Georgian–Ukrainian Relations Experience Lowest Point in Diplomatic Relations

Executive Summary:

• The diplomatic relationship between Georgia and Ukraine has reached its lowest historical point as both sides lack the political will necessary to normalize relations.
• Kyiv and Tbilisi’s continuing estrangement is a result of strained relations between the ruling party of Georgia and the West, and the overly cautious approach of the Georgian government to Russia’s war against Ukraine.
• Georgian–Ukrainian relations are unlikely to normalize anytime soon unless a pro-Western government comes to power in Georgia, which is currently improbable.

Georgia and Ukraine are experiencing the lowest point in their history of diplomatic relations despite having once been viewed as close partners. They were even once considered a sort of package deal in their potential membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (NATO, April 3, 2008). On April 2, Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream party amended its visa policy for Ukrainian citizens, reducing the visa-free stay duration from three years to one. This amendment comes just a year after the government extended Ukrainians’ visa-free stay from two to three years in solidarity with those fleeing the full-scale Russian invasion (Civil.ge, April 3). The reduction of the visa-free period appears to be Tbilisi’s penalty against Ukraine for supporting the pro-European Georgian opposition. Following Georgian Dream’s decision to postpone Georgia’s EU integration, Ukraine imposed sanctions on Bidzina Ivanishvili, Georgian Dream’s honorary chairman and founder, and 19 other officials, accusing them of “selling out the interests of Georgia and its people” (Jam-News; AFP, November 28, 2024; Kyiv Independent; Ukrainska Pravda, December 5, 2024). Additionally, there were reports that the Ukrainian delegation and the Georgian opposition jointly prepared a resolution that was critical of the current Georgian government in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, criticizing Georgian Dream for democratic backsliding and demanding new parliamentary elections (Civil.ge, January 29; Freedom; 1tv.ge, January 30).

Relations between Kyiv and Tbilisi have particularly worsened since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Georgian Dream continuously claims that the West and Kyiv want to involve Georgia in providing military aid to Ukraine (see EDM, May 12, 2022, April 2, 2024). For the last six months, top Georgian Dream officials, including Ivanishvili, publicly boasted about their resistance to alleged Western pressure to involve Georgia in Russia’s war against Ukraine (Civil.ge, April 7, 2023, October 22, 2024; Facebook/GeorgianDreamOfficial, December 21, 2024; Jam-News, January 8; Imedi-news, March 1). The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry condemned Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze’s statement on the topic, which, according to Kyiv, contained “distorted assessments” of events in Ukraine (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, May 30, 2024). Kobakhidze alleged that the Ukrainian government was appointed “from the outside” and blamed Russia’s war against Ukraine on foreign powers  (Facebook/GeorgianDreamOfficial; Civil.ge, May 30, 2024). He claimed that the Georgian government will not allow either “Ukrainization” of Georgia or a situation similar to the pro-European Union 2013 “Euromaidan” movement in Ukraine, which subsequently resulted in the 2014 Maidan Revolution (Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, May 30, 2024; Official Website of Ukraine, November 20, 2024; Ekho Kavkaza, November 30, 2024). In March 2024, the Georgian government demanded that Ukraine allow the extradition of Georgian officials from the former ruling party, the United National Movement (UNM). The Ukrainian government has ignored these demands to return UNM politicians who found refuge in Ukraine, some of whom now occupy important positions in the Ukrainian government (Civil.ge March 12, 2024). The Ukrainian government’s counterdemands, which include the release of Mikhail Saakashvili, a former Georgian president and citizen of Ukraine, from prison are unlikely to be met.

Georgian Dream leadership has repeatedly accused Ukrainian special services of involvement in Georgian opposition groups’ attempts to topple the government. Georgian Parliamentary Speaker Shalva Papuashvili claimed that Saakashvili’s return to Georgia in 2021 was planned and carried out by Ukrainian military intelligence (Inter Press News, March 17). The State Security Service of Georgia (SSG) claimed that former high-ranking officials of the Georgian government living outside the country and former employees of law enforcement agencies in Ukraine organized and financed a plot to overthrow the Georgian Dream government and assassinate Ivanishvili. Additionally, the SSG accused Georgian volunteers fighting for Ukraine, perhaps the only positive aspect of Georgian-Ukrainian relations, of intending to violently support opposition protests (SSG May 5, 2024). The SSG, however, did not provide details or evidence from their investigation, claiming that the accusations were a preventive measure. Georgian volunteer fighters from the Georgian Legion called the SSG’s allegations “nonsense” and claimed that the Georgian Dream government targeted the legion as a favor to Moscow (Eurasianet, May 9, 2022, Sep 18, 2023; Tabula.ge, July 24, 2024). On the other side, Ukrainian officials and intelligence agencies have accused the Georgian government of acting as a passthrough to help Russia dodge Western sanctions imposed in response to Russia’s war against Ukraine (SSG; OC Media, April 5, 2022). The Georgian government demanded Ukraine provide evidence to corroborate these accusations and dismissed the claims as “completely baseless and absurd” (Civil.ge, April 5, 2022).

Some Ukrainian pundits urge Ukraine and Georgia to revitalize their strategic partnership and overcome bitter divisions. The diplomatic rift between the two countries underlines differences in ideology, security priorities, and foreign policy orientation. Ukrainian commentators urge the Georgian government to demonstrate its solidarity with Ukraine and refrain from divisive rhetoric (Georgian Institute of Politics, August 6, 2023). Reckoning with past and present diplomatic disputes, however, is proving difficult. Many in Georgia still remember that after the Russo-Georgian war in 2008, the Ukrainian parliament refused to vote for a resolution on the recognition of hostilities in Georgia as an aggression by Russia (Gazeta.ru, September 2, 2008; Liga.net, August 12, 2017). Currently, the embassies of Ukraine and Georgia in Tbilisi and Kyiv are operating without ambassadors, yet another indicator of a deep crisis in their bilateral relations (Civil.ge, March 1, 2022; Georgia Today, July 6, 2023; Ukrainian Embassy in Georgia, accessed April 22).

The likelihood of normalization or improvement in Georgian–Ukrainian relations is very low, largely because they are inextricable from the larger Eurasian geopolitical context. The relationship’s future depends on the security architecture constructed by major international players and, of course, the outcome of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Georgia’s growing alignment with Russia has resulted in frequent criticism from Ukraine and the West. The breakdown in productive diplomatic relations between Kyiv and Tbilisi, along with their increasingly distant positions on salient bilateral issues, especially regarding Russia, will be difficult to overcome. The next parliamentary elections, whose date has yet to be determined, may change the situation in Georgia if a pro-European Union party comes to power.