Connectivity and Security Drive Russia’s Elevated Ties With Taliban

Executive Summary:

• Russia’s concerns regarding threats emanating from the Islamic State Khorasan Province and diversions from north-south transit routes have been the driving factors behind Moscow’s rapprochement with the Taliban.
• Afghanistan and Russia are close to establishing official diplomatic relations, but the Kremlin will likely choose a more cautious approach, meaning that official recognition of the Taliban government might still be a distant possibility.
• Russia’s shifting posture toward the Taliban fits into the wider regional trends, with the Central Asian countries attempting to build relations with Kabul to improve regional security and connectivity.

In mid-May, Russia hosted the Russia-Afghanistan Business Forum as part of the Russia-Islamic World Economic Forum in Kazan. Russian and Taliban officials discussed developing transit routes to Afghanistan via Central Asia and Pakistan, as well as an additional route through Turkmenistan and the Caspian Sea. Moscow has placed special emphasis on linking the Trans-Afghan Railway (still under construction) with the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), primarily to maintain connectivity to the Indian Ocean (Russia’s Pivot to Asia, May 20).

The event followed a Russian Supreme Court decision in early April that removed the Taliban from the Kremlin’s terrorist list, thus paving the way for official dealings with the de facto ruling government (see EDM, November 13, 2024; The Moscow Times, April 17). The decision was long in the making, as Russia has steadily increased engagement with Kabul since the militant group regained control in August 2021 (see EDM, July 29, 2024, January 15). Afghanistan’s prime position as a transit node for north-south trade has also led to increased engagement with the People’s Republic of China and Central Asia. Overall, Russia’s decision is driven by a mixture of security and connectivity issues. Moscow hopes not only to maintain the dominance of north-south transit routes but also to ensure that those routes remain secure from possible sabotage.

Russia initially did not oppose the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Throughout the 2010s, however, Moscow took steps to establish close contact with the Taliban (see EDM, January 6, 2016, November 13, 2018). Bilateral engagement was further boosted following the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul in 2021 (see EDM, August 19, 2021). Moscow’s growing animosity toward Washington also drove this rapprochement, most acutely due to Russia’s initial invasion and occupation of part of Ukraine.

The Kremlin has long been concerned with potential security spillover from terrorist activity in the surrounding regions. Of late, one particular concern has been the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), a regional jihadist branch of the Islamic State that has begun to make significant inroads in Central Asia (see EDM, July 15, 2024). This became especially pertinent for Russian policymakers after the March 2024 deadly terrorist attack in Moscow, perpetuated by ISKP (see EDM, March 26, 28, 2024). As potential threats continue to emanate from the group, Moscow will likely double down on its rapprochement with the Taliban to quell the spread of ISKP’s influence (see EDM, July 29, 2024).

Russia’s decision to elevate ties with the Taliban is the result of a simple fait accompli. The Taliban remains the de facto ruler of Afghanistan, and Moscow sees little geopolitical benefit in denying this fact. Continuing to designate the Taliban as a terrorist movement would presumably complicate Russia’s ability to project power across Central Asia.

Moscow also sees a great opportunity for investing in Afghanistan’s mining and agricultural sectors, as well as selling Russian energy to Kabul. Afghanistan’s Chamber of Commerce and Investment announced an opening for Russian companies to participate in the resource extraction industry and the construction of roads and tunnels to improve connectivity in the mountainous regions (Gazeta.ru, June 21). Kabul has also recently asked Moscow for greater imports of agricultural products, given the instability caused by Israeli and U.S. bombings of Iran, a key food provider to Afghanistan (Kommersant, June 20).

Additionally, the Kremlin views Afghanistan as a rich source of cheap labor. Russia is in desperate need of labor migrants as Central Asian migrants are increasingly returning home due to rising xenophobia among the Russian population (see EDM, May 9, 15, 2024, May 20). In May, the two sides reached a labor agreement under which Russia would welcome labor migrants from Afghanistan, including masons, welders, electricians, and painters (The Insider, June 20).

Connectivity has been a critical factor pulling the Kremlin and the Taliban closer together. Moscow regards Afghanistan as a critical link to Pakistan and the Indian Ocean within the sprawling INSTC (see EDM, January 15). Russian officials have placed special emphasis on the route passing through Central Asia to Afghanistan and Pakistan. In recent years, Islamabad has actively voiced its desire to increase participation in the INSTC and has accepted container shipments coming southward from Russia (Sputnik India, May 27, 2023). Concrete plans are now in the works to send the first batch of containers northward to Russia via Central Asia (TASS, April 9; RailFreight, June 16).

The Trans-Afghan Railway provides Moscow with a tangible route to link with the INSTC. Russian participation in the project, however, has so far remained minimal (Trackopedia, April 22). As a result, the route could play a major role in allowing Russian goods to enter and pass through the country. Russian companies could also bolster their investments in extracting untapped deposits of vital resources. To this end, in December 2024, Russian geologists in Afghanistan began conducting special research on rare-earth resources in the country (Evening-kazan.ru, December 6, 2024).

More importantly, Russia’s shifting perception of the Taliban should be seen in the context of wider regional developments. Most of the Central Asian states have moved to improve their relations with the Taliban. Tajikistan chose to open its border with Afghanistan in 2023 and continues to export electricity to its neighbor. In 2024, Kazakhstan removed the Taliban from its terrorist list and officially recognized the credentials of the Taliban’s diplomatic envoy (see EDM, January 18, 2024; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, August 27, 2024). In August 2024, Uzbekistan’s trade and investment with Afghanistan reached $2.5 billion. The two also opened the Airitom Free Zone on the Afghan border (see EDM, May 21; Airitom.com, accessed June 24).

The removal of legal hurdles now allows Afghanistan and Russia to establish official diplomatic relations. Moscow, however, will likely choose a more cautious approach, which means that official recognition of the Taliban government might still be a distant possibility. Maria Zakharova, spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry, recently stated that Russia will recognize the current Afghan government “in due time” (Gazeta.ru, June 19). Much will depend on how other countries respond, especially the Central Asian states. Nevertheless, the overall trajectory suggests that Moscow is becoming increasingly open to more intense cooperation with the Taliban to strengthen north-south transit lines and enhance regional security.