Brief: Attack on Damascus Church Exposes Fragile Protection for Syria’s Christians

Executive Summary:

• On June 22, an Islamist terrorist entered the Mar Elias Greek Orthodox Church in Damascus mid-service, opening fire on the crowd before detonating his suicide vest. The attack killed 25 and injured 63. While it is not yet known who is responsible for the attack, the new Syrian regime under Ahmed al-Sharaa has failed to assuage the concerns of Syrian Christians who fear further violence.
• The apparent trend of the new regime’s security forces failing to rid themselves of signals of previous allegiance to one or another armed group active during the civil war creates two hazards. First, agents of Islamic State (IS) may more easily disguise themselves as regular members of the security forces. Second, the phenomenon gives religious minorities more reasons to fear sectarian violence at the hands of armed agents of the new regime.

On June 22, an Islamist terrorist entered the Mar Elias Greek Orthodox Church in Damascus mid-service, opening fire on the crowd before detonating his suicide vest. The attack killed 25 and left more than 63 injured. The attack was the first of its kind in Damascus since the conclusion of the Syrian Civil War that brought the ascension of President Ahmed al-Sharaa (for more on al-Sharaa, see Terrorism Monitor, March 25). This comes amid continued concern about the new government’s ability to integrate jihadist elements into a functional and even-handed security force. The killing has opened a new series of questions regarding the new Syrian government’s relationship to jihadist elements in its society, and points to the tenuous position of ethnic and religious minorities in al-Sharaa’s new Syria.

The attack occurred at a large Orthodox church in the heavily Christian Duwail’ah neighborhood just east of Damascus’s Old City when the church was full (Al Jazeera, June 23). The attacker approached in military gear and began shooting at the churchgoers from outside the doors before entering, killing many and damaging pews, the altar, and the Church’s icons. Moments later, he detonated his suicide vest while standing near the entryway, killing both those close by and those outside the door, including some men who had attempted to restrain him (Instagram/jusoornews, July 8). 19 were killed in the immediate aftermath, with the death toll rising to 25 from fatal injuries. Children were counted among the slain, as well as many young adults (Hawar News Agency, June 23).

The identity of the attacker and responsible party remains unclear. Open-source analysts on X identified the attacker as Ziyād Anwar Idlibi, a member of the Public Security forces (al-Aman al-’Ām) and formerly affiliated with al-Sharaa’s Hay’at Taḥrīr al-Shām (“Committee for the Liberation of the Levant”; HTS). While a Facebook account of an individual with the same name and strong HTS sympathies exists, no official or independent sources have substantiated Ziyād Anwar Idlibi’s role, in spite of the rumor’s spread on social media (X/@GoergElias, June 22; X/@nidalhamade2, June 23; Al Akhbar [Lebanon], June 23; Facebook/زياد ادلبي, June 23). Meanwhile, Minister of the Interior Anas Khattab blamed Islamic State (IS) cells and claimed to have detained a member of the cell responsible, an Iraqi refugee named Kinān Ramadhān ‘Ali from the al-Hawl camp in northeastern Syria (X/@DeirEzzore, June 26). The camp is under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and depending on the veracity of the accusation, could be seen as indicative of SDF complicity with Islamists, or an attempt to shift blame onto the SDF and away from more directly responsible parties. In the days following the attack, the group Sarāya Anṣār al-Sunnah (SAS) claimed responsibility (Jihadology, June 23). The group is new and not well understood, splitting off from the formerly HTS-affiliated transitional government only in February 2025. SAS has also claimed other lone wolf attacks against areas populated by the Alawites and other minorities. These claims are, however, disputed and may be made to enhance the nascent SAS’s reputation (Institute for the Study of War, March 5). SAS itself claimed the attacker was yet another man, Muḥammad Zain al-‘Ābidīn (Al Aan TV, June 24).

Regardless of which jihadist-affiliated organization bears direct responsibility, Duwail’ah’s Christians report feeling unsafe. Social media from the region suggests that they believe that the new government, if not directly responsible, is at least apathetic to their plight and has created an atmosphere conducive to violence against religious minorities. Some of the same accounts that accuse Ziyad Idlibi of the bombing refer to a documented event that occurred previously. In this incident, an Islamic preacher was said to have driven through the neighborhood with loudspeakers blasting messages “calling” Christians to Islam in what was interpreted by residents as sanctioned harassment (X/@mohamadyeser4, March 19; Instagram/almuntada_forum, March 24). Numerous locals report that some members of the security forces retain IS insignias on their uniforms, an indicator that the current government has not yet managed to create a separation between its fighters and whichever ideological and militant affiliations they were previously loyal to (X/@kocihadro, June 22). If this is true, it would imply that violent extremism-adjacent affiliations are accepted among the new government’s armed security personnel. Likewise, it also offers terrorists affiliated with IS, SAS, or other similar organizations an easy cover, allowing them to go unnoticed by posing as members of the General Security Service right up until they are ready to commit an attack. President Ahmed al-Sharaa released a statement of condolence to the victims, although it failed to mention both the fact that the victims were Christian and that jihadist elements were responsible (Facebook/Nedaa Post نداء بوست, June 23). Likewise, Syrian Christians condemned the government for its failure to adequately respond and attempted to apply pressure on President al-Sharaa, imploring him to investigate the attack in an even-handed manner and find those responsible (France24, June 25). Some Christians in Syria and internationally responded in solidarity, demonstrating in marches where they held crosses and chanted religious slogans, symbolizing pride in their identity (TikTok/@eastern.christians, June 23).

The Mar Elias attack has become a chilling symbol of Syria’s unresolved tensions between post-war stability and the ideological tendencies of its victors. While the matter of who was directly responsible for the attack remains contested—be it IS remnants, Sarāya Anṣār al-Sunnah, or rogue elements within the security forces—the deeper reality is that jihadist identities and mindsets continue to exist just beneath the surface of the new regime. The lackluster response by the new regime suggests they may even be comfortable allowing sectarian sentiment to fester out in the open. For Syria’s Christians, the attack underscores a painful truth: the conclusion of war does not guarantee social or spiritual security for minorities who remain caught between state neglect and extremist hostility. Whether President al-Sharaa’s government will confront the mire of ideological entanglements within its own apparatus or continue to sidestep them will determine not only the safety of Syria’s Christians but also the credibility of its fragile national unity in the years to come.