and the West in general (see EDM, April 2, 10).

Russian media have also repeated the Trump Administration’s talking points linking its “fight against bureaucracy” with an alternative vision of democracy. The Russian Defense Ministry’s TV Zvezda outlet released a documentary on USAID and USAGM’s reductions, with Russian experts rationalizing Trump’s dismantlement of the “deep state” and “eliminating active resistance to Trump’s policies” (TV Zvezda, March 30). The documentary portrayed the cost-cutting moves as beneficial to Trump’s electorate in “deep America,” which “has received nothing in return for ‘color revolutions’ abroad.” RT invoked a similar point, covering the U.S. Institute of Peace, which has published extensively on Russia’s wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. RT quoted the White House’s statement that “taxpayers do not want to spend another $50 million per year on a publicly-funded ‘research institute’ that has failed to deliver peace” (RT, March 30). Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has been more cautious than these commentators, calling the reduction of “purely propagandistic” USAGM channels “an internal matter of the United States” (TASS, March 17).

Washington’s reductions coincide with Moscow’s optimism in its own soft power toward its neighbors. In Moldova, Komsomolskaya Pravda celebrated the reduction of RFE/RL’s Romanian Service (Europa Liberă) as the end of “a mouthpiece for PAS [Action and Solidarity Party] and Maia Sandu,” the pro-western president reelected in November 2024, who will “have to explain to her fans how the ‘torch of democracy’ was left without money” (Komsomolskaya Pravda, March 16). A Russian diplomat told The Moscow Times that RFE/RL and VOA “undoubtedly caused us harm in post-Soviet countries, as their work was aimed at dividing us and our allies” (The Moscow Times, March 18).Yevgeny Primakov, head of the Rossotrudnichestvo agency for international cooperation under the Russian Foreign Ministry, stated that he is “closely monitoring the progress of negotiations and [the] developing situation in the United States. We hope that the ice will thaw” (Parlamentskaya Gazeta, April 7). Primakov cited an internal poll in the “near abroad,” without specifying which countries were selected, finding that 70–98 percent of respondents consider Russian language education should be kept or expanded. This finding would facilitate Rossotrudnichestvo’s mission to deliver “objective information about Russia” and the “reasons for the start of the special military operation” against Ukraine (Parlamentskaya Gazeta, April 7).

Officials and media commentators have signaled that a whole-of-society competition with Washington is still on. In December 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin told a United Russia party conference that “the confrontation [with Russia’s adversaries] affects all aspects of our lives: culture, education, worldview, economy, and the technological sphere” (Izvestiya, December 14, 2024). Alexander Belyaev, a commentator cited as a retired FSB lieutenant colonel, told Tsargrad that “there was never a day when the [United] States, even for a few minutes, closed their dossier named ‘Russia,’” claiming anti-colonial narratives in Central Asia as examples of such U.S. activity. Malofeev also quoted the late Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) party chief Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s view of post-Soviet states, that “these 15 republics are 15 fronts against Russia” (Tsargrad.tv, December 14, 2024).

Vladimir Dzhabarov, an Uzbekistan-born former FSB official in the Federation Council, singled out RFE/RL’s Kyrgyz Service, Radio Azattyk, claiming that he does “not doubt that funds will be found for Russophobes to continue their work,” noting that European leaders “will not ignore” the news services in Central Asia (Telegram/senatorDzhabarov, March 17). These services have helped cover the region’s democratic backsliding, social problems, and participation in Russia’s sanctions-evasion schemes following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. They also help inform Central Asian officials of problems avoided by loyal regional media (Times of Central Asia, March 17).

Vasiliy Piskarev, chairman of the State Duma’s commission on foreign interference, said that the USAGM is “unlikely to leave the professionals in the sphere of interference in the internal matters of undesirable states without work,” and that RFE/RL may be replaced with “a new network structure with analogous tasks” (Telegram/komisgd, March 17).

While many journalists noted Russia’s reaction to changes in U.S. influence efforts, fewer have responded to the effect on Washington’s own analysis of the region. Russian writer, RT columnist, and Trump biographer Kirill Benediktov described the closing of the Kennan Institute as “the most curious thing,” calling it the United States’ “main think tank” for Russia and former Soviet states. Criticizing the Institute’s embrace of Russia’s liberal opposition, Benediktov proclaimed that “American Russia studies will, possibly, receive a new impulse for their development” (Telegram/RealFitzroy, March 16).

Belyaev also approved the Wilson Center’s closure as a response to the U.S. government having received “inadequate data on the real conditions in Russia” due to its sourcing from “Russia-hating losers” who were predicting a “collapse in the Russian economy and imminent revolution” (Aftershock.news, March 17). In other words, Russian state-aligned commentators foresee less critical analysis of Russian policy in the United States.

The reduction of RFE/RL’s language services and other think tanks will likely leave a void. These outlets, having been commissioned during the Cold War, retained their usefulness as an important source of non-state narratives on regional and global developments. RFE/RL, headquartered in Prague with over 1,700 staff, including native journalists from heavily restricted environments such as Russia and Afghanistan, is a hub for language and regional expertise whose niche coverage would be missed throughout the Eurasia-watching community (RFE/RL, accessed April 14). The organization’s end would also deprive scholars of historical data, evidenced by the U.S. Institute of Peace’s reports being no longer accessible online. Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala, therefore, has called for European states to provide funding to RFE/RL and “do everything that we can to give them the chance to continue in this very important role” (Financial Times, March 22).

Russian media have hardly commented on the Pentagon’s elimination of the Office of Net Assessment (Kommersant, March 14). TASS, however, notably reported the announcement of the “Center for Special Operations Analysis,” which “will focus on the contributions of SOF [special operations forces] serving as an inside force, concepts and capabilities based on lessons learned from the Russia-Ukraine war,” citing the Senate testimony of U.S. SOCOM (Special Operations Command) commander General Bryan Fenton (TASS; Senate Armed Services Committee, April 8).

Moscow appears hopeful that reducing organizations such as RFE/RL will afford it an advantage through more positive analysis of Russia beyond its borders. While potentially motivated by demonstrating readiness to address one of Moscow’s longstanding complaints and security concerns, the reductions and rollbacks on these organizations have not been interpreted as diplomatic overtures but rather retreats from a position of strength.