PRC and Russia Operationalize Strategic Partnership

Executive Summary:

• The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia advanced operational bloc-building at their May 2025 summit, issuing dense agreements and three joint statements that laid out a shared strategic vision across defense, technology, law, and multilateral governance. The summit marked a shift from symbolic reaffirmation to functional coordination, particularly in sectors under U.S. scrutiny, including artificial intelligence, energy, cross-border payments, and legal standards for international order.
• The joint statements portrayed the PRC-Russia partnership as a normative response to U.S. hegemony, invoking World War II memory, defending sovereign development rights, and opposing Western-led institutions and coercive measures. While framed as defensive, the alignment reflects a deeper ideological and structural commitment to constructing parallel systems in trade, security, and information governance.
• This strategy will be tested in the months ahead, with Beijing expected to use the BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summits to deepen bloc architecture, promote renminbi-based financial integration, and push regional security initiatives.
• Underlying asymmetries, geopolitical caution, and competing interests—particularly in Central Asia and the Arctic—may constrain how far this convergence extends beyond coordinated rhetoric.

The May 8 summit in Moscow between People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin marked a forward step in strategic convergence between their two countries. The meeting produced a detailed joint statement and over 20 new cooperation agreements across the energy, finance, and digital infrastructure sectors, as well as on multilateral coordination. Framed around World War II commemorations, the summit outlined practical mechanisms for tighter alignment, particularly in high-impact sectors subject to U.S. scrutiny, such as artificial intelligence (AI), biosecurity, and cross-border payments.

To reinforce this posture, Beijing and Moscow issued three separate joint statements, each articulating a distinct but interlocking rationale for closer coordination across security, legal, and geopolitical domains.

Framed as a historical and normative reaffirmation of wartime partnership, the “Joint Statement on Further Deepening the China-Russia Comprehensive ‘Strategic Coordinated Partnership’ Relationship for a New Era” underscored shared resistance to U.S. dominance, NATO expansion, and what both sides call “subversion” (颠覆) of the postwar order. It outlined expanded cooperation across key strategic domains—including defense, AI governance, energy, cross-border payments, and Arctic logistics—while reaffirming mutual support for sovereignty claims over Taiwan and Ukraine. The statement also deepened alignment in multilateral arenas such as the United Nations, BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and World Trade Organization (WTO) reform, portraying the PRC and Russia as co-architects of a multipolar world order resistant to external sanctions and power projection (Xinhua, May 8). [1]

In the parallel “Joint Statement on Global Strategic Stability,” Beijing and Moscow accused U.S. missile defense systems, “nuclear sharing” (核共享) alliances, and space weaponization efforts of eroding deterrence and heightening risks of nuclear conflict. The two sides positioned themselves as defenders of the principle of “equal and indivisible security” (安全平等且不可分割), calling for new multilateral arms control mechanisms and condemning efforts to politicize export controls, AI, and biotechnology. While affirming their January 2022 pledge to avoid nuclear war, they emphasized the need to manage arms control and disarmament with “no reduction in the security of any country” (各国安全不受减损) (MFA, May 9).

The “Joint Statement on Further Strengthening Cooperation In Safeguarding Authority of International Law” asserted the PRC’s and Russia’s shared commitment to a UN-centered international legal order. The statement reaffirmed principles such as non-interference and sovereign equality but framed these selectively to shield both countries from legal scrutiny over their external behavior. By emphasizing the “equal, universal, and good faith” (平等普遍善意) application of international law, the document aimed to reframe PRC-Russia joint commitments as a defense of international order—even where they challenge prevailing global governance mechanisms (MFA, May 9).

Taken together, these documents outline an ambitious, multipronged attempt to frame bloc alignment as both defensive and legally justified. This alignment is normative, not merely strategic. For all its rhetorical coherence, however, this convergence has not erased enduring asymmetries and caution on both sides. The summit therefore remained bounded by familiar constraints amid all the density and symbolism. Beijing remains wary of overcommitting to Moscow’s more explicitly revisionist agenda in Europe, while Moscow must navigate its growing dependency on the PRC without ceding too much autonomy or control over its strategic frontiers.

The Meeting: Xi and Putin Advance Operational Bloc Building

The meeting between the two heads of state advanced PRC-Russia relations beyond symbolic reaffirmation, offering an updated roadmap for operational convergence across multiple strategic domains. Concrete indicators of future action emerged in several critical areas. Xi described the current phase of relations as “more calm, confident, stable, and durable” (从容自信、稳定坚韧). He called for the two countries to “uphold the general direction of cooperation, eliminate external interference” (坚持合作大方向，排除外部干扰), and to make the “foundation of ‘stability’ in cooperation more firm and the momentum of ‘progress’ more sufficient” (让合作“稳”的基础更坚实、“进”的动能更充足). He also called for expanded cooperation in high-impact sectors such as AI, aviation and aerospace, energy, and agriculture—areas already subject to sanctions pressure and Western scrutiny (Xinhua, May 8).

The meeting’s proposed joint buildout of cross-border infrastructure under the One Belt One Road framework, docked with the Eurasian Economic Union, signals intent to hardwire integration across Eurasia. [2] If realized, this would create overlapping connectivity platforms that reduce dependence on maritime chokepoints and Western financial systems—an explicit hedge against future decoupling or conflict.

References to biosecurity, digital economy, and global strategic stability in the list of agreements were equally notable. While details remain vague, these sectors have clear implications for dual-use development, critical infrastructure protection, and financial system independence. As such, these agreements hint at a methodical effort to construct a parallel system that insulates the PRC and Russia from Western pressure, using technological, legal, and institutional tools to do so. They also suggest increasing willingness to align regulatory standards, legal practices, and digital ecosystems between the two countries, with potential spillover to other multilateral frameworks that the two dominate.

Multilateral positioning also featured prominently. Xi urged that the PRC and Russia should “closely coordinate and cooperate” (密切 … 协调和配合) in multilateral platforms such as the United Nations, the SCO, and the BRICS countries. He emphasized the importance of uniting the so-called Global South to lead the “correct direction” (正确方向) of global governance reform. According to the PRC readout, Putin explicitly echoed this framing.

The meeting nevertheless stopped short of crossing escalation thresholds. There were no references to Ukraine in Xi’s statements, and no mention of formal military cooperation or new defense commitments. This restraint remains consistent with the PRC’s strategy of “support short of sanctions” as outlined in prior meetings (International Centre for Defence and Security, April 25, 2023). Still, the inclusion of “global strategic stability” (全球战略稳定) among the signed agreements suggests that discussions around security and deterrence continue under the surface, possibly through opaque military-technical channels, and perhaps even via the regular bilateral prime ministerial meeting (中俄总理定期会晤), which has served as a key platform for cooperation in satellite navigation and space.

The Joint Declaration: A Partnership in Motion, not Overdrive

Xi and Putin signed a joint statement on May 8, reaffirming their alignment against the United States, anchoring their cooperation in a narrative of historical grievance, and expanding it across key strategic sectors (Xinhua, May 8). Both leaders framed the relationship as rooted in World War II victory, declaring that the PRC and Russia “shoulder the common responsibility and mission of maintaining a correct view of World War II history” (肩负维护正确二战史观的共同责任和使命). This phrase signals that the two men see their respective countries—not the United States and its allies—as the principal victors of the war, and therefore as the legitimate guardians of the postwar international order.

The statement signals the greatest forward motion in energy, finance, and digital infrastructure. The two sides agreed to “consolidate the comprehensive energy cooperation partnership” (巩固全面能源合作伙伴关系) across oil, gas, liquefied natural gas (LNG), coal, and renewables, with a clear emphasis on “maintain[ing] the stable operation of relevant cross-border infrastructure” (维护相关跨境基础设施稳定运营). Financial cooperation is set to deepen through expanded interbank transactions, local currency settlement, and collaboration in insurance, credit ratings, and securities. These areas are critical: they represent the foundation of an alternative economic system capable of operating outside the dollar-based architecture. On the digital front, both sides pledged to strengthen cooperation on AI, cybercrime, and information security, including through the United Nations Convention against Cybercrime and the establishment of “a future permanent mechanism for international information security” (国际信息安全未来常设机制) (UN Office on Drugs and Crime, accessed May 12).

Military cooperation is reaffirmed but, again, carefully bounded. The statement describes PRC-Russia military ties as “of special significance” (具有特殊意义) and calls for expanded joint exercises, air and maritime patrols, and military-technical exchange. This wording is consistent with earlier statements. [3]

Logistical integration and Arctic cooperation are other areas of note. The two sides emphasized improving PRC-Russia cross-border infrastructure, customs capacity, and transit corridors, while also committing to “mutually beneficial cooperation on the Arctic route” (北极航道互利合作). The absence of institutional detail or new Arctic agreements, however, suggests limits to Russia’s willingness to share governance over this critical frontier.

Multilateral coordination and bloc expansion remain central pillars of the joint vision. The statement affirms efforts to strengthen cooperation within BRICS and the SCO, accelerate the creation of regional security centers in Tashkent and Dushanbe, and promote “BRICS+” expansion (China Brief, September 8, 2023; July 12, 2024). The parties pledged to assist new members, explore local currency trade settlement, and align regional frameworks such as the Eurasian Economic Union with the One Belt One Road initiative. Still, these remain mostly process-oriented commitments. They reinforce long-standing ambitions rather than marking a step-change in institutional structure.

The latest joint statement advances the PRC-Russia axis in the sectors most vital to their long-term strategic positioning. It reaffirms military cooperation and multilateral alignment—a statement of intent to keep pressure on the United States and Europe. The closer Beijing and Moscow move toward each other’s strategic redlines, however, the more likely constraints are to appear, most notably in Central Asia and, for Russia, the Arctic. The statement codifies direction but does not substantively increase velocity, indicating that while the PRC and Russia remain committed to long-term alignment, they are still constrained by strategic caution, regional rivalry, and the need to manage external economic blowback.

Beijing and Moscow Tighten Bloc Blueprint

The latest joint statement reinforces many of the themes from the Joint Declaration signed in 2024 but adds sharper ideological alignment, more expansive multilateral ambitions, and denser detail in specific areas of cooperation (China Brief, April 12, 2024; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 16, 2024).

Both documents assert that PRC-Russia relations are at their “highest level in history” (历史最高水平), rooted in non-alignment, and “not targeting third parties” (不针对第三方). The 2025 statement intensifies the ideological framing by invoking World War II memory as a moral and geopolitical foundation, claiming legitimacy based on historical sacrifice and anti-fascist credentials and directly challenging U.S. and European interpretations of the postwar order.

Whereas the 2024 statement placed more emphasis on the longevity of bilateral ties (75 years of diplomacy), the 2025 statement shifts the frame to shared bloc identity. Beyond ideological alignment, three key operational shifts are evident. The first is in military cooperation. Both years’ statements call military ties “special,” endorse joint exercises and increased operational coordination, and stress mutual support in sovereignty and territorial defense; however, the 2025 version deepens this slightly by emphasizing peaceful Arctic cooperation and commiting to “raising the level” (提升 … 水平) of maritime and air patrols.

The second shift is in institutional layering and bloc construction. In 2024, the PRC and Russia expressed strong support for BRICS, the SCO, and the “Greater Eurasian Partnership.” The 2025 statement enhances this integration, endorsing mutual initiatives such as the PRC’s “Global Civilization Initiative” (全球文明倡议) and Russia’s “Eurasian Security Architecture.” The language now envisions a connected mesh of multilateral institutions, positioned explicitly as a rival to U.S.- and NATO-aligned systems.

The third is economic integration, where asymmetry is deepening. Both years’ statements stress expanded trade, energy, and financial ties, but 2025 introduces more formal mechanisms, including a new investment protection treaty and upgraded commitments on cross-border payments and logistics. The PRC’s dominant economic role is now tacitly acknowledged through expanded references to yuan-based trade settlement and supply chain coordination. While Russia remains an indispensable commodities partner, the 2025 language suggests a growing economic asymmetry favoring Beijing.

The 2025 joint statement is more detailed and likely reflects Xi’s emphasis on building more “firm” and “sufficient” cooperation—an attempt to draw Russia deeper into the PRC’s strategic orbit at a time when U.S.-Russia relations are inching toward tentative normalization. While the statement does not fundamentally alter the bilateral trajectory, it marks a more explicit ideological and geopolitical alignment, signaling a shared intent to reshape global order from outside the U.S.-led system.

Moscow was the Message—BRICS and SCO will be the Test

PRC state media covered Xi’s Moscow trip less as a diplomatic report than as a narrative of unbroken national ascent—a continuation of what Party propagandists are now portraying as a series of victories across multiple fronts. A widely republished Xinhua feature cast the visit as the embodiment of the country’s strategic resilience, with Xi’s presence at the 80th anniversary of the Soviet victory in World War II symbolizing the PRC’s position as both heir to historical legitimacy and architect of a new international order (Xinhua, May 12).

The rhetorical core of the narrative came directly from Xi’s signed article to the Russian public: “We should not be confused by the moment or the events, nor be unsettled by the storm” (不为一时一事所惑, 不为风高浪急所扰). Repeated verbatim across outlets, these lines served as a message to Party cadres at home: stay the course—the PRC is not only weathering external pressure, but gaining ground. Xi was quoted emphasizing that both countries “have clear historical logic, strong endogenous driving force, and profound civilizational heritage” (具有清晰历史逻辑、强大内生动力、深厚文明底蕴), and saying that their partnership is “not directed against any third party, nor subject to any third party” (不针对第三方，也不受制于任何第三方). This disavowal of bloc logic was contradicted, however, by the article’s portrayal of the PRC and Russia as co-leaders of a global justice axis that has been forged through wartime sacrifice and is now tasked with resisting U.S.-led efforts to rewrite postwar norms.

By invoking shared trauma and glory, the coverage positioned the PRC’s current geopolitical assertiveness as a continuation of its historical role in defeating fascism, now extended to countering hegemonism in a “new era” of strategic flux. Most importantly, the coverage reinforced the message that the PRC’s strategic line is succeeding without adjustment. According to Xinhua, Xi’s presence released “stability and certainty in relations between major powers” (大国关系的稳定性和确定性). This framing was widely and visibly circulated across Party media and given clear priority over coverage of the concurrent U.S.-PRC trade talks in Geneva.

The optics were deliberate, as with all editorial decisions made in Party media newsrooms. While the Geneva outcome was framed as tactical management, Xi’s Moscow visit was elevated as a strategic milestone—a reaffirmation that the PRC’s rise will not be negotiated with Washington but achieved through deeper alignment with Russia and the reshaping of global order on Beijing’s terms.

Conclusion

The next phases of this strategy will be tested on multiple fronts. In the coming months, the PRC will likely use its presidency of the SCO—culminating in an autumn summit in Tianjin—to push forward regional security frameworks and promote Eurasian economic integration aligned with its interests. The summer BRICS summit, now featuring an expanded membership, will offer another opportunity for Beijing and Moscow to present themselves as co-leaders of a more “representative” and “multipolar” global order. As Washington continues to adjust tariffs and tighten technology controls, Beijing will also intensify efforts to build alternative economic institutions, promote RMB internationalization, and expand bilateral partnerships aimed at securing critical technology and commodity access beyond the reach of U.S. and allied constraint.

These next summits will not merely reaffirm alignment. They will reveal how far the PRC and Russia are prepared to go in translating joint rhetoric into operational blocs. Whether this hardens into durable architecture or stalls under the weight of asymmetries and local interests will shape the next phase of global order competition.

Notes

[1] BRICS is a loose political-economic grouping originally comprised of Brazil, Russia, India, the PRC, and South Africa, but now comprising 11 member states (BRICS Info, accessed May 12).

[2] The Eurasian Economic Union is an organization for regional economic integration of five post-Soviet states: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia.

[3] For more on military language in the statements, see: Eurasia Daily Monitory, May 12.