Xi Establishes ‘Strategic Endurance’ Priorities for the PRC’s Next Five-Year Plan

Xi speaking at the Shanghai economic symposium on April 30. (Source: Xinhua)

Executive Summary:

  • Xi Jinping’s April 30 remarks preview a fundamental shift in the Party’s upcoming 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030), signaling that national security—not growth—is now the central organizing principle of economic planning. A new “security pattern” will be directly integrated with the “development pattern,” embedding resilience, tech sovereignty, and risk mitigation into national long-term strategy.
  • The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is transitioning from growth-maximization to strategic endurance—pursuing survivable 4–5 percent GDP growth and concentrating state resources in high-tech sectors such as semiconductors, AI, aerospace, and energy. This pivot aims to harden the economy against systemic risks from U.S.-led decoupling and domestic vulnerabilities.
  • In effect, Beijing is creating a two-tier planned economy: mobilizing high-tech sectors for long-term resilience while trying to stabilize the remaining “ballast” enough to prevent stagnation and unemployment. But here lies the tension: a highly targeted sectoral approach threatens to undercut broader recovery goals.

An April 30 economic symposium chaired by People’s Republic of China (PRC) president Xi Jinping in Shanghai offers the most authoritative early insight into the Party’s priorities for the 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) (People’s Daily, May 1). The readout indicates that Beijing is preparing for a prolonged period of both external and internal pressure by embedding national security, technological self-reliance, and domestic resilience (both economic and social) into its next development blueprint. Many details are yet to be specified, but the outline aligns with pillars of Xi’s long-term vision for national modernization and rejuvenation.

These priorities are increasingly framed not as growth objectives but as strategic preconditions for enduring what Beijing sees as a multi-decade contest with the United States. For the remainder of 2025, the outlook points to policy continuity: eschewing large-scale stimulus in favor of steady implementation of existing stabilization tools, unless economic shocks escalate.

Xi explicitly acknowledged the deteriorating global environment, citing pressure from the United States and slowing global growth as factors shaping the PRC’s development posture. He urged Party officials to “be farsighted in grasping the impact of developments and changes in the international situation on our country” (要前瞻性把握国际形势发展变化对我国的影响) and to “use [the PRC’s] advantages to guide adjustment and optimization of the economic layout” (因势利导对经济布局进行调整优化). These comments represent one of the clearest acknowledgments to date that global geopolitical turbulence is altering the logic of the PRC’s long-term economic planning.

Xi Integrates High Quality Development with National Security

Xi’s remarks affirm a deepening commitment to “high-level opening” (高水平对外开放) while continuing the push for domestic upgrading. This strategy includes facilitating both foreign capital and technology inflows, alongside bolstering the PRC’s high-end manufacturing capabilities. Parallel efforts aim to stabilize employment, enterprises, markets, and expectations—anchored by a focus on “effectively stabilizing economic fundamentals” (有效稳住经济基本盘). Core to this vision is the acceleration of “new development” and “high-quality development” (高水平发展) agendas. These prioritize infrastructure modernization, industrial upgrading, advanced manufacturing, dual-use technology development, and innovation within the “real economy” (实体经济).

The further integration of development and security was articulated in calls to strengthen national security systems and construct a “new security pattern” (新安全格局) to reinforce the evolving “new development pattern” (新发展格局). In this framework, scientific and technological innovation remains the guiding force of economic policy, with an emphasis on achieving autonomy in key and emerging technologies. While these themes are not new, having appeared in speeches and planning documents since 2019, the context has evolved. Xi’s call for greater self-reliance and the fusing of security with development now reflects the pressures of a more adversarial external environment. The trajectory is no longer about managing risk at the margins, but the redesign of the PRC’s political economy to withstand prolonged confrontation with the United States. There is little here to suggest a moderation of Xi’s approach or a renewed emphasis on structural reform.

Incremental Tools and Local Experimentation for Rest of 2025

Xi provided little detail about immediate policy shifts, instructing cadres simply to “step up implementation of the planning goals and tasks” (加紧落实规划目标任务) for the 15th Five-Year Plan. While he did leave room for adjustment, noting the need to “adapt to changes in the situation” (适应形势变化), he offered no specifics on timing or content. In practice, this signals continuity rather than deviation: no large-scale stimulus is expected in the first half of 2025.

Beijing will likely continue relying on incremental tools such as targeted reserve requirement ratio (RRR) cuts, support for export manufacturing, and calibrated messaging to stabilize expectations—consistent with recent State Council and Politburo meetings. Financial risk control remains a top priority, with limited local debt issuance and efforts to preserve banking sector stability aligned with statements from the Ministry of Finance and the country’s central bank, the People’s Bank of China.

Localized experimentation will serve as a release valve, with initiatives like consumer voucher pilots and small-scale infrastructure acceleration rolled out to provide flexibility without altering the broader macroeconomic posture. Beijing also appears poised to selectively liberalize foreign direct investment, particularly through free trade zone initiatives in regions such as Shanghai and Hainan, as part of a broader effort to stabilize foreign relations and deepen ties with Europe and Southeast Asia.

‘Strategic Endurance’ Signals Shift in Planning Logic

A deeper transition is underway from tactical crisis management to long-term strategic endurance planning, as Beijing braces for a sustained decoupling and confrontation with the United States. Read closely, Xi’s remarks reflect a subtle but meaningful shift in how his ideological framework, policy toolkit, and security-development linkages are being operationalized. The Party is recasting its development narrative around resilience and security. This is the fruition of an approach that Xi has advocated for since coming to power in 2012—referred to as “strategic determination” (战略定力) (Study Times, February 27, 2023). The most notable change is that security has moved from contextual backdrop to centerpiece. The pairing of the “new development pattern” with a corresponding “new security pattern” marks a qualitative step toward viewing economic planning as a matter of strategic defense—not solely about growth and efficiency.

This could cement the shift toward a model of “survivable” growth—targeting 4–5 percent annually—rather than the 6 percent-plus expansion characteristic of the pre-pandemic era. Under the rubric of strategic endurance, Beijing is no longer seeking to outpace its geopolitical rivals through sheer economic scale but to outlast and out-adapt them through structural resilience. This strategy prioritizes security and stability over liberalization and efficiency, channeling intensified state support toward key areas. These include hard tech sectors such as semiconductors, aerospace, AI, and energy systems; domestic supply chains via reshoring, import substitution, and upstream resource access; and industrial sectors through targeted investment from state-owned enterprises, policy banks, and “little giant” (小巨人) firms. Demand-side policies are increasingly focused on government-led initiatives—such as appliance upgrades, electric vehicle incentives, and rural revitalization—rather than market-based reforms or household income redistribution. Capital markets and credit, meanwhile, are being repurposed as instruments of industrial policy, serving national priorities rather than acting as autonomous allocators of capital.

Conclusion

If implemented as envisioned, the 15th Five-Year Plan will represent a decisive detachment of economic governance from short-term growth metrics. Instead, it will anchor performance evaluation to the broader national strategic objectives of resilience, security, and tech sovereignty. Xi is no longer focused on whether PRC can grow fast enough to catch up with the United States. Rather, he is asking whether the PRC can endure long enough to outlast it.