Bello Turji: Nigeria’s Notorious Bandit Still Violent, Unaligned

Executive Summary:

• On June 24, Nigerian militant Bello Turji Kachalla and his men staged a large ambush on security forces, killing up to 44 people. During his decade-long time as a bandit in northwestern Nigeria, it was frequently feared that Turji could join forces with local jihadist forces to oppose the government, though this continues to be unlikely.
• While Turji purports himself to be motivated by a desire to protect his fellow Fulani herders against their more agricultural Hausa neighbors, it is more likely that he and his men are motivated by vengeance and greed as opposed to any sort of ideology.

On June 24, Nigerian militant Bello Turji Kachalla (generally referred to as Bello Turji) and his men staged a large ambush on security forces, allegedly killing 44 near the Shinkafi Local Government Area in Zamfara State (Daily Post [Nigeria], June 24; Zagazola, June 25). While there is some doubt over whether said number has been inflated, Bello Turji’s ambush comes amid a renewed Nigerian offensive since early 2025 to capture the infamous bandit and bring him to justice. Bello Turji is frequently considered to be a strategically important figure in northwestern Nigeria—a dangerous foe should he ever side with local jihadist groups or a powerful, if untrustworthy ally if he ever sided with the government—but his continued refusal to take a side in Abuja’s fight against Islamism over the last three years and the waning strength of his forces suggests that Turji’s importance should not be overstated in the current fight.

On June 12, al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for Supporters of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) attacked Basso, Benin, 15 kilometers from Benin’s border post with Nigeria. This represents JNIM’s closest attack yet to Nigerian territory (Premium Times [Nigeria], June 13). While some worry that Turji could ally with JNIM and help the group penetrate Nigeria, there is little reason to be concerned about such an alliance. Turji remains only pseudo-ideological, and his organization, while still active, is in decline. These facts make him a relative nonfactor in JNIM’s advances toward Nigeria’s northwestern states.

Turji has spent 2025 on the run from security forces, leading his still-nameless group of several hundred men. Turji’s forces have been implicated in the extortion, rape, and murder of locals in Nigeria’s rural northwestern Sokoto and Zamfara states. Typically, Bello Turji’s fighters demand up to 50 million naira (approx. $25,000) in “protection fees” in exchange for allowing farmers to return to normal life. If this fee is not paid, his fighters may kill the farmers and their families (Access Post [Nigeria], June 11). Turji’s motivations seem to be in no small part ethnic, citing the ongoing conflict between farmers and his own Fulani herders—but there also appears a general profit and vigilante motive, hence his frequent branding as “bandit” rather than “ethnoterrorist.”

This year’s Nigerian campaign against him has seen mixed success. The Nigerian Army claimed early victories, killing Turji’s son and dozens of militants on January 17 and killing an important lieutenant around May 19 (Punch [Nigeria], January 22; YouTube/WION, May 19). Turji’s men have remained lethal even under pressure. On April 2, for example, his group killed 11 farmers in Sokoto, with the survivors blaming the Nigerian security forces for not stopping Turji (Daily Trust [Nigeria], April 3; Nigerian Tribune, April 3). In May, Turji’s men forcibly evicted thousands in Sokoto State amid threats of violence (Punch Magazine [Nigeria], May 13).

In the past, Turji has lamented the lives “wasted” as a result of his conflict with the Nigerian forces, claiming to seek peace for the Fulani and Hausa peoples of his native Zamfara State and the surrounding regions (Daily Trust [Nigeria], March 6, 2022). He further claims the mantle of protecting Fulanis against Hausa farmers, his primary victims. While some sources characterize him as a clearly ideological Fulani militant, he is generally understood to be motivated “more by vengeance and grievances than a cogent ideology” (see Militant Leadership Monitor, November 1, 2021; allAfrica, June 20, 2024).

As Turji’s grievances are ethnic and he fights primarily with another Muslim ethnic group, it seems reasonable that he would not be attracted to jihadist messaging. Regional Islamists preach Islamic unity, which would prevent or restrict Turgi from vigilantism and banditry of his coreligionists. Likewise, Turji would endanger himself and his men by fighting alongside JNIM, as this would mean remaining in close proximity to some of his former Hausa victims, now armed and potentially looking to even the score. Although Ansaru, an al-Qaeda-affiliated group that operates in northern Nigeria also claims to defend Fulanis (against Christians, not jihadists), Bello Turji is adamant that his group “doesn’t know them [Ansaru or Boko Haram, another Islamist group] and that “we don’t [even] know what [Boko Haram] means” (Sahara Reporters, May 6; Daily Trust [Nigeria], March 6, 2022). While Turji claims complete dissociation and feigns ignorance, it remains to be the case that Turji’s group, while extremely violent, is not inspired by ideology, lowering the likelihood that they side with Islamists.

Conclusion

All in all, Turji remains a major security threat, but not a likely jihadist proxy or partner. His enduring violence against local populations and Nigerian security forces does not negate the risk of jihadist infiltration of his group, but Turji himself would not be the bridge for such a change. While Turji has at times demonstrated softer and more conciliatory rhetoric, his group has remained highly militant, as evidenced by recent attacks, and he has continued this violent streak for nearly a decade. While Turji’s group will remain a significant human security threat in northwestern Nigeria, there are few signs the bandits will link up with JNIM or Ansaru. In fact, Turji’s lack of any coherent ideology, much less a religious one, should be viewed as a symptom of lawlessness in Nigeria’s northwest, rather than a catalyst for future jihadist gains.