Russian Summer of Doubt and Foreboding Drags On

Executive Summary:

• Russia is experiencing a decline in morale as its war against Ukraine enters its fourth summer, with feelings of hope and pride appearing to be replaced by indifference and fear.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin’s concerns about public discontent with the war are apparent in the Kremlin’s increase in information control and the severity of repression, including a new law criminalizing any internet searches for materials deemed “extremist.”
• The economic situation in Russia continues to deteriorate amid budget deficits and industrial stagnation, and now faces a new EU sanctions package that institutes a price ceiling on Russian oil.

The fourth summer of Moscow’s war against Ukraine has brought feelings of tiredness and hopelessness, rather than the usual seasonal optimism, to Russia. The spring expectations of a probable cessation of hostilities are gone, and the messages from the Kremlin about the firm determination to stay the course aimed at subjugating Ukraine undercut the longing for a normal life. Opinion polls cannot fully capture this shift in public mood, particularly when conducted by “foreign agents.” They still indicate a decline in feelings of pride and hope, however, and an increase in indifference and fear (Levada Center, July 18). Even the weather in Moscow departs from all perceptions of normalcy. Following an extreme heat wave in early July, tropical rains have caused traffic chaos and local flooding (Ritmmsk.ru, July 17).

The course of combat operations, despite the upbeat official reporting and inflated claims of jingoist bloggers, is widely perceived as stagnant (TopWar.ru, July 16; Izvestiya, July 19). The intensity of Russian tactical attacks, which in May and June yielded a few square miles every day at the cost of enormous casualties, has notably declined (see EDM, July 14; The Insider; Meduza, July 18). Recruitment produces diminishing reinforcements, so there are few expectations of a decisive summer offensive. The memories of such shocking surprises as the Wagner Group mutiny in Summer 2023 or the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk oblast in Summer 2024 have faded (Radio Svoboda, July 17). Even the scale of Russian attacks on Ukrainian cities has gone down from the record of 750 missiles and drones in early July to just 35 drones last Friday, July 18, increasing to 330 projectiles on Saturday, July 19, and dropping again to 57 on Sunday, July 20 (Verstka Media, July 9; Current Time, July 19).

Over the last few weeks, the rigidity of information control and severity of repression have increased in Russia (Novaya gazeta Europe, July 18). The legislation criminalizing any internet search for materials deemed “extremist” can be applied selectively and is aimed at disconcerting the wide audience of various Russian-language media working in exile (Forbes.ru; The Moscow Times, July 18). In parallel, preparations are underway to block access to WhatsApp, a widely popular messaging service in Russia, precisely because it is resistant to monitoring by Russian special services (Meduza, July 18). Boris Akunin, one of the most popular Russian authors, who emigrated in 2014, can shrug off the sentence of 14 years imprisonment issued by the Moscow military court as he resides in the United Kingdom, but such anti-war activists inside Russia as Nadezhda Rossinskaya cannot, as she is facing 22 years of real prison time (RBC, July 14; Meduza, July 15).

These extreme measures and severe sentences reveal that Russian President Vladimir Putin is, in fact, deeply worried about the growth of public discontent with the war. He is hiding his fear behind the pretence of total confidence in Russia’s resolve to achieve a victory resembling the triumph over Nazi Germany in 1945 (Republic.ru, July 14). He may not have precise measurements of the depth of this discontent, but the economic situation—the only part of the problem about which Russian officials and experts are allowed to argue—is clearly deteriorating (see EDM, July 7; Nezavisimaya gazeta, July 10; Riddle, July 18). The steel industry, for instance, continues to struggle in a protracted crisis, with production falling by approximately 18 percent in the second quarter after contracting by 8.6 percent in 2024. The accumulating losses have brought leading enterprises, such as the Magnitogorsk and Novolipetsk plants, to the brink of bankruptcy (The Moscow Times, July 17). The financial sector demands a reduction in the key interest rate and may receive another symbolic one from Russia’s inflation-wary Central Bank, but the rapidly expanding state budget deficit looms large over all attempts to find palliative solutions for particular sectors (The Bell, July 9; Re: Russia, July 15).

This economic weakness is targeted precisely by the 18th sanctions package approved by the European Union last Friday, which instantly became top news in Russia (Kommersant; Izvestiya, July 18). The key item in this package is the new price ceiling on Russian oil set at $47.6 per barrel, which is significantly lower than the previous mark of $60 per barrel and also lower than the usual discount of 10 percent from the benchmark Brent price, currently at about $70 per barrel (Vedomosti, July 19). Russian exporters now have to rely exclusively on the “shadow fleet” of tankers, but the European Union has added 105 ships to the list of 444 sea vessels banned from its ports and services, including insurance (see EDM, January 27; Neftegaz.ru, July 18). The Kremlin declared that Russia had become “immune” to sanctions, but a painful cut to the already curtailed revenues from oil export is forthcoming, while operations of the “shadow fleet” are set to become more complicated and expensive, particularly in the Baltic Sea (RIA Novosti, July 18; Forbes.ru, July 7).

Russian commentators emphasize that the long-debated EU move to tighten sanctions is not coordinated with the United States, as U.S. President Donald Trump has granted Moscow a 50-day respite for showing readiness to end the war (RIAC, July 18). No such readiness has been evident so far, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy agreed to send a team of negotiators for the third round of talks in Istanbul, primarily to expose this intransigence (NV.ua, July 18; RBC, July 19). Moscow pundits downplay the consequences of Trump’s “disappointment” with Putin, but the opening of new channels for the supply of U.S. weapons to Ukraine is definitely incompatible with Russian conditions for a ceasefire (Rossiiskaya gazeta, July 15).

The long war of attrition may deliver more surprises, and Putin’s confidence in controlling the strategic initiative could be shattered yet again. He relies more on the resignation and adaptability of the Russian polity than on a “patriotic” mobilization, but the gradual spread of tiredness with the war may suddenly turn into an explosion of discontent—and he knows from experience that the only certainty about such a swing of public mood is unpredictability. Fifty days is an entirely artificial timeframe for the war, which has already lasted 1,244 days, and one week out of seven, as earmarked by Trump, has already passed in the same mode. No reliable measure of the reserves of Russia’s endurance exists, but its progressing degradation in the course of the war of aggression makes this perseverance self-defeating.