Militant Monks Fuel Government Terror in Myanmar

Executive Summary:

• An ultranationalist subset of Myanmar’s community of Buddhist monks have become active supporters of the military junta, offering the regime legitimacy and support in the ongoing civil war.
• This alliance reflects a broader pattern of authoritarian regimes weaponizing religious authorities to suppress dissent and target minorities. Myanmar’s case highlights the need to include non-Muslim religious extremism within global counterterrorism frameworks.

Myanmar’s ongoing sectarian conflict has seen a dangerous convergence between the military junta and ultranationalist Buddhist monks. Myanmar’s current military government, frequently referred to as the Sit-Tat (referred to by its supporters as the Tatmadaw), led by Min Aung Hlaing, is aligned with the country’s community of monks (called the Sangha) in important ways. While the Sangha is divided politically—and has an apolitical mandate—portions have decided to collaborate with the regime as a result of shared interests. Pro-junta monks, exemplified by the MaBaTha (Committee for the Protection of Nationality and Religion) organization, serve as a powerful actor in the service of the current regime, engaging in both civil and military activity against anti-junta forces (The Irrawaddy, September 9, 2021).

A number of developments underscore how the Sit-Tat has co-opted segments of the Sangha into a political instrument, weaponizing religion to suppress internal resistance, court international allies, and incite violence against ethno-religious enemies of the state. The alliance of MaBaTha and the Sit-tat have affected Myanmar’s international posture. Following Myanmar’s magnitude 7.7 earthquake on March 28, Sri Lanka extended support, specifically citing that it and Myanmar are “two Buddhist states,” a gesture underpinned by ties between Sri Lanka’s Bodu Bala Sena (BBS) and Myanmar’s MaBaTha (Tamil Guardian, April 2). A few months earlier, the arrest of Saffron Revolution veteran and dual U.S.–Myanmar citizen Venerable Pinnya Jawta on terrorism charges highlighted the regime’s crackdown on dissenting monks (Radio Free Asia, December 6, 2024). Jawta was an activist opposed to military rule, and his arrest showcases the Sit-tat’s disdain for monks who fail to hold the party line.

The Sangha and Myanma Society

Myanmar’s Buddhist monks are one of the largest and most influential institutions in the country, only second to the country’s powerful military (The Irrawaddy, June 22, 2024). Comprising around 575,000 monks and nuns, the members of the Sangha are highly influential in their communities and generally considered sacred.

The Sangha has historically been politically engaged and has been a visible part of political protests for decades (International Crisis Group, March 10, 2023). The monks have, however, tended to be critical of foreign intervention and the influence of outside cultures, norms, values, and religions that contradict Buddhist principles. This includes serving a prominent role in the country’s independence movement from Great Britain, exemplified by monks like U Ottama, who is considered a national hero (Burma News International, September 11, 2012). More recently, the Sangha played a leading role in the 2007 Saffron Revolution, whose name derives from the color of the monks’ robes (The Irrawaddy, September 19, 2019).

The Sangha is composed of individuals with a variety of political opinions. In the context of the current regime, there are a small number who are openly anti-regime (with some even going so far as to “disrobe” and fight alongside anti-junta forces). Much of the Sangha range from neutral to quietly sympathetic, be it due to fear of reprisals, desire to align with whatever the local sentiments are, or opposition to efforts by the former National League for Democracy (NLD) government to secularize the majority Buddhist state (International Crisis Group, March 10, 2023).

Nonetheless, a notable portion of the Sangha, represented by prominent monks like the ultranationalist Sitagu Sayadaw, have fostered open relationships with the Sit-Tat. These monks promote the regime’s continued rule, often in return for material favors and public support (The Irrawaddy, June 10, 2024). These monks play an important role as societal intermediaries, anchoring the unpopular Sit-Tat’s in the country’s deeply rooted and respected religious institutions (London School of Economics South Asia Centre, December 18, 2023). The monks’ support also helps the junta to divide the rebels along nationalistic and religious lines, amplifying sectarian divides between the population and the various ethnic and religious militias opposing the Sit-Tat. For example, far-right monks have widely criticized the dominant Christian-based Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and vowed to fight against it for the junta (Myanmar Now, January 12, 2024). These sentiments led to the rise of the influential 969 Movement, and later the MaBaTha organization.

Buddhist Extremism: 969 Movement and MaBaTha

The 969 Movement, a radical Buddhist supremacist movement within the Sangha, quickly became influential after it was formed by ultranationalist monk Ashin Wirathu in 2011. [1] It grew out of a 1997 pamphlet by U Kyaw Lwin, who sought to protect the cultural tradition of Buddhism from the perceived encroachment of Islam, citing local violence and deep-seated numerological superstitions as proof of an Islamic conspiracy to take over Burmese society (Democratic Voice of Burma, May 10, 2013; 969 Movement, accessed May 18). It is still led by Ashin Wirathu, who has been referred to as the “Buddhist Bin Laden” for his ideological extremism and calls for violence (South China Morning Post, January 4, 2023).

A set of escalating events quickly pushed the group to the forefront. In 2012, tensions between the Muslim Rohingya community and the Buddhist Rakhine community began to mount in Arakan (officially called Rakhine State today) over police accusing Rohingya Muslim men of the rape and murder of a Buddhist woman (Irrawaddy, June 12, 2012). This prompted the 969 Movement to call for the boycott of Muslim businesses and goods and strict prohibition of interfaith marriages between Buddhists and Muslims. Outrage proceeded to spread among locals and resulted in displacement, riots, and the murder of people from both religions (Al Jazeera, May 31, 2013). It is believed that these events were key steps in the rising of tensions between the various ethno-religious communities in Myanmar, helping transform long-standing, local sectarian problems to a full-scale ethnic conflict (Mizzima, July 29, 2022).

The situation was such that the Sangha banned the 969 Movement in 2013 and effectively outlawed it on the grounds that it had illegally used religious symbols for violent purposes (The Irrawaddy, September 10, 2013). In response, the ultranationalist monks regrouped and founded the MaBaTha organization, pledging allegiance to the 969 Movement and promising to serve as the “steward of the populist anti-Muslim narrative” (The Rohingya Post, June 15, 2019). The MaBaTha quickly became an umbrella organization for ultranationalist monks and their aligned movements (New Mandala, August 27, 2015). One of their early achievements included two of the four controversial “Race and Religion Protection Laws,” which were designed to restrict the growth of the country’s Muslim community (Frontier Myanmar, October 10, 2015). Later, MaBaTha-aligned monks used Facebook to incite the local Buddhists against the Rohingya minority of Rakhine State. They therefore played a significant role in fueling the violence which would become the 2017 Rohingya crisis, which left tens of thousands dead and around a million Rohingya seeking refuge across the border in Bangladesh (The Japan Times, March 24, 2024).

The State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee, Myanmar’s highest Buddhist authority, banned the MaBaTha under the premises that the latter’s mandate conflicted with its own (Radio Free Asia, March 23, 2017). However, many monks were furious with this move by the democratic government, and even after the group’s formal disbanding, the MaBaTha remained unofficially active as a loosely connected but organized network of ultranationalist monks. The period between the disbanding of MaBaTha and the junta’s coup in 2021 was marked by the nationalist monks’ animosity toward Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD. The democratic government was keen to tackle MaBaTha’s ideological incitement in favor of greater secularism (The Irrawaddy, September 21, 2015).

Alienation from the NLD led hardline monks to pursue relationships with the military even before the 2021 coup. In 2019, General Min Aung Hlaing (who would come to lead the Sit-Tat) had asserted that MaBaTha’s existence was “a necessity” (The Irrawaddy, June 19, 2019). Min Aung Hlaing and his commanders accordingly donated significant chunks of money to members of this group, bolstering the Sit-Tat’s positive image among the MaBaTha’s members (The Irrawaddy, June 17, 2019). In 2020, MaBaTha-affiliated monks Sitagu Sayadaw and Ashin Chekinda reportedly called on Min Aung Hlaing ahead of the 2020 general election to lead a coup (The Irrawaddy, September 15, 2022). Wirathu was banned from preaching for a period, was charged with sedition and slander, and was ultimately arrested just before the November 2020 general election (The Diplomat, September 7, 2021).

MaBaTha and the Sit-Tat

The junta takeover of power in 2021 presented an immense opportunity to usher in MaBaTha-aligned Buddhist ultranationalism as state policy. These monks were agitated by the democratic government, which censored their views as “extreme.” While MaBaTha had been sidelined during the NLD’s rule, the 2021 military coup enabled these monks to reemerge and establish a symbiotic relationship with the otherwise unpopular military regime (The Irrawaddy, June 7, 2024). Months after the Sit-Tat’s coup, Wirathu and other imprisoned monks were released from prison by the new military government (The Diplomat, September 7, 2021).

Since their seizure of power, the influence of monks is crucial for the Sit-Tat’s rule, especially now that it increasingly lacks manpower and popular support. Researchers refer to this monk-military collaboration as part of a military-led project called the Saya-Dakar program, which began in 1988 after the military crushed the unprecedented major pro-democracy protests of the time and retook power. Through this program, researchers allege that the monks were gradually aligned with pro-military views through lavish donations to pagodas, funding education in monasteries, and land grants, creating a “military-monastic complex” (New Mandala, October 1, 2024).

Civil War and Symbiotic Relationship

In addition to wielding tremendous influence on Myanma society, some ultranationalist monks have played a role leading pro-junta militias. This includes the infamous Wathawa, who leads a pro-government militia implicated in the brutal killing of rebels (The Irrawaddy, June 22, 2024; Mizzima, March 29, 2024). These monks-turned-militia-warlords command thousands of men to fight for the military in the name of protecting “the nation and Buddhism”—for which they receive much praise from the Sit-Tat (The New Humanitarian, January 24). Wathawa is actively engaged in organizing monks’ training to join the fight against the rebels, along with the secular pro-military Pyu Saw Htee militia in the ongoing civil war (Radio Free Asia, January 24, 2023). Notably, MaBaTha-aligned members of the Sangha enjoy unusual privileges, with Wathawa going so far as to get away with criticizing Min Aung Hlaing and demanding his resignation for failing to contain the rebels. Wathawa was only briefly detained and released afterwards (The Irrawaddy, January 19, 2024). Later, Wathawa’s militias conducted joint operations alongside the regular military forces (Radio Free Asia, January 21, 2023).

While the Sit-Tat’s relationship with pro-military elements in the Sangha is an open secret, it has at times passed into becoming performative state policy. Wirathu’s stance was recognized with a national award in 2022 on Myanmar’s Independence Day in a ceremony which included then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu (The Irrawaddy, November 21, 2022).

Conclusion

The relationship between the Sit-Tat junta and hardline ultranationalist monks is based on mutual benefits and legitimacy. The monks’ anti-democratic stance strongly overlaps with the measures the junta believes necessary to maintain power, and former’s religious authority lends the Sit-Tat a semblance of divine legitimacy. The Sit-Tat perceives itself as a protector of Buddhism, which the pro-regime monks support and legitimize (The Irrawaddy, September 9, 2021). Just after the 2021 coup, Min Aung Hlaing visited a MaBaTha-aligned ultranationalist Buddhist abbot in Hpa-an (Myanmar Now, June 3, 2021). The relationship was so intimate that Sitagu Sayadaw even referred to Min Aung Hlaing as the “King of Myanmar” for honoring the former chairman of MaBaTha, U Tilawka Bhivamsa, with the highest Buddhist title in 2022 (The Irrawaddy, March 21, 2022). Mass civil disobedience, protests, and criticism of some neutral monks after the 2021 coup proved troublesome for the junta, but ultranationalist MaBaTha endorsements helped the junta balance those criticisms. Four years later, this relationship is still vulnerable to high-profile incidents, as the accidental shooting of Sayadaw Bhaddanta Munindabhivamsa, a very senior monk critical of the 2021 coup, forced a rare public apology by Min Aung Hlaing (Firstpost, June 26, 2024).

Altogether, this demonstrates the level of influence and power Buddhism and monks can wield with the regime in Myanmar. Even during Ming Aung Hlaing’s foreign trips, religion has played a symbolic role in strengthening ties with close allies, such as Russia. In a bizarre move, Hlaing referred to Putin as the “Great Buddhist Prophet,” despite the latter having no connection to the religion (Asia Times, March 19). Moreover, this ultranationalist Buddhism is also finding allies in South Asian states like Sri Lanka and India, which are geopolitically and religiously connected to Myanmar (Tamil Guardian, April 2; The Print, June 16, 2024). Taken together, these moves underscore how the Sit-Tat uses a politicized vision of Buddhism and the Sangha not only to consolidate domestic control but to build a legitimizing narrative at home and abroad.

Notes:

[1] Most charitably, the “969” here refers to the “nine special attributes of the Buddha, the six special attributes of his Dhamma, or teachings, and the nine special attributes of the Sangha, or community of monks” (The Irrawaddy, June 22, 2013). More to the point, the number was chosen in response to the usage of “786” by Muslims (itself shorthand for “in the name of Allah, the ever merciful, the ever compassionate”) to identify Muslim-owned businesses. The 969 Movement was partially in response to a sense that Buddhists felt that it was unfair that only Muslims should try to draw their own kind to businesses owned by their coreligionists, hence the movement’s “buy Buddhist” campaign and boycotting of Muslim businesses (International Crisis Group, September 5, 2017; London School of Economics South Asia Centre, December 18, 2023). The “Islamic conspiracy to take over Burmese society” stems from the questionable notion that since 7 + 8 + 6 = 21, Muslims who say or advertise “786” are really referencing that they intend to take over Myanmar in the 21st century. Other issues notwithstanding, it should be noted that according to the Hijri calendar used in Islam, it is currently the 15th century.